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SUMMARY 
 
This thesis is a history of a hitherto unexplored dimension of Britain’s 
engagement with the post-war Middle East with a particular focus on 
intelligence and security aspects. More specifically, it examines the 
counter-subversive policies and measures conducted by the British 
Intelligence and Security Services, and Britain’s secret propaganda 
apparatus, the Information Research Department (IRD) of the Foreign 
Office, in Middle Eastern countries, such as Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Turkey, and Iran, during the period between 1949 and 1963. 
This thesis is also about intelligence liaison – the relationship between 
British Intelligence and Security Services and their Middle Eastern 
counterparts. This thesis argues that the British Empire declined between 
1949 and 1963; in this, intelligence was understood by British 
policymakers as a tool to maintain British influence and preserve British 
strategic and economic interests in the Middle East. The imperial drive 
derived from a mixture of strategic and economic interests in the region 
but it was Britain’s anti-Communist attitudes which were shared with 
Middle Eastern governments. This was the context in which intelligence 
liaison was established between Britain and Middle Eastern states on the 
basis of their common interests. Although Britain’s anti-Communist 
policy contributed to preventing the spread of Communist movements in 
the region, it sought to strengthen the repressive capability of Middle 
Eastern governments which undermined their own political position by 
their repressiveness. An unintended consequence was that the Middle 
Eastern governments conducted counter-subversion not only against 
Communists, but also their own people. This thesis concludes that 
Britain’s anti-Communist policy sustained British influence and British 
interests in the region in the short term, but failed to sustain its objectives 
in the long term. It demonstrates the importance of common interests in 
encouraging intelligence liaison and the significance of conflicting 
interests in restricting it. 
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There is no such thing as ‘friendly intelligence agencies’. There are only the intelligence 
agencies of friendly powers. 
- Henry A. Kissinger
1
 
 
This thesis is a history of a hitherto unexplored dimension of Britain’s engagement 
with the post-war Middle East with a particular focus on intelligence and security aspects. 
More specifically, it examines the counter-subversive policies and measures conducted by the 
British Intelligence and Security Services, and Britain’s secret propaganda apparatus, the 
Information Research Department (IRD) of the Foreign Office, in Middle Eastern countries, 
such as Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iran, during the period between 1949 and 
1963. Since counter-subversion in foreign countries inevitably entailed cooperation with local 
authorities, this thesis is also about intelligence liaison – the relationship between British 
Intelligence and Security Services and their Middle Eastern counterparts.  
In recent years, the ‘War on Terror’ has raised the public profile of British 
intelligence liaison with Middle Eastern governments.
2
 This is not a new phenomenon, 
however. Sir Stephen Lander, former Director-General of the Security Service, MI5, for 
instance, reminds us that the British Intelligence Services maintained a relationship with their 
Middle Eastern counterparts long before the ‘War on Terror’. 3  According to him, 
international intelligence cooperation is ‘something of an oxymoron’; while intelligence 
services serve national self-interest of individual states, they often cooperate with their 
foreign counterparts on their common interests.
4
 He also explains that intelligence liaison, in 
other words international intelligence cooperation, is not only intelligence sharing, but also 
has a variety of forms, including exchanges of ‘technical know-how’ and intelligence and 
security training. Such ‘operational collaboration’ happened ‘where there [was] a pressing 
                                                 
1
 Henry Kissinger was the National Security Advisor (1969-75) and the Secretary of State of the United States 
(1973-1977). Quoted from Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 3
rd
 ed. (Washington: CQ 
Press, 2006), p.146. 
2
 Documentary evidence of such dealings has been found in Tripoli as a result of the turmoil in Libya. Cf. 
Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Sir Mark Allen: the secret link between MI6, the CIA and Gaddafi’, The Guardian, 4 
Sep 2011, assessable on-line at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/04/mark-allen-mi6-libya-profile 
(accessed, 9 Sep 2013); Ian Cobain, Mustafa Khalili, and Mona Mahmood, ‘How MI6 deal sent family to 
Gaddafi’s jail’, ibid., 9 Sep 2011, accessible on-line at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/09/how-
mi6-family-gaddafi-jail (accessed, 9 Sep 2013); Nick Hopkins, ‘The Libya papers: a glimpse into the world of 
21
st
-century espionage’, ibid., 9 Sep 2011, accessible on-line at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/09/libya-papers-tripoli-mi6-cia (accessed, 9 Sep 2013).  
3
 Stephen Lander, ‘International Intelligence Cooperation: An Inside Perspective’, Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs, vol.17, no.3 (2004), pp.483-4, 489. 
4
 Ibid., p.481. 
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shared need that [went] beyond the capacity or capability of one country to address’.5 Indeed, 
this thesis shows that this was the context in which the British-Middle Eastern intelligence 
liaison developed in the Cold War. Yaacov Caroz, a former Deputy-Chief of the Israeli 
Intelligence Service, known as Mossad, also testified over three decades ago that the British 
Intelligence Services had been instrumental in developing the Arab security services.
6
  
The subject of intelligence liaison is a developing field but it remains one of the least 
studied subjects of Intelligence Studies. Len Scott and Peter Jackson once remarked in 2004 
that it is ‘a final ‘missing dimension’’ in the field.7 In recent years, some scholars have started 
to engage with the subject, especially in the context of the intelligence failure prior to the Iraq 
War in 2004 over the issue of the agent codenamed Curveball; and so-called ‘extraordinary 
rendition’ in the ‘War on Terror’.8 While there is a general discussion of how, when, and why 
a state cooperates with another through intelligence liaison, few studies, nevertheless, offer 
an adequate explanation on the basis of a rigorous historical analysis. On their respective 
case-studies on contemporary liaison, Stephane Lefebvre and Chris Clough both argue that 
trust is a necessary condition for intelligence liaison.
9
 James Walsh, however, suggests that it 
is not trust but a hierarchy that dictates intelligence cooperation.
10
 Jennifer Sims further 
suggests that an intelligence service ‘must penetrate its liaison partner to determine if losses 
are likely to exceed gains in the relationship’ ensuring that ‘the partner is not penetrated by a 
hostile third party’.11 One of the main problems of these existing studies is associated with 
their methodologies. Some of case-studies are theoretically driven – for instance, Jennifer 
Sims’s work is on the one hand framed in her neo-realist perspective on international politics 
that the international system is ‘inherently competitive and selective, even among allies’, 
because it is ‘essentially one of self-help and anarchy’;12 James Walsh’s case-studies, on the 
other hand, are based on ‘social scientific [deductive] approach’ to develop his ‘theoretical 
                                                 
5
 Ibid., p.492. 
6
 Yaacov Caroz, The Arab Secret Services (London: Corgi, 1978), p.13. 
7
 Len Scott and Peter Jackson, ‘Journeys in Shadows’, in Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First 
Century, edited by Len Scott and Peter Jackson (London: Routledge, 2004), pp.20-21. 
8
 Cf. James I. Walsh, The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2010); Simon Chesterman, Shared Secrets (New South Wales, Australia: Lowy Institute, 2006); Stephane 
Lefebvre, ‘the Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation’, IJIC, vol.16, no.4 (2003), 
pp.527-542; Jennifer Sims, ‘Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details’, IJIC, vol.19, no.2 (2006), 
pp.195-217. 
9
 Lefebvre, ‘The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation’; Chris Clough, ‘Quid Pro 
Quo: The Challenges of International Strategic Intelligence Cooperation’, IJIC, vol.17, no.4 (2004), pp.601-613. 
10
 Walsh, International Politics of Intelligence Sharing, p.14. 
11
 Sims, ‘Foreign Intelligence Liaison’, p.205. 
12
 Ibid., p.196. 
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argument’.13  The following thesis seeks to contribute to these discussions and offers an 
insight into intelligence liaison from the case-studies of Britain’s engagement with the post-
war Middle East. 
The following thesis is not only a case-study of intelligence liaison, however. The 
significance of Britain’s counter-subversion policy and its counter-subversive measures in the 
Middle East cannot be underestimated. As Bernard Porter once remarked on the role of MI5 
in the domestic context, ‘without it [counter-subversion] we would be a very different 
country from what we are today’.14 His remark is also applicable to the Middle Eastern 
context. As Communist Parties were largely prohibited in the Middle East, the Communist 
movements and influence in the region were less prominent throughout the Cold War.
15
 This 
was perhaps helped by the undemocratic characteristics of most Middle Eastern regimes, 
chiefly supported by strong domestic security forces which were central to the existence of 
these regimes.
16
 As this thesis demonstrates, a hidden connection was maintained through 
liaisons between British Intelligence and its Middle Eastern counterparts, and British anti-
Communist policy was behind the development of Middle Eastern security services, who also 
received training in counter-subversion from their British counterparts.  
Looking at a history of British counter-subversion in these Middle Eastern countries 
with particular focus on intelligence and security aspects gives new insights into our 
understanding of the past and present. Firstly, it is known that MI5 operated in the territories 
of the British Empire, but this thesis sheds new light on MI5’s activities overseas, outside the 
colonial territories in the Middle East. This may indeed seem rather contradictory as areas 
outside the British territories were normally considered to be the remit of Britain’s foreign 
intelligence service, the Secret Intelligence Service, also known as MI6.
17
 This thesis shows 
that MI5 was given responsibility to liaise with Middle Eastern governments, and 
demonstrates that MI5 and MI6 operated together in the region. Secondly, any historical 
                                                 
13
 Walsh, International Politics of Intelligence Sharing, p.26. 
14
 Bernard Porter, Plots and Paranoia (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), p.vii. He referred  to counter-subversive 
activities as ‘domestic espionage’, but what he meant was counter-subversion. 
15
 Cf. Walter Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1956); Tareq Ismael, The Communist Movement in the Arab World (London: Routledge, 2005). 
16
 Cf. Caroz, The Arab Secret Services, pp.1-19. 
17
 The demarcation of the jurisdictions between MI5 and MI6 was defined by the Attlee Directive of 1948. Cf. 
Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm: the Authorized History of MI5 (London: Allen Lane, 2009), 
pp.442-443; Tom Bower, The Perfect English Spy (London: Heinemann, 1995), pp.219-20; Stephen Dorril, 
MI6: inside the covert world of her Majesty’s Secret Intelligence Service (London: Free Press, 2000), p.31; 
Keith Jeffery, MI6: the History of the Secret Intelligence Service, 1909-1949 (London: Bloomsbury, 2010), 
pp.638-9; Calder Walton, Empire of Secrets (London: HarperCollins, 2013), pp.23-24.  
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enquiry into British intelligence liaison with its Middle Eastern counterparts also requires an 
analysis of Middle Eastern intelligence and security services. The relationship was based on 
different political systems – between democratic and non-democratic governments, which 
also reflected differences between Britain and Middle Eastern countries in political and 
cultural values, and operational conditions, in counter-subversion. This element of the thesis 
adds a non-Western dimension to the existing literature.
18
  
Thirdly, this thesis contributes to the rather thin literature on the subject of 
intelligence liaison. As Sir Stephen Lander noted, intelligence liaison was just synonymous 
not only intelligence sharing, but also included other forms of cooperation. The thesis 
explores the nature of the British-Middle Eastern intelligence liaison, its efficacy and 
limitations, and the role of bilateral and multilateral intelligence liaisons in the region during 
the period. In addition, it offers another aspect of intelligence liaison – liaison as the means of 
influencing the policy of a foreign government. The thesis thus explores the extent to which 
Britain was able to influence the policies of Middle Eastern governments in favour of its own 
national interests through clandestine means. Finally, this hitherto unexplored aspect also 
resonates with contemporary issues surrounding human rights abuses by Middle Eastern 
governments, and Britain’s alleged complicity in human rights abuse.19 This thesis discusses 
the extent to which British Intelligence was involved in such misconduct by its Middle 
Eastern counterparts at the time, and how Britain saw the actions conducted by Middle 
Eastern governments in the name of anti-Communist counter-measures, including torture of 
political prisoners.    
It is necessary to explain the use and meaning of the phrase ‘informal empire’ in the 
Middle East in the title of this thesis. The term ‘informal empire’, as opposed to ‘formal 
empire’, involves countries outside of the colonial administration of the British Empire.20 It 
                                                 
18
 The field of Intelligence Studies has been dominated by Western perspectives, but recently non-Western 
perspectives are emerging. See Philip Davies and Kristian Gustafson (eds.), Intelligence Elsewhere 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2013); Rob Dover, Michael Goodman and Claudia 
Hillebrand (eds.), Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies (London: Routledge, 2014), part iv. But more 
than two decades ago, there was also a comparative study on intelligence organisations, including Japanese and 
Chinese ones, see Jeffrey Richelson, Foreign Intelligence Organizations (Cambridge, US: Ballinger, 1988). 
19
 On Britain’s (alleged) complicity in human rights abuse, cf. Mark Townsend, ‘Ex-MI6 officer joins 
Guantanamo inmate in hunger strike’, The Observer, 10 Aug 2013, accessible on-line at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/10/mi6-officer-guantanamo-hunger-strike (accessed on 9 Sep 
2013). 
20
 The terms are generally used by imperial historians and have long been at the centre of debates about its 
meaning since the 1950s. Cf. John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, The 
Economic History Review, vol.6, no.1 (1953), pp.1-15; Wm. Roger Louis (ed), Imperialism: The Robinson and 
Gallagher Controversy (London: New Viewpoints, 1976). 
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also connotes the notion of imperialism, and influence over subordinate states, without the 
formal status as a colonial territory.
21
 The Middle East in the post-war period consisted of 
both colonial territories (Cyprus, Aden Colony, the Palestine Mandate, and the Persian Gulf) 
and foreign countries. Britain’s interactions with those non-colonial Middle Eastern 
countries, and her desire to influence the policy of these countries, have sometimes been 
referred to by imperial historians to as Britain’s ‘informal empire’ in the Middle East.22 This 
thesis thus addresses Britain’s engagement in these non-colonial territories of the British 
Empire in the Middle East.  
Intelligence, Security and Subversion 
The term intelligence is a vague concept.
23
 For Sherman Kent, a leading figure of 
American intelligence analysts, it denotes three distinctive meanings: intelligence as ‘a kind 
of knowledge’, ‘the type of organisation which produces the knowledge’, and ‘the activity 
pursued by the intelligence organization’.24 In addition, it is used and applied differently from 
one country to another.
25
 According to one definition, intelligence is ‘a means for public 
policy to ensure security’.26 More precisely, the term comprises ‘that which states do in secret 
to support their efforts to mitigate, influence, or merely understand other nations (or various 
enemies) that could harm them’.27 It thus implies that the term intelligence can refer to 
intelligence as information for governmental knowledge, and also intelligence as activities 
                                                 
21
 Yoav Alon, ‘Historiography of Empire: the Literature on Britain in the Middle East’, in Britain and the 
Middle East: From Imperial Power to Junior Partner, edited by Zach Levey et al. (Brighton: Sussex Academic 
Press, 2008), pp.34-35. 
22
 A reference to the ‘informal’ empire: cf. Alon, ‘Historiography of Empire: the Literature on Britain in the 
Middle East’, pp.33-47; Glen Balfour-Paul, ‘Britain’s Informal Empire in the Middle East’, in The Oxford 
History of the British Empire: vol.IV, the Twentieth Century, edited by Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis 
(Oxford: OUP, 1999), pp.490-514; John Darwin, ‘An Undeclared Empire: the British in the Middle East, 1918-
39’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol.27, no.2 (1999), pp.159-176; Peter Sluglett, ‘Formal 
and Informal Empire in the Middle East’, in The Oxford History of the British Empire: vol.V, Historiography, 
edited by Robin W. Winks (Oxford: OUP, 1999), pp.416-436. 
23
 Cf. Michael Warner, ‘Wanted: A Definition of “Intelligence”’, Studies in Intelligence, vol.46 (2002), pp.15-
22. 
24
 Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1949), p.ix. 
25
 Cf. Michael Goodman, ‘The British Way in Intelligence’, in The British Way in Cold Warfare: Intelligence, 
Diplomacy and the Bomb, 1945-1975, edited by Matthew Grant (London: Continuum, 2009), pp.127-140; Philip 
H.J. Davies, ‘Idea of Intelligence: Divergent Concepts and National Institutions’, Harvard International Review, 
vol.24, no.3 (2002), pp.62-66; and also K.G. Robertson (ed.), British and American Approaches to Intelligence 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987). 
26
 Rob Dover et al., Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies, p.xvi. 
27
 Michal Warner quoted in ibid. 
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associated with intelligence organisations – collection, analysis and even clandestine political 
actions – to ensure security.28 Similarly, the term security is also an elusive concept and has 
been the subject of academic attention from various fields.
29
 In this thesis, however, security 
is frequently used to describe the activities commonly associated with MI5. In the realm of 
MI5’s activities, it refers to both information (such as security intelligence, including counter-
intelligence/espionage and counter-subversion) and certain activities (such as protective 
security, including security vetting and physical security – access to secret information or 
documents).
30
 In this regard, the terms intelligence and security overlap – this is particularly 
the case as the terms relate to different organisations. For instance, both MI6 and MI5 
maintain their own counter-intelligence functions. To avoid duplication of work, and 
confused jurisdiction, a demarcation line was drawn by the Attlee Directive (also known as 
the ‘Attlee Doctrine’) of 1948 – wherein MI5 would maintain authority for imperial security 
through the British Empire and Commonwealth, while MI6 would operate in foreign 
countries outside them.
31
 However, while the Attlee Doctrine was about geographical 
division of responsibility, functions were performed by both as in counter-espionage. In order 
to minimise these conceptual and terminological confusions, the terms, intelligence and 
security, are selectively and carefully used throughout the thesis. Specific terms, such as 
counter-espionage, counter-subversion, and protective security, are also referred to in their 
specific context, rather than employing the umbrella term security. In addition, in this thesis, 
the term intelligence does not refer to the specific activities of MI6, clandestine political 
actions, also known as special political actions. 
The subject of counter-subversion is understudied in the literature, and the term itself 
also needs some clarification. It is sometimes treated as an area of irregular warfare and the 
term is often interchangeably used with counter-insurgency in the literature.
32
 According to 
Frank Kitson, a first-hand practitioner as well as classic theorist in the field of counter-
insurgencies, the term subversion means ‘all measures short of the use of armed force taken 
by one section of the people of a country to overthrow those governing the country at the 
                                                 
28
 See an insider’s point of view, John Bruce Lockhart, ‘Intelligence: a British View’, in British and American 
Approaches to Intelligence, pp.37-52. 
29
 Cf. Ken Booth (ed.), Critical Security Studies and World Politics (London: Lynne Rienner, 2005); Ronnie 
Lipschutz (ed), On Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); and David Baldwin, ‘The concept of 
security’, Review of International Studies, vol.23 (1997), pp.5-26. 
30
 Lockhart, ‘Intelligence: a British View’, pp.41-46. 
31
 See Note 17 above. 
32
 Cf. Ian F.W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies (London: Routledge, 2001). 
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time, or to force them to do things which they do not want to do’.33 It may include the use of 
political and economic pressure, strikes, protest marches, propaganda, and ‘the use of small-
scale violence for the purpose of coercing recalcitrant members of the population into giving 
support’. 34  The term counter-subversion means counter-measures by the rulers of the 
government against such activities. Kitson, who differentiates between subversion and 
insurgency, also offers a useful distinction – insurgency covers ‘the use of armed force by a 
section of the people against the government’, whereas subversion means ‘all measures short 
of the use of armed force’ to overthrow the rulers of the government.35 This distinction was 
indeed made by the British Government and used in this way during the period. In this thesis, 
therefore, counter-subversion precludes any military conflicts involving the use of armed 
force against subversive elements.  
Propaganda was also an integral part of both subversion and counter-subversion. 
According to the definition of propaganda by Jowett and O’Donnell, it is ‘the deliberate and 
systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to 
achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist’.36 Propaganda was 
extensively used both by subversive elements against political authorities and by the 
authorities reacting against the subversive elements.
37
 The terms propaganda and 
psychological warfare can often be used synonymously in a similar context. According to 
Philip Taylor, psychological warfare is normally used in times of war and is particularly 
associated with the activities of military services.
38
 The British Government also 
distinguished these terms – while the use of the term propaganda was mostly associated with 
the activities of the IRD under the direction of foreign policy, the term psychological warfare 
was used by military forces mostly in counter-insurgency campaigns, which was defined as 
‘the planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions in support of military 
                                                 
33
 Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1971), p.3. 
34
 Ibid.  
35
 Ibid.  
36
 Garth Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell (eds.), Reading in Propaganda and Persuasion: News and Classic 
Essays (London: SAGE, 2006), pp.ix-xv. 
37
 Cf. Ian Greig, Subversion: Propaganda, Agitation and the Spread of People’s War (London: Tom Stacey, 
1973); Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, pp.1-10. 
38
 Philip Taylor, ‘Psychological Warfare’, in Propaganda and Mass Persuasion, edited by Nicholas Cull, David 
Culbert and David Welch (Oxford: ABC Clio, 2003), pp.323-327.  
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operations’. 39  Thus, instead of psychological warfare, the term propaganda is used 
throughout the thesis. 
The term counter-subversion connotes an action of a political authority to counter 
anti-governmental activities of individuals or groups. The meaning is thus political in nature, 
which makes it inherently subjective. As a result, a recurrent theme throughout the thesis is 
that the term was understood and applied differently by Britain and Middle Eastern 
governments. For the British it was primarily directed against Communist activities and, to a 
lesser extent, radical anti-British nationalist movements in the region, whereas for Middle 
Eastern governments it was against any anti-governmental political activities. The difference 
becomes more apparent in applying counter-subversion by propaganda. For the British, the 
purpose of propaganda was essentially to broadcast and publicise information to expose the 
methods and tactics of Communist subversive propaganda.
40
 Counter-subversion was purely 
seen as a defensive concept to counter or prevent subversive propaganda activities in the 
region.  
However, the regional members of the Baghdad Pact (Iraq, Turkey, Iran and 
Pakistan), for instance, adopted a more aggressive definition: they considered that aggressive 
counter-subversion would be necessary to eradicate the threats coming from outside the Pact 
area, not only the Soviet Union, but also Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
41
 In addition, the term 
counter-subversion was above all understood by the regional members as dealing with 
subversive elements ‘by locking them up’.42  Moreover, owing to the subjectivity of the 
meaning, the demarcation line between subversive elements and anti-British sentiment was 
also a cause of confusion even among MI5 officers in the region, who were responsible for 
counter-subversion but found it difficult to distinguish between anti-British nationalist 
                                                 
39
 The National Archives, London (hereafter TNA): Public Record Office (hereafter PRO) FO1110/1102: PSW 
(57) 2: draft report of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, ‘interdepartmental working party on psychological 
warfare: psychological warfare requirements in limited war and police actions’, 20 Jan 1958. Also see Cf. TNA: 
PRO DEFE28/74, entitled ‘Psychological Warfare’, c. 1958. 
40
 Note that the purpose of propaganda was essentially a reaction to Communist propaganda and to dispel an 
illusion about the Soviet Union as a ‘workers’ paradise’ throughout the world by the exposure of the reality in 
the Soviet Union and Communist bloc. See Christopher Mayhew, A War of Words: A Cold War Witness (I.B. 
Tauris: London, 1998), pp.14-47. Sir Roger Stevens, the British Ambassador in Tehran (1954-58), who saw 
‘Communist propaganda’ undermining ‘morale and confidence’ of the Baghdad Pact countries by twisting ‘the 
truth’, once noted in 1956 that ‘truth must be told and people should have a correct view of events and policies’.  
Quoted from TNA: PRO FO371/121283: V10710/8: telegram by Sir Roger Stevens, Tehran, to FO, 5 Apr 1956. 
41
 Egypt and Saudi Arabia became secretly but actively involved in subversive activities in the region, including 
Jordan, Lebanon and the Pact countries. Cf. TNA: PRO FO371/121287: V10710/75G: letter by Gordon 
Waterfield, Ankara, to P.G.D. Adams, Beirut, 28 Jun 1956.  
42
 TNA: PRO FO371/121283: V10710/28: letter by P.G.D. Adams, Beirut, to FO, 10 May 1956. 
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movements and legitimate anti-British governments.
43
 Thus, owing to the inherent nature of 
the term itself, counter-subversion connotes both offensive and defensive meanings. 
Although the term is sometimes interchangeably used, and it was used during the period as 
such, it is hoped that the contexts make the meanings clear throughout the thesis.  
The core forms of counter-subversive activities to be addressed in this thesis thus 
exclude the activities associated with military forces, but constitute the following activities; 
policing, intelligence-sharing, protective security, security training, special political action 
(so-called covert action), and propaganda, all of which were pursued and clandestinely 
implemented through MI5, MI6, and the IRD. This thesis thus rules out the activities of all 
military agencies, including the Directorate of Forward Plans, the post-war deception 
organisation within the Ministry of Defence.
44
 However, these services (MI5, MI6 and the 
IRD) had different roles in counter-subversion, some of which overlapped and some of which 
were incompatible. MI5 was responsible for defensive counter-subversive activities, such as 
protective security and security training. Similarly, the IRD exclusively conducted 
propaganda campaigns. MI5 and the IRD did not engage in special political action, such as 
paramilitary operations and overthrowing a foreign government by clandestine means, for 
which MI6 was responsible. These services were engaged in different degrees of intelligence-
sharing with local authorities. As the thesis shows, these defensive and offensive counter-
subversive activities could also be incompatible with one another. In some conceptual 
frameworks, propaganda is a sub-category of covert action.
45
 The use of the term covert 
action is avoided in the thesis unless necessary.  
Literature Review 
The subject of Britain in the Middle East in the post-war period has long caught 
attention from different strands of scholarship. The literature offers a range of geographical 
                                                 
43
 TNA: PRO KV4/238: Pol.F.1001/1/H.S.: report, ‘SIME Record Note’, by W.M.T. Magan to R.W.G. 
Stephens, 28 Apr 1951. 
44
 Deception operations can be considered part of counter-subversion, and the Directorate of Forward Plans 
(DFP) certainly operated with MI5, MI6, and the IRD. See Richard Aldrich (ed.), Espionage, Security and 
Intelligence in Britain, 1945-1970 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), pp.229-231. Also see 
TNA: PRO CAB121/110: JP (50) 67 (final): report by the Joint Planning Staff ‘London Controlling Section’, 2 
Jun 1950, which stipulates that the DFP ‘will maintain close liaison with the Foreign Office, MI5, MI6 and 
other government organisations and departments’.   
45
 Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence, 3
rd
 ed. 
(Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Book, 2002), pp.75-97; Lowenthal, Intelligence, pp.162-165. 
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focuses and themes. Diplomatic historians have paid attention to the non-colonial territories 
of the British Empire in the region in the Cold War context, but mostly regarding regional 
crises, such as the Suez Crisis in 1956 and the Iraqi Revolution in 1958, or histories of a 
specific country.
46
 Imperial historians, however, tend to overlook the significance of the 
region in post-war British imperial strategy after the end of the Palestine Mandate in 1948 as 
they often see the region in the context of wider British decolonisation.
47
 Historians of the 
Middle East mostly ignore the connections with Britain especially in the post-war period.
48
 
Some works on the importance of the Cold War to post-war British imperial strategy have 
suggested that these Cold War and End of Empire historiographies overlap.
49
 Military 
historians have studied Britain’s post-war defence strategy in the context of the Cold War in 
the region, which has been described by Wm. Roger Louis as ‘a region honeycombed with 
British military installations’.50 Indeed, the British military presence in the region has also 
attracted historians, who have produced a wealth of studies on British counter-insurgency 
                                                 
46
 Cf. Keith Kyle, Suez: Britain’s End of Empire in the Middle East (London: St Martins Pr, 1991); W. Scott 
Lucas, Divided We Stand: Britain, the US and the Suez Crisis (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991); Saul Kelly 
and Anthony Gorst (eds.), Whitehall and the Suez Crisis (London: Frank Cass, 2000); Wm. Roger Louis and 
Roger Owen (eds.), Suez 1956: the crisis and its consequences (Oxford: OUP, 1989); Wm. Roger Louis and 
Roger Owen (eds.), A Revolutionary Year: the Middle East in 1958 (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2002); Robert A. 
Ferrea and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.), The Iraqi Revolution of 1958 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991); Nigel J. Ashton, 
Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser (London: Macmillan, 1996). 
47
 Cf. John Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation (London: Macmillan, 1988); idem, The End of the British 
Empire: historical debate (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991); Robert Holland, The Pursuit of Greatness (London: 
Fontana, 1991); Paul Kennedy, The Realities behind Diplomacy (London: Fontana, 1985); David Reynolds, 
Britannia Overruled (London & New York: Longman, 1991); Bernard Porter, The Lion’s Share, 4th ed (London 
& New York: Longman, 2004); Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire (Cambridge: CUP, 2006). 
48
 This has been addressed by a number of scholars. Cf. Alon, ‘Historiography of Empire’, pp.33-34; Sluglett, 
‘Formal and Informal Empire in the Middle East’, pp.422-423. 
49
 See Rory Cormac, Confronting the Colonies: British Intelligence and Counterinsurgency (London: Hurst, 
2013); Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon, Imperial Endgame (Palgrave Macmillan: London, 2011); and Wm. Roger 
Louis and Ronald Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Decolonization’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History, vol.22, no.3 (1994), pp.462-511. Some exceptional studies are Wm. Roger Louis, The British Empire in 
the Middle East, 1945-1951 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); John Kent, British Imperial Strategy and the 
Origins of the Cold War 1944-49 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993); Zach Levey and Elie Podeh 
(eds.), Britain and the Middle East: from Imperial Power to Junior Partner (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 
2008). 
50
 Quoted from Louis, British Empire in the Middle East, p.10. Cf. Kent, British Imperial Strategy and the 
Origins of the Cold War; Michael J. Cohen, ‘The strategic role of the Middle East after the war’, in Demise of 
the British Empire in the Middle East, edited by Michael J. Cohen and Martin Kolinsky (London: Frank Cass, 
1998), pp.23-37; Anthony Gorst, “We must cut our coat according to our cloth’: the making of British defence 
policy, 1945-8’, in British Intelligence, Strategy & the Cold War, 1945-51, edited by Richard J. Aldrich 
(London: Routledge, 1992), pp.143-163. On the importance of Egyptian base, see John Kent, ‘The Egyptian 
Base and the Defence of the Middle East, 1945-54’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol.21, 
no.3 (1993), pp.45-65. On the convergence of the Anglo-American strategic (offensive) interests, and 
subsequent the formation of the Baghdad Pact, see: Michael J. Cohen, Fighting World War Three from the 
Middle East (London: Frank Cass, 1997); idem, ‘From ‘Cold’ to ‘Hot’ War: Allied Strategic and Military 
Interests in the Middle East after the Second World War’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol.43, no.5 (2007), pp.725-
748. 
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campaigns in the colonial territories, such as the Palestine Mandate, Cyprus and the Aden 
Colony.
51
 
These existing literatures make clear that Britain had vast defence, economic, imperial 
interests in the Middle East in the post-war period, and the defence of the region was indeed 
regarded as one of the pillars of British post-war strategy in the case of war against the Soviet 
Union. The retention of the region was considered necessary for several reasons, namely 
strategic bomber bases for attacking on the Soviet Union; communicating with the 
Commonwealth and Colonies; and its natural resources, vital for fighting wars as well as the 
recovery of the post-war British economy. As a result, the Chiefs of Staff thought that the 
integrity of the region was essential to this strategy. Despite Prime Minister Clement Attlee’s 
attempt to retreat from the region, it was Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, ‘the architect of 
Britain’s imperial strategy’, who dominated the government in the formulation of foreign and 
defence policy and firmly accorded with the line of the Chiefs of Staff.
 52
  This was also 
endorsed by the Permanent Under-Secretary to Bevin, Sir William Strang.
53
 The culmination 
of the British preoccupation with maintaining its influence in the region can be seen in the 
Suez Crisis, where Prime Minister Anthony Eden’s personal endeavour against Egyptian 
                                                 
51
 On the counter-insurgency campaign in Palestine, for instance, cf.: David Charters, The British Army and 
Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945-47 (London: Macmillan, 1989); idem, ‘British Intelligence in the Palestine 
Campaign, 1945-47.’ Intelligence and National Security (hereafter INS), vol.6, no.1 (1991), pp.115-140. On her 
colonial, foreign, and defence policies in South Arabia, cf. Peter Hinchcliffe, John T. Ducker and Maria Holt, 
Without Glory in Arabia (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006); Spencer Mawby, ‘The “Big Lie” and the “Great 
Betrayal”: Explaining the British Collapse in Aden’ in The Cold War in the Middle East, edited by N. Ashton 
(London: Routledge, 2007), pp.167-187; Simon Smith, Britain’s Revival and Fall in the Gulf (London: 
Routledge, 2004). On the “special operations”, Clive Jones, Britain and The Yemen Civil War 1962-65: Foreign 
Policy and the Limits of Covert Action (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2004); Spencer Mawby, ‘The 
Clandestine Defence of Empire: British Special Operations in Yemen 1951-64’, INS, vol.17, no.3 (2002), 
pp.105-30. On counter-insurgency campaigns in Cyprus, Panagiotis Dimitrakis, ‘British Intelligence and the 
Cyprus Insurgency, 1955-1959’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (hereafter IJIC), 
vol.21, no.2 (2008), pp.375-94. Note that although the studies on counter-insurgency campaigns address 
intelligence and security issues, their prime focus on military-led campaigns inevitably precludes rigorous 
discussion of political intelligence. The point about ‘missing dimension’ in the studies on counter-insurgencies 
was firstly raised by Richard Popplewell. See, idem, “Lacking Intelligence’: some reflections on recent 
approaches to British counter-insurgency, 1900-1960’, INS, vol.10, no.2 (1995), pp.336-352. See also Walton, 
Empire of Secrets, pp.xi-xxxii.    
52
 Quoted from Kent, British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War, p.2. Note that the Prime 
Minister Clement Attlee, a ‘committed internationalist, actively opposed a military strategy based on the 
traditional imperial pattern’, also acknowledged that foreign affairs including Commonwealth or colonial affairs, 
economic policy and defence were Bevin’s sphere and it would be ‘a mistake to intervene personally’. See 
Raymond Smith and John Zametica, ‘The Cold Warrior: Clement Attlee reconsidered, 1945-7’. International 
Affairs vol.61, no.2 (1985), pp.237, 251. Also see Clement Attlee, As It Happened (London: William 
Heinemann, 1954), p.169; Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945-1951 (London: W.W. Norton, 
1983), pp.215, 399.  
53Richie Ovendale, ‘William Strang and the Permanent Under-Secretary’s Committee’, in British Officials and 
British Foreign Policy 1945-50, edited by John Zametica (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1990), p.217. 
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leader Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser included collusion with France and Israel.
54
 Some so-
called ‘revisionist’ historians have suggested that the Iraqi Revolution in July 1958 had a far 
larger impact on Britain’s position and its influence in the region.55  
Despite the exhaustive literature on Britain’s engagement with the post-war Middle 
East, the subject of counter-subversion is considered marginal in the scholarship on post-war 
British history. To illustrate the point, the series of Documents on British Policy Overseas 
and British Documents on the End of Empire, for instance, contain no reference at all to 
British counter-subversion policy overseas.
56
 One of the main policy-making bodies of 
British post-war counter-subversive activities overseas, including in foreign and colonial 
territories, was in fact established in late 1949, named the Official Committee on 
Communism (Overseas), also known as the AC (O) Committee. However, the collection 
edited by Ronald Hyam, which covers not only colonial matters but also the defence of the 
Middle East from 1945 to 1951, contains no reference at all to the existence of the AC (O) 
Committee.
57
 This is somehow understandable: the declassification process of the first batch 
of the records on the AC (O) Committee only began in October 2010 – over six decades after 
the establishment of the committee.
58
  
The British government, however, was far more concerned with subversive activities 
not only in domestic contexts, but also in foreign and colonial territories against British 
interests overseas. A declassified record of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) of 1958, 
for instance, viewed ‘subversive threats’ to ‘British interests throughout the world’ as the 
highest priority intelligence targets, together with a strategic nuclear attack by the Soviet 
Union against Great Britain.
59
 However, this is not reflected at all in the collection edited by 
                                                 
54
 On the Suez Crisis, cf. Kyle, Suez; and Lucas, Divided We Stand.  
55
 For a “classical” or “traditional” account: Elizabeth Monroe, Britain’s Moment in the Middle East, 1914-1971 
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1981). A “revisionist” account is provided by: Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan and 
the Problem of Nasser; and Robert McNamara, Britain, Nasser and the Balance of Power in the Middle East 
1952-1967 (London: Frank Cass, 2003). 
56
 Except one document, TNA: PRO CO968/353: no.37: extract, ‘Communist literature in the colonies: minutes 
of the Official Committee on Communism’, 24 Sep 1952, in the volume of David Goldsworthy (ed.), British 
Documents on the End of Empire: The Conservative Government and the End of Empire, 1951-1957: Part I: 
International Relations (London: HMSO, 1994), pp.25-26. The lack of any intelligence related materials in the 
series British Documents on the End of Empire has been mentioned by Philip Murphy, ‘Intelligence and 
Decolonization: The Life and Death of the Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau, 1954-63’, The Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol.29, no.2 (2001), p.101. 
57
 Ronald Hyam (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire: The Labour Government and the End of 
Empire, 1945-1951: Part III: Strategy, Politics and Constitutional Change (London: HMSO, 1992), Doc. No. 
273-282. 
58
 E.g. amongst a few, the first batch of the declassified records were PRO CAB134/2-4.  
59
 TNA: PRO CAB158/33: JIC (58) 72 (Final): report by the Joint Intelligence Committee, ‘Intelligence 
Targets’, 21 Nov 1958. 
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Ronald Hyam and Wm. Roger Louis, which covers the period between 1957 and 1964.
60
 This 
is perhaps owing to a lack of attention to intelligence, even though a close examination of 
intelligence targets can reveal the priorities of British concerns at a time.
61
 
In spite of the lack of scholarly attention to the subject, there are indeed like-minded 
scholars who have worked on counter-subversive measures implemented by the British 
Government. Some have identified the importance of MI5, and law enforcement activities, 
for instance, during the Second World War, when any subversive elements, mostly aliens or 
immigrants associated with the Axis powers, were detained without trial under Defence 
Regulation 18B.
62
 In the post-war period, when serious academic work on maintaining 
internal security in Britain was seldom carried out, Bernard Porter’s book, Plots and 
Paranoia, was a pioneering study outlining MI5’s activities in Britain (before the publication 
of the authorised history of MI5 by Christopher Andrew in 2009).
63
 In the imperial dimension, 
based on declassified records of MI5 and the Colonial Office, Calder Walton has recently 
demonstrated in his book, Empire of Secrets, the existence of MI5’s connections with 
colonial policing in the context of British decolonisation. He has argued that MI5 was above 
all successful in maintaining British influence through its own liaison officers with local 
authorities even after the independence of the Colonies.
64
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Dilks (ed.), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan 1938-1945 (London: Cassell, 1971), p.21. This was then 
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‘Introduction’, in The Missing Dimension, edited by idem. (Urbana & Chicago: University Illinois Press, 1984), 
pp.1-16. 
62
 A.W. Brian Simpson, In the Highest Degree Odious: Detention without Trial in Wartime Britain (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1992); Richard Thurlow, The Secret State (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). And also F.H. Hinsley and 
C.A.G. Simkins, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol.4: Security and Counter-Intelligence 
(London: HMSO, 1990). 
63
 Porter, Plots and Paranoia. Also see Mark Hollingsworth and Richard Norton-Taylor, Blacklist: the Inside 
Story of Political Vetting (Hogarth: London, 1988); Peter Hennessy and Gail Brownfield, ‘Britain’s Cold War 
Security Purge: the origins of positive vetting’, Historical Journal, vol.25, no.4 (1982), pp.965-973. 
64
 Walton, Empire of Secrets, pp.334-339. Also see David Anderson & David Killingray (eds.), Policing and 
Decolonisation: Politics, Nationalism, and the Police, 1917-65 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1992); Richard J. Popplewell, Intelligence and Imperial Defence (London: Frank Cass, 1995); Martin Thomas, 
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While there is no comprehensive work on counter-subversion, there is literature on 
the propaganda campaigns conducted by the British Government in the Cold War. Since the 
end of the Cold War, the release of records on the IRD has caught scholarly attention as a 
covert instrument of anti-Communist British foreign and colonial policy.
65
 Concerning the 
Middle Eastern context, there is work by James Vaughan on the development of British 
propaganda policy towards the region and its activities in the early Cold War until 1957. His 
central thesis was mainly that Britain and the United States failed to influence the population 
in the region in favour of the West.
66
 Johan Franzen follows Vaughan’s thesis and argues that 
the Iraqi Revolution was largely the result of failed British propaganda efforts.
67
 
The literature on the activities associated with Britain’s Intelligence Services, such as 
MI5, MI6, and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), in the region is very 
slim. While there is some literature which indicates that MI5 operated in the post-war Middle 
East, there is no serious academic study on this aspect.
68
 The authorised history of MI5 only 
covers the Colonies in the region, such as the Palestine Mandate, Cyprus and the Aden 
Colony.
69
 There are a few academic works on MI6’s special political action.70 A notable such 
                                                                                                                                                        
Intelligence: Security Service and Colonial Disorder after 1914 (London and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 2008). 
65
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Defectors, 1945-1952’, The International History Review, vol.9, no.1 (1987), pp.48-72; and Philip Deery, 
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Department, 1948-50’, Labour History, vol.73 (1997), pp.219-225. On the colonial territories, Susan L. 
Carruthers, Winning Hearts and Minds: British Governments, the Media and Colonial Counter-Insurgency, 
1944-60 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1995). 
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pp.157-172; idem, “A Certain Idea of Britain’: British Cultural Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1945-57’, 
Contemporary British History, vol.19, no.2 (2005), pp.151-168.  
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 21 
 
 
case is the coup in Iran in August 1953, which MI6 orchestrated with its American 
counterparts.
71
 Richard Aldrich’s recent book on the GCHQ contains a section on the Middle 
East, though it is arguable whether the GCHQ had a role in counter-subversion.
72
 On the 
subject of intelligence liaison, the literature is even thinner.
73
 As the subject concerning the 
Middle East has also been dominated by the theme of the UK-US special intelligence 
relationship, there is no academic work on British-Middle Eastern intelligence liaison.
74
  
A Historical Enquiry into State Secrets 
An enquiry into state secrets inevitably faces methodological hurdles. This is no 
exception to a history of British Intelligence, especially after the Second World War. Despite 
positive developments since the Waldegrave initiative on Open Government in 1992 – 
including the recently released files from the Permanent Under-Secretary’s Department 
(PUSD), which included some aspects of MI6’s work at the time as the PUSD liaised with 
MI6, access to the sources remains limited: not all intelligence records have been made 
available to the public.
 75
 MI6 maintains its official policy of ‘not releasing its records into the 
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public domain’ and withholds its own archives. 76  Similarly, GCHQ, Britain’s largest 
intelligence organisation, has only partially opened its own records to the public domain, 
most of which predate the Cold War.
77
 Above all, the intelligence record is by no means 
complete. Richard Aldrich reminds us that archived intelligence records which are to be 
exposed to public scrutiny are inevitably selective, and some parts are redacted in the 
declassification process.
78
 Moreover, those records kept for permanent preservation made up 
merely 2 per cent of the official records, and the rest of them were destroyed before being 
scrutinised by historians.
79
 Besides these limitations, the records concerning the subject of the 
thesis are incomplete in many other ways, largely due to the fact that, for instance, the 
majority of the records concerning Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME), the regional 
headquarters of MI5 in the Middle East, did not survive at all.
80
 Nearly all SIME files were 
destroyed in the course of the reorganisation process in the mid-1950s even before its closure 
in 1958, although some of the relevant counter-intelligence records were passed onto MI6 for 
continued use.
81
  
In addition, another difficulty is that owing to ‘over-classification’ of intelligence 
records, beyond the 20 years rule (of course 30 years rule until 1 August 2013), it is nearly 
impossible to construct an oral history as the people concerned with the subject had mostly 
passed away by the time the records were declassified. In the course of this doctoral research 
(2009-2013), a number of officers who were involved in the subject have been identified. 
One of the key officers was Brigadier William Magan, Head of SIME (1947-1952) and also a 
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vol.CXIX, no.483 (2004), pp.922-953. 
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the records of the latter category are yet to be released into the public domain. 
 23 
 
 
long-career MI5 officer, who passed away at the age of a hundred-and-one in January 2010.
82
 
In addition, despite the declassification of the records, there is a tendency on the part of the 
former intelligence/security officers, or even non-intelligence or security related officials of 
other departments, to be extremely reluctant to talk about their experiences to anyone, even 
their own family members.
83
 According to Christopher Andrew, this ‘attitude’ of many 
former intelligence/security officers who worked either for MI5 or MI6 in the 1940s/1950s 
makes the task of intelligence historians more difficult.
84
 As a result, the sources used 
throughout the thesis are inevitably documentary evidence, while indirect oral testimonies 
proved useful for background knowledge.  
The sensitivity of the subject matter is another hindrance. As subversion aims at 
overthrowing a government, it is directly related to an issue of national security. Any 
policies, or activities, to counter subversive threats can thus be very sensitive if a government 
resorts to any clandestine measures to counter the threats. It is notable, for example, that the 
existence of the aforementioned AC (O) Committee was kept secret even within the British 
government at the time, and knowledge of its activities was confined to a small circle of 
British officials on a “need to know” basis. Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, the Permanent Under-
Secretary of the Foreign Office (1953-57), once warned all his departments about the secrecy 
of the committee, so much so that even the name of the committee ‘should never be 
mentioned to posts abroad, and quotations from its minutes or papers should only be made 
after consultation with the OPS [Overseas Planning Section, sub-committee of the Official 
Committee on Communism (Overseas)]’ and that it should be referred to as the “ACO” 
Committee.
85
  
Bradford Westerfield, one of a few preeminent scholars on the subject of intelligence 
liaison, once remarked that the paucity of the literature on intelligence liaison reflected the 
fact that the subject is one of the most secret aspects of intelligence activity.
86
 It indicates that 
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Ray.html (accessed, 8 Sep 2013). 
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a historical enquiry on the subject of intelligence liaison may face more severe 
methodological challenges than other research projects on intelligence. His remark carries 
some weight. For instance, the records concerning the multilateral international 
intelligence/security cooperation between Britain and Middle Eastern states, namely the 
Liaison and Counter-Subversive Committees of the Baghdad Pact (later renamed Central 
Treaty Organisation), are largely limited due to the nature of the topic. The materials can only 
be found from FO371 series (the Political Department of the Foreign Office) but have been 
redacted in the declassification process. In addition, the delegation of the British Government 
to the Liaison Committee was from MI5, which has no intention of disclosing its records on 
the subject.
87
  
Rigorous multi-archival research may have fruitful results, for instance, on the other 
side of the Atlantic, but as the US delegation team was mostly headed by CIA officers, and as 
it remained an ‘observer’ in the Pact, documentary evidence is very sketchy. Even in a 
declassified in-house history of CENTO by the Department of State of the United States, for 
instance, the sections on the Liaison and Counter-Subversion Committees have been 
completely blacked-out, including the names of the committees.
88
 In addition, owing to the 
sensitivity of the subject, the existence of these committees was kept secret and their 
activities were kept separate from other activities of the Pact. Professor George Harris, a 
former Political Officer attached to the American Embassy in Ankara (1957-62), where the 
headquarters of CENTO were housed, for instance, was not informed of such activities of the 
Baghdad Pact, let alone the existence of the Liaison and Counter-Subversive Committees, 
during his stay in Ankara.
89
  
Moreover, despite the fact that the CENTO itself was dissolved in 1979, over thirty 
years ago, British documents concerning the Liaison Committee have been mostly removed 
from the National Archives in London.
90
 Furthermore, while CENTO records were confirmed 
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to be held in Ankara, where the headquarters of CENTO were located after the Iraqi 
Revolution in July 1958,
91
  no such CENTO records, i.e. the memoranda or minutes of the 
meetings, can be found or accessed at the Turkish State Archives in Ankara.
92
 A senior 
official of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in charge of the declassification of 
intelligence and security related records, is more inclined to believe that, akin to the bulk of 
other historical records, CENTO records no longer exist.
93
 Evidence suggests that these 
records, especially these from before the Iraqi Revolution, were confiscated by the 
revolutionary Iraqi government; some were passed on to Nasser’s Egypt, and others were 
deliberately destroyed by MI6 officers.
94
 
Finally, intelligence liaison is sometimes maintained on the basis of an informal 
arrangement, and therefore no such records cannot be found from archives. As a result, the 
only way of finding evidence for such liaison is to find records on intelligence/security 
liaison in private hands. To illustrate the point, Colonel Sir Patrick Coghill, the Director-
General of Intelligence of the Arab Legion (1952-56), noted in his diaries that when he made 
a secret and informal agreement with his Lebanese, Iraqi, Iranian, and Turkish counterparts 
on intelligence sharing on subversive threats in the region, there was a ‘clause’ of their secret 
security cooperation providing that any records regarding the intelligence cooperation were 
indiscriminately kept as personal possessions and not disclosed to anyone, including any 
evidence of the cooperation which was considered to be ‘unsafe to hand to a successor’. 
Moreover, it further recorded that if any of the persons involved in the liaison had been 
‘sacked or transferred’ by their own governments, the records referring to the existence of the 
secret liaison between these states had to be ‘destroyed’.95  
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In spite of these methodological hurdles, nevertheless, a historical enquiry into state 
secrets can still be conducted. Pioneering intelligence historians, such as Christopher Andrew, 
accomplished it about three decades ago, when British Intelligence Services did not officially 
exist. Diligent and time-consuming multi-archival research, mainly at the National Archives 
in London, can yield fruitful results.
96
 The following dissertation is thus a product of multi-
archival research (including official records, private papers, and archives abroad), combining 
oral interviews and published sources. In addition, a number of records released under the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) of 2000 at my request shed new light on hitherto 
unexplored aspects. The majority of primary sources are British, but American, Arabic, 
Turkish and Iranian records are also used.  
Thesis Organisation 
The following thesis thus seeks to make an original and significant contribution to 
Intelligence Studies, International History, Cold War History, Imperial History, and Middle 
Eastern studies – thus this is not a theory-based case study such as in International Relations 
Theory or alliance theory.
97
 While the thesis intends to contribute to a general discussion of 
the subject of intelligence liaison, it also provides a hitherto unexplored history of Britain’s 
engagement in the post-war Middle East. Nevertheless, some limitations in the thesis must be 
stated. Firstly, although this thesis addresses the nature of intelligence liaison, its efficacy and 
limitations, it does not discuss the extent to which intelligence acquired through liaison was 
used (or not used) and influenced policy-making, in other words the so-called “intelligence 
cycle”. The reason for not doing so is that no evidence has been found about it. Secondly, 
while the thesis analyses the role of British Intelligence in counter-subversion in the post-war 
Middle East, there are some inevitable limitations in access to government records, 
particularly those of MI6 and the GCHQ. Further multi-archival research may yield more 
fruitful results in the future, but owing to the time constraint of doctoral research, I have been 
unable to overcome such limitations.  
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The geographical focus of this thesis includes countries such as Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Iran and Turkey, but excludes Britain’s Colonies and Protectorates, such as Cyprus, 
the Aden Colony, and the Persian Gulf, and also Israel. There are some reasons for the 
exclusion of these countries. Firstly, Britain’s engagement in the Colonies in the region is 
mainly a subject of counter-insurgency, rather than counter-subversion. The authorised 
history of MI5 indicates that there were elements of counter-subversion in counter-
insurgency campaigns, but the military forces remained the major actor in fighting against 
insurgencies.
98
 In addition, it has been found in the course of this research that MI5 was also 
involved in the protective security of oil companies in the Persian Gulf, but its involvement 
was passive – mainly contacting security officers of the oil companies concerning vetting 
procedures of oil companies’ employees (i.e. excluding Communist elements in the oil 
companies).
99
 Moreover, while Britain had close connections with the local police in the 
Persian Gulf, its security liaison was mainly for maintaining law and order, such as in cases 
of disturbances and riots, rather than for political reasons – fighting Communist activities 
there.
100
 Furthermore, the research on British-Israeli relations after 1948 indicates while there 
were some informal personal connections between British Intelligence and its Israeli 
counterparts, there was not much official cooperation in counter-subversion during the 
period.
101
 According to Tom Bower, the biographer of Sir Dick White, both former Director-
General of MI5 and Chief of MI6, ‘anti-Semitism’ amongst senior MI6 officers and ‘pro-
Arab sentiments’ within the Foreign Office prevented MI6’s cooperation with the Israeli 
Intelligence Service, Mossad.
102
 Nevertheless, the exclusion of these countries leaves scope 
for further research.  
The argument of the thesis is as follows: the British Empire declined between 1949 
and 1963; in this, intelligence was understood by British policymakers as a tool to maintain 
British influence and preserve British strategic and economic interests in the Middle East. 
The imperial drive derived from a mixture of strategic and economic interests in the region 
but it was Britain’s anti-Communist attitudes, which were shared with Middle Eastern 
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governments. This was the context in which intelligence liaison was established between 
Britain and Middle Eastern states on the basis of their common interests. Nevertheless, the 
British intelligence liaison with its Middle Eastern counterparts was a short-term success but 
a long-term failure. Although Britain’s anti-Communist policy contributed to preventing the 
spread of Communist movements in the region, it sought to strengthen the repressive 
capability of Middle Eastern governments which undermined their own political position by 
their repressiveness. The problem was that common anti-Communist interests encouraged 
intelligence liaison, but conflicting interests between Britain and Middle Eastern states also 
restricted it. It was also exacerbated by the fact that, unlike the Colonies, Britain had little 
influence over the policy of Britain’s ‘informal’ empire in the Middle East. An unintended 
consequence was that the Middle Eastern governments conducted counter-subversion not 
only against Communists, but also their own people. This thesis concludes that Britain’s anti-
Communist policy sustained British influence and British interests in the region in the short 
term, but failed in the long term. British anti-Communist policy in the post-war Middle East 
was thus not far-sighted. It demonstrates the importance of common interests in encouraging 
intelligence liaison and the significance of conflicting interests in restricting it. 
The thesis consists of six chapters, divided into thematic topics. There is, however, a 
degree of overlap between the chapters owning to the nature of the subject. Each chapter 
makes an original contribution to the literature. A number of arguments are presented 
throughout the thesis. Chapter One shows the development of Britain’s anti-Communist 
policy overseas from the Attlee Government of 1945-51 to the Macmillan Government of 
1957-63, and how the role of intelligence was understood by policymakers in dealing with 
the difficulties Britain faced in maintaining its positions overseas, and especially in the 
Middle East. Based on records declassified under the FOIA, it demonstrates that counter-
subversion was the centre of concerns for the British Government throughout the period, and 
shows that intelligence was considered as the solution to these problems by policy-makers 
such as Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. Chapter Two investigates the introduction of 
British security/police liaison officers and the role of the liaison officers in instituting the 
anti-Communist measures on the part of Middle Eastern governments up to the mid-1950s. 
This was the period in which police training in anti-Communist measures was considered 
particularly necessary in the region as the Chiefs of Staff contemplated a potential war 
against the Soviet Union. The chapter demonstrates that not only Britain’s anti-Communist 
policy but also requests from Middle Eastern states for Britain’s advice on anti-Communist 
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measures dovetailed neatly with Britain’s interests in the region. Chapter Three examines the 
role of a hitherto unexplored organisation, Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME), the 
regional headquarters of MI5, in counter-subversion in the region. It shows how SIME 
operated in the region to liaise with local authorities, and its relationship with MI6.  
 Chapters Four and Five are both concerned with the nature of multilateral intelligence 
and propaganda cooperation with the signatories to the Baghdad Pact. Chapter Four examines 
not only anti-Communist measures in the Pact, but also the many obstacles or preconditions 
which limited intelligence sharing. It shows that the protective security of the Baghdad Pact 
was a prerequisite for intelligence cooperation. Chapter Five demonstrates conflicting 
interests between Britain and Middle Eastern governments in counter-subversion by 
propaganda. It shows the British were primarily concerned with Communist activities. This 
concern did not necessarily accord with those of the regional members. A schism in 
propaganda approaches can be seen as a microcosm of the problems affecting regional 
cooperation as a whole. Based on the findings from preceding chapters, Chapter Six 
examines the general extent to which Britain was involved in the conduct of anti-Communist 
measures by Middle Eastern governments, and Britain’s attitudes towards the security 
measures of Middle Eastern governments, often conducted in violation of human rights. It 
also discusses the efficacy and limitation of the intelligence liaison between British 
Intelligence and its Middle Eastern counterparts.   
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Chapter One 
Fighting the ‘Communist Menace’ Overseas: The 
Development of British Counter-Subversive Policy in the 
“Informal Empire” in the Middle East.103 
  
                                                 
103
 The term ‘Communist menace’ can often be found in official records, but was firstly referred to by Foreign 
Secretary Ernest Bevin in his memorandum to Prime Minister Clement Attlee in the context of the establishment 
of the Official Committee on Communism (Overseas). Cf., TNA: PRO PREM8/1365: PM/49/115: 
memorandum by Bevin to Attlee, Top Secret, 17 Aug 1949. 
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The term “counter-subversion” is used in this paper to mean clandestine activities, whether by 
propaganda or by operations, directed against Communism or, in the Colonies, against 
subversive forms of nationalism.  
- Prime Minister’s Memorandum, 10 December 1955
104
 
 
The principal object of our Middle East policy has recently been stated by Ministers to be the 
security of the oil on which the United Kingdom so greatly depends. The main instrument by 
which we hope to achieve our policy is the Baghdad Pact. Its value to the United Kingdom is 
primarily as a means of improving the Western position in the cold war and retaining the 
goodwill of two of the oil producing countries, namely, Iran and Iraq.  
- The Chiefs of Staff Committee, 13 Jul 1956.
105
 
Introduction 
By the end of the 1940s, the British government had adopted a firm anti-Soviet stance 
and envisaged a potential war against the Soviet Union.
106
 In order to fight the Cold War 
against the Soviet Union, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin had, by 1949, decided to establish 
the Russia Committee, the Information Research Department (IRD), and the Permanent 
Under-Secretary’s Committee in the Foreign Office.107 Recent research by Daniel Lomas 
detailed the strong anti-Soviet stance taken by the Attlee Government, which attached 
particular importance to MI5’s role in preventing Communist influence in the United 
Kingdom.
108
 Concerning MI5’s role in the Colonies in the post-war period, Calder Walton 
has shown the close link between the Security Service and the Colonial Office, which, he 
claims, was an important factor in maintaining British interests overseas against Communist 
influence during the transition period when the Colonies were moving towards 
independence.
109
 His work is important especially as there was the relationship between anti-
Communism and decolonisation, in which MI5 had a special role to play to maintain the 
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internal security throughout the British Empire.
110
 Despite the importance of MI5’s role in 
British decolonisation, Britain’s post-war anti-Communist policy overseas has been 
understudied.  
The chapter will show the development of Britain’s post-war overseas anti-
Communist policy from the Attlee Government to the Macmillan Government, with a 
particular focus on Middle Eastern countries between the late 1940s and 1955/56, when anti-
Communist measures in the Middle East were considered most important to preserve 
Britain’s national interests in the region. It will also show how the role of intelligence in anti-
Communist measures overseas, and especially in the Middle East, was understood by the 
British Government. In addition, it will demonstrate that the shift in Britain’s anti-Communist 
policy in 1955/56 mainly came from the difficulties of fighting the Cold War with limited 
financial resources and departmental infighting. Britain’s relationship with the United States 
in anti-Communist measures in the Middle East will also be discussed.    
The Origins of Post-War Counter-Subversive Activities Overseas 
The range and scope of the activities of MI5 remained largely unknown until the 
publication of the authorised history of MI5 in 2009. The Defence of the Realm: The 
Authorized History of MI5 confirms that MI5’s role was not confined to Great Britain, but 
instead extended to the territories of the British Empire for the defence of the realm against 
any forms of subversive activity including espionage, subversion and sabotage.
111
 Based on 
declassified records of MI5 and the Colonial Office, with a particular focus on British 
decolonisation, Calder Walton’s Empire of Secrets shows that, especially during the early 
period of the Cold War, the role of MI5’s local representatives, working under the title of 
Security Liaison Officer (SLO), was to liaise with local security forces to prevent Communist 
influence and ensure that newly-independent states would not fall to Communism.
112
 In 
addition, the establishment of the Security Intelligence Adviser (SIA), a representative of 
MI5, who advised the Colonial Secretary on security matters in the Colonies, was another 
important development in maintaining the post-war internal security of the British Empire.
113
 
The Colonial Office even formed its own Intelligence and Security Department in 1955, and 
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MI5 regularly organised a series of training courses for colonial security officers both in 
Britain and in the colonial territories in order to maintain Empire’s internal security.114  
These activities of MI5 were largely Cold War phenomena. The academic literature 
makes clear that such activities of MI5 were less prominent before the outbreak of the Second 
World War in 1939.
115
 In Empires of Intelligence, Martin Thomas showed that the 
maintenance of security throughout the British Empire in the early 20
th
 century was mostly 
dependent on military intelligence units.
116
 The in-house history of MI5 shows that prior to 
the outbreak of the Second World War, there were just a few MI5 officers responsible for D 
Branch (Imperial Overseas Intelligence),
117
 and only a handful of representatives, under the 
title of Defence Security Officer (DSO), were stationed in a limited number of colonial 
territories.
118
 Harry Hinsley and Anthony Simkins, the official historians of British 
Intelligence in the Second World War, note that the security arrangement was ‘more 
impressive on paper than in practice’ and ‘no more than the skeleton of an imperial 
organisation for security’.119  During the war, nevertheless, at the urging of the Colonial 
Office, the contingents of MI5 officers grew noticeably. According to MI5’s in-house history, 
the value of the DSOs for training and advising the colonial police was noted by the Colonial 
Office, and their relationship was maintained in the post-war period.
120
  
However, MI5 was not acting independently on its own. All activities of the 
intelligence and security services were directed by government policy. While Calder 
Walton’s book is less clear about the relationship between MI5’s activities overseas and 
government policy, it was government policy that directed these post-war anti-Communist 
measures overseas across government departments and services. In addition to the 
establishment of anti-Communist organisations, such as the Russia Committee, the IRD, and 
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the Permanent Under-Secretary’s Committee, there were additional but more important 
developments in Britain’s post-war anti-Communist stance at the Cabinet and 
interdepartmental levels in the late 1940s. As stated in the Introduction, records declassified 
in October 2010 reveal that an interdepartmental official committee, the Official Committees 
on Communism (Overseas), was established in December 1949.
121
 This highly secret cabinet 
committee were established at the suggestion of Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, who 
recommended that Attlee set up ‘a small official committee’ to conduct, in Bevin’s words, 
both ‘offensive and defensive’ actions against the ‘Soviet and Communist menace in all 
spheres, political, military, economic and social, at home and abroad’.122  
The activities of the committee were supervised by the newly-established Ministerial 
Committee on Communism, alias the AC (M) Committee, chaired by Attlee himself.
123
 The 
AC (M) Committee periodically received the reports on their activities from the Official 
Committees on Communism (Overseas), and the role of the AC (M) Committee was to 
approve the proposals and recommendations put forward by these official committees. One of 
such proposals concerning anti-Communist activities overseas in December 1950 was, for 
instance, MI6’s ‘certain activities’ behind the Iron Curtain and its ‘full co-operation with the 
Americans’. 124  Another decision was to establish a domestic-focused anti-Communist 
committee, the Official Committee on Communism (Home), in 1951.
125
 
The Official Committee on Communism (Overseas), alias the Anti-Communist 
Committee, or AC (O) Committee, was chaired by a senior official from the Permanent 
Under-Secretary’s Department of the Foreign Office: Sir Gladwyn Jebb (1949-50); Sir 
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Pierson Dixon (1950-53); Sir John Ward (1954-55); and Sir Patrick Dean (1955-56).
126
  The 
permanent members included the Chairman of the JIC, the Chief of MI6, and representatives 
of the Ministry of Defence and of the Chiefs of Staff.
127
 Members of relevant departments, 
including the Colonial Office, the Commonwealth Office, and MI5, were invited to the 
committee meeting on an ad hoc basis. From 1953, MI5 became a permanent member, and 
was represented by Brigadier William Magan, Director of E Branch (the overseas department 
in charge of external affairs, liaising with all Colonial, Commonwealth, and friendly foreign 
countries).
128
 The purpose of the committee was the co-ordination and initiation of ‘any 
measures’ which ‘appeared desirable in the conduct of the Cold War’. ‘Any measures’ 
included propaganda by the IRD; clandestine paramilitary operations by MI6; and security 
training of both foreign and colonial police forces supervised by MI5.
129
 Thus, the activities 
associated with MI5, as Calder Walton has identified, were directed by the AC (O) 
Committee. As will be shown in Chapter Two in more detail, the AC (O) Committee was also 
the engine for facilitating its security liaisons with Middle Eastern countries.   
In addition to their own wartime experience, some counter-measures were also 
borrowed from the techniques and methods of Britain’s post-war enemies, the Soviet Union 
and International (Soviet-sponsored) Communism. Air Chief Marshal Sir John Slessor, an 
influential figure in setting up the AC (O) Committee, who was also one of the architects of 
Britain’s plans for the liberation of the Eastern Bloc through special operations in the late 
1940s, for instance, commented on countering Communist threats overseas that, although ‘we 
should never descend to their levels’, it would be ‘profitable to borrow certain methods from 
our enemies’ and ‘we should not hesitate to adopt measures against them which would not be 
warranted in dealing with a Civilized Power’.130 Interestingly, a parallel development, and 
also very similar thinking to that of the Doolittle Report (a report on covert activities of the 
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United States), was also taking place on the other side of the Atlantic, where the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) was empowered in 1948 under the National Security Council 
(NSC) Directive 10/2 to engage in special operations, including ‘subversion against hostile 
states’, in other words, well-known as ‘covert action’.131  
In the mid-1950s there was an important shift in British Government anti-Communist 
policy. The AC (O) Committee was disbanded in February 1956, and replaced by newly 
established committees.
132
 Firstly, there was an international context – there was a new 
application of the traditional Leninist critique of the West by the Soviet Union after Stalin’s 
death in March 1953; the rise of nationalism in the colonial territories and the emergence of 
the non-alignment movement loomed large, and ‘colonialism’ became the pretext under 
which the Soviet Union was attacking European empires. As a result, the AC (O) Committee 
was regarded as too ineffective to cope with these complex colonial problems, and the way in 
which anti-Communist measures were conducted under the direction of the AC (O) 
Committee would produce less fruitful results. Secondly, there was also the domestic context 
– there was departmental infighting, and the AC (O) Committee, was regarded as an 
undesirable body for the conduct of the Cold War.  
Quarrelling over the Conduct of “The Cold War” 
As opposed to a departmental policy, anti-Communist policy overseas was dealt with 
by Cabinet committees. Assessing the chain of command in making anti-Communist policy 
overseas is, however, a difficult challenge.
133
 This is partly because any decisions that 
emerged from interdepartmental committees sought a consensus amongst committee 
members.
134
 The distinctiveness of British culture in policymaking, as evident from either 
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minutes or memoranda of the JIC, for instance, so-called ‘collegiality’, i.e. a tendency to 
mask over the political processes of debate and discussion by seemingly joint consensus, 
makes it difficult to identify organisational or individual opinions between departments.
135
 
Moreover, there was also the fact that policy formed through several layers of 
interdepartmental committees, such as the AC (O) Committee (and the OPS, a sub-committee 
of the AC (O) Committee for policy-planning, which was housed in the Permanent Under-
Secretary’s Department of the Foreign Office) or the JIC. These committees all directly or 
indirectly influenced anti-Communist policymaking, which even more difficult for historians 
to assess the policy-making process. Richard Aldrich reminds us that a static view of how 
these interdepartmental committees operated is ‘bound to be misleading’ since ‘the exact 
location of power and responsibility shifted in each administration, depending on the 
preferences of the Prime Minister and Cabinet Secretary’. 136  Nevertheless, the AC (O) 
Committee remained at the centre of making anti-Communist policy overseas, as well as 
coordinating all anti-Communist activities overseas, until its dissolution in February 1956. 
From this period, how it evolved further will be discussed below.  
Concerning the relationships between intelligence and security activities with 
departments in Whitehall in general, the JIC remained as the central hub at the national level, 
where intelligence customers (such as the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence, and three 
military services) and the three intelligence services (MI6, MI5 and GCHQ) were 
represented.
137
 Until 1957, the JIC was as a Chiefs of Staff Committee before moving to the 
Cabinet Office, and its output was more associated with what was needed by military 
planners.
138
 MI6 and GCHQ were the main intelligence collectors and were held 
administratively answerable to the Foreign Secretary.
139
 MI5 had direct access to the Prime 
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Minister, and became answerable to the Home Secretary from 1952, providing the JIC with 
security intelligence but also remaining as an independent and self-tasked organisation.
140
  
At the departmental level, the three intelligence services maintained their 
relationships through liaison with the other departments.
141
 It is worth mentioning MI6’s anti-
Communist activities in particular. From 1949, MI6’s link with the Foreign Office was 
maintained through the Permanent Under-Secretary’s Department (PUSD).142 In the early 
post-war period, however, MI6 had an even closer relationship with the Chiefs of Staff and 
the Ministry of Defence than the Foreign Office.
143
 A former intelligence officer recalled that 
the Chiefs of Staff, and also the Ministry of Defence, remained the ‘primary customer’ of 
intelligence collected by MI6 in the early post-war period.
144
 There was also the fact that MI6 
had traditionally been headed by former Navy or Army officers until 1956.
145
 This 
relationship was not only formed by the requirement for intelligence collection, the Chiefs of 
Staff also used MI6 as a tool of ‘Cold War fighting’ – special political action, including 
paramilitary operations against Albania, code-named Operation VALUABLE.
146
  
Despite the consensual committee approach, which obscures any particular input in 
policy-making process, careful analysis shows that departmental infighting over Britain’s 
conduct of the Cold War was a common occurrence. In The Hidden Hand, Richard Aldrich 
showed that Britain’s post-war foreign, defence and security policies often formed out of 
civilian-military infighting especially in the early period of the Cold War.
147
 Aldrich argues 
that while the Chiefs of Staff had dominated Britain’s foreign policy and MI6’s special 
political action after the war, the Foreign Office took control of the conduct of the Cold War 
from 1950 onwards.
148
 However, this departmental infighting continued in the first half of the 
1950s up until February 1956, when the AC (O) Committee was officially disbanded. Before 
going into detail about the subsequent development in Britain’s anti-Communist policy from 
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the mid-1950s, it is worth exploring the reasons behind the disbandment of the committee. A 
series of developments in Britain’s anti-Communist policy from the establishment of the AC 
(O) Committee in 1949 to its replacement with new committees in 1955/56 resulted from 
such civilian-military infighting.  
As noted earlier, the AC (O) Committee was established in December 1949 at the 
suggestion of Ernest Bevin, which came largely in response to pressure a year earlier from 
the Chiefs of Staff, who suggested that the Attlee Government take stronger action against 
the Soviet Union and the spread of International Communism.
149
 Considering action to 
counter Soviet propaganda and political pressure, the views from the Chiefs of Staff were 
expressed through the Ministry of Defence to the Attlee Government by Air Chief Marshal 
Sir John Slessor, then Commandant of the Imperial Defence College, who noted that: 
In order to help the Foreign Secretary effectively to undertake this onerous task we recommend 
that the existing machinery should be appropriately expanded and put on a higher level, in close 
touch with the Chiefs of Staff and with advisory, planning and coordinating functions…not 
only to counter possible Soviet moves but also to put us in a position to take the initiative 
ourselves and take advantage of Soviet difficulties as they arise. [...] Co-ordination of the 
activities […] should be secured by the appointment of a Cold War Committee.
150
  
Prime Minister Clement Attlee, who was still uncertain whether a new committee for 
‘conducting the Cold War’ was necessary, asked the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Norman Brook, 
for his opinion on this matter. After consulting with officials from both the Foreign Office 
and the Ministry of Defence, Brook endorsed Bevin’s suggestion to establish such a 
committee.
151
  
A similar situation played out in mid-1950s. By October 1955, the Chiefs of Staff had 
noted a change of Soviet tactics from direct military confrontation with the West to ‘the 
intensification of subversion’ all over the world, and recommended that the Eden 
Government take stronger and extensive anti-Communist action throughout the world. 
According to them, their anti-Communist measures had largely been so far ‘by way of ad hoc 
measures aimed half-heartedly at the stopping of gaps’, and warned that this was ‘the reverse 
of a winning policy’.152 Echoing the point made by Air Chief Marshal Slessor five years 
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earlier, the Chiefs of Staff pointed out the need for ‘a world-wide strategic policy’ including 
foreign and colonial territories and also at home, to initiate ‘whole-hearted’ counter-offensive 
operations against ‘communist subversion’ as well as behind the Iron Curtain itself. As one of 
the ‘fundamental requirements for our success in the cold war’, the Chiefs of Staff noted, ‘we 
should vigorously combat and counter-attack subversion by clandestine and all other related 
means’. 153  This recommendation preceded by a week a separate suggestion by Foreign 
Secretary Harold Macmillan for forming the new anti-Communist committees which would 
eventually replace the old AC (O) Committee.
154
 However, while this recommendation by the 
Chiefs of Staff triggered a change in anti-Communist policy, it took the policy in a different 
direction from what the Chiefs of Staff desired.  
Prime Minister Anthony Eden sought out Sir Norman Brook for his long-standing 
position at the centre of the Cabinet Office and, as Attlee had a few years earlier, asked 
Brook for his comments on the report put forward by the Chiefs of Staff and the suggestion 
by Harold Macmillan. Once more choosing the Foreign Minister’s side, Brook supported 
Macmillan’s proposals as being the ‘more cautious’ approach to the subject to the Chiefs of 
Staff’s on which he labelled a ‘rather feverish and muddled report’. 155  Macmillan’s 
recommendation was to revise Britain’s anti-Communist policy overseas, and to review the 
activities of MI6, MI5 and the IRD in the context of decolonisation and on the basis of 
Britain’s financial limitations. Macmillan suggested Eden pay more careful attention to 
colonial problems as well as maintaining British interests abroad, especially in the Middle 
East, where the Soviet Union was exploiting anti-British nationalist movements on their side. 
He pointed out that anti-Communist activities against the Communist-occupied states were 
yielding unfruitful results, and only wasting Britain’s resources.156   
Sticking to the outline of the framework that Harold Macmillan suggested, Sir 
Norman Brook dispatched a memorandum on the subject to Anthony Eden. With specific and 
clearer recommendations on subsequent anti-Communist policy, officially termed ‘counter-
subversion’ policy from this point (thus the terms counter-subversion and anti-Communist 
measures were used interchangeably in official papers hereafter), it also contained Brook’s 
own views on a problem in the British Government’s approach to counter-subversion. Firstly, 
agreeing with Macmillan’s point, Brook suggested that Eden suspend anti-Communist 
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activities conducted by MI6 and IRD against the countries behind the Iron Curtain for the 
time being.
157
 Secondly, he also agreed with Macmillan’s suggestion on the necessity of 
‘more vigorous steps’ towards countering the colonial problems. In order to counter 
‘Communist encroachment’ in the Colonies, Brook noted that ‘sound’ Colonial 
administration, ‘good’ police forces, and an ‘efficient’ intelligence system were necessary. It 
could be done through coordinating covert counter-subversive measures under the direction 
of clear governmental policy. He also noted that by mobilising ‘all our available resources’, 
‘Communism is held in check and nationalist movements are guided along sound lines’.158  
Thirdly, and more importantly, Brook expressed his views on the way in which the 
AC (O) Committee, more specifically the Chiefs of Staff, handled counter-subversion abroad.  
He noted to Eden that: 
I fear that Ministerial responsibility is being weakened by allowing the clandestine activities in 
this field to be “stimulated” by an interdepartmental Committee of officials including a 
representative of the Chiefs of Staff...One of the disadvantages of the term “cold war” is that it 
has tempted the Chiefs of Staff to think that it is their business. This Committee [the AC (O) 
Committee] was originally appointed at a time when the Chiefs of Staff were restive about the 
conduct of foreign policy and thought that the Foreign Office were not doing enough to counter 
Communist encroachments abroad…Now that the risk of “hot war” has become more remote, 
the Chiefs of Staff have again become restive about the conduct of the “cold war”.
159
 
It is clear there was a growing sense in Whitehall that the Chiefs of Staff were interfering in 
the conduct of governmental policy in late 1955. There is evidence of further interference by 
the Chiefs of Staff under the pretext of the “Cold War”. A minute of the Colonial Office 
reveals that the Chiefs of Staff also attempted to initiate a survey on ‘Communist infiltration 
in schools, both in the United Kingdom, and all foreign and colonial territories’ as a ‘general 
exercise by the JIC’.160 Once this was known to Brook, who thought it an inappropriate 
action by the Chiefs of Staff, he intervened in the matter and stopped it.
161
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 It was not only Brook who felt discontented with the interference by the Chiefs of 
Staff, this was also a prevalent feeling amongst senior officials especially in the Foreign 
Office. As a result of ‘a clear cleavage’ in the AC (O) Committee between the Chiefs of 
Staff, who wanted to ‘get cracking’, and those of the Foreign Office, who preferred ‘a more 
cautious approach’, Sir John Ward, Chairman of the AC (O) Committee (1954-55), 
consequently found himself in the ‘invidious position of acting as a brake rather than an 
accelerator on the Committee machine’.162 In addition, Sir Patrick Dean, the successor to Sir 
John Ward as Chairman of the AC (O) Committee (1955-56), who also chaired the JIC, 
recorded in his minute in December 1955 to Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, the Permanent Under-
Secretary of State, that:  
…there would be no objection to telling General Templer and the Chiefs of Staff generally 
about what was going on [about counter-subversive policy in the FO], but the trouble was that 
they conceived it their duty to “stimulate” action and were always interfering in the details of 
the special operations which were not their concern. We are always having difficulty on this 
with the Chiefs of Staff representative in the OP Section of PUSD [the Overseas Planning 
Section of the Permanent of Under-Secretary’s Department, a subcommittee of the AC (O) for 
drafting planning of anti-Communist activities].
163
 
Moreover, ‘in my experience’, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick noted to the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn 
Lloyd, when the Chiefs of Staff were arguing that stronger counter-subversive activities were 
necessary, they mostly relied on ‘hearsay’ from their low-level representatives and did not 
‘always know what they [were] talking about’.164  
Brook also insisted to Eden that the use of the term ‘Cold War’ in any official minutes 
and memoranda should be refrained from as it meant a wide variety of activities, ranging 
from economic support to a friendly state to the conduct of military operations.
165
 The term 
was, in Brook’s words, ‘responsible for a lot of muddled thinking – or, worse still, lack of 
thinking’, which ‘led the Chiefs of Staff to suppose that they are in some way responsible for 
matters which are essentially the business of the Foreign Secretary’.166 In addition, agreeing 
with Macmillan’s suggestion of paying more attention to the colonial problems, the Colonial 
Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd, also noted that:  
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we should not I think allow the metaphorical expression, “cold war”, to blind us to the fact that 
what we are considering is not war-like operations at all, but, whatever methods may be 
employed, operations which are essentially political.
167
 
In his minute, Brook endorsed Lennox-Boyd’s perspective on the inappropriate machinery of 
the AC (O) Committee, which had no permanent representative from the Colonial Office, and 
then reminded Eden that counter-subversion was ‘an instrument of policy, not an end in 
itself’ and thus must be directed either by its foreign or colonial policy in respective 
territories: the Foreign Secretary must be responsible for all counter-subversion in foreign 
countries, and the Colonial Secretary must be similarly responsible for counter-subversion in 
the Colonies.
168
  
Following the minutes by Harold Macmillan (October 19), the Colonial Secretary 
(November 15), the Minister of Defence (November 23), in consultation with Sir Norman 
Brook, and Prime Minister Anthony Eden issued a memorandum on 10 December 1955, 
which defined British counter-subversive policy both in the Colonies and foreign countries. 
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the term counter-subversion was defined, without 
reference to the term ‘Cold War’, as ‘clandestine activities, whether by propaganda or by 
operations, directed against Communism or, in the Colonies, against subversive forms of 
nationalism’.169 
The Eden Memorandum and the Establishment of the ‘Special 
Committee’ in the Foreign Office 
Following Cabinet approval on 24 February 1956, the AC (O) Committee was 
disbanded and replaced by new counter-subversive committees.
170
 Unlike the old AC (O) 
Committee, these new committees excluded the Chiefs of Staff, who were ‘very strongly 
opposed’ to Eden’s memorandum which proposed the formation of these committees.171 The 
Official Committee on Counter-Subversion in the Colonial Territories was formed as an 
inter-departmental committee formed at the Cabinet Office to cover the colonial territories, 
supervising all counter-subversive activities in the colonies, and some Commonwealth 
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countries, under the direction of the Colonial Policy Committee.
172
 The other committee, the 
Overseas Planning Committee (1956-57), was directly concerned with foreign countries, 
including Middle Eastern states, according to declassified records released under the FOIA. 
The committee, often referred to as the ‘special’ committee, was established in the Foreign 
Office. From 1957, after absorbing the Russia Committee, it was renamed the Political 
Intelligence Committee.
173
 Unlike the interdepartmental Official Committee on Counter-
Subversion in the Colonial Territories, the Overseas Planning Committee was an intra-
departmental committee in essence – it consisted of senior experts of three geographical areas 
of the Foreign Office; the Soviet Union and its satellites; the Middle East; and the Far East. 
Experts on other areas, such as Central and South America; economic matters; and 
information matters were called on if necessary. MI6 and the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB) 
also had their own representatives there.
174
  
Eden’s memorandum, which set up these new committees, replacing the old AC (O) 
Committee, and excluded any representation of the Chiefs of Staff, was largely influenced by 
Sir Norman Brook’s input. Sir Patrick Dean, Chairman of both the AC (O) Committee and 
the JIC, found this development ‘even more radical’ than Macmillan’s initial proposal but 
‘not for that reason any the less welcome’.175 Indeed, the total exclusion of the Chiefs of Staff 
invited acute criticism on committee decisions. A minute by Dean to Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick 
indicates that the newly appointed Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, who had been the 
Minister of Defence until December 1955, was concerned about the exclusion of the Chiefs 
of Staff, especially from the Foreign Office’s special committee. Despite this concern, Dean 
sought to convince Selwyn Lloyd that ‘the memorandum was right’ and that ‘it would be 
better for the Chiefs of Staff to keep out of this sort of activity because they could not be 
                                                 
172
TNA: PRO CAB130/114: GEN 520/1
st
 meeting, ‘Committee on Counter-Subversion in Colonial Territories’, 
16 Mar 1956. It was composed of the representatives of the Foreign, Colonial, and Commonwealth Offices, 
Ministry of Defence and MI6 and MI5, excluding the Chiefs of Staff. After the Colonial Policy Committee 
ceased to exist in late 1963 as a consequence of the re-organisation of cabinet committees and government 
departments, the Committee on Counter-Subversion was renamed the “Counter-Subversive Committee” and 
placed under the new Official Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy. Also see TNA: PRO CAB21/5379, 
the file entitled, ‘Counter-Subversion’. 
173
 A minute by the Foreign Office ‘The Russia Committee and the Overseas Planning Committee’, 18 Jul 1957. 
O/1/57. obtained under the FOIA at my request (REF: 1258-12), 8 Mar 2013. 
174
 A minute by Patrick Dean to M.S. Williams, ‘Organisation of Intelligence in the Foreign Office’, 22 Dec 
1955. Obtained under the FOIA at my request (REF: 1258-12), 8 Mar 2013. 
175
 A minute by Patrick Dean to Secretary of State, 16 Dec 1955. Obtained under the FOIA at my request (REF: 
1258-12), 8 Mar 2013. Patrick Dean also noted that ‘The Prime Minister’s proposals for reorganising the anti-
subversion campaign are much more far-reaching than those proposed by the Secretary of State [Harold 
Macmillan]. The Secretary of State proposed that the A.C. (O) Committee should in general oversee all such 
activities both in foreign countries and in the Colonies…The Prime Minister proposes to abolish the AC (O) 
Committee altogether’. 
 45 
 
 
responsible for the policy, which must be the Foreign Secretary’s, and they in fact had 
virtually no resources to help’.176  
However, in the end, Selwyn Lloyd decided to include Major-General William G. 
Stirling on the Overseas Planning Committee as a representative of the Ministry of Defence 
and the Chiefs of Staff.
177
 In addition, it had been planned that the newly established Foreign 
Office’s intra-departmental committee be chaired by the Head of PUSD, but Selwyn Lloyd 
instead selected his Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Douglas Dodds-Parker, to chair 
the committee.
178  Lloyd thought that ‘it would be useful for a Minister to be closely 
concerned because he could then talk to the Chiefs of Staff and the Minister of Defence as 
well as discussing with the Secretary of State himself’. 179  The chairing of the Foreign 
Office’s special committee by Dodds-Parker was formally accepted by the same Cabinet 
meeting that approved Eden’s memorandum on 24 February 1956.180  
The Eden memorandum was significant in a number of ways. Firstly, it established a 
clear government policy to maintain British interests overseas – shifting the focus of anti-
Communist measures away from the Soviet Union and its satellite countries to the Colonies 
and also to non-colonial territories, most notably Middle Eastern states, where Britain had 
national interests – oil in particular.181 The memorandum stated that in shifting from the 
Eastern Bloc, ‘we should be ready to make more use of counter-subversion in the smaller 
countries in the Middle East and in South-East Asia which are seriously threatened with 
Communist infiltration’.182 Secondly, the Eden Government recognised that while nationalist 
movements in the Colonies were not necessarily Communist, they had the potential to be 
exploited by the Soviet Union or local Communist parties. The recognition of this 
longstanding problem at the highest level led to developments in the Foreign Office.  
In addition to setting up the new intra-departmental committee, the memorandum also 
directed the collation of intelligence and intelligence assessments in the Foreign Office. 
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Around the same time, there had been a parallel shift of emphasis in Foreign Office 
intelligence from ‘a possible global war’ against the Soviet Union and its satellite countries to 
‘present and increasing’ subversive activities overseas, such as the Middle East. Observing 
this shift, Sir Patrick Dean, the JIC Chairman, noted that ‘nearly all the intelligence now 
considered by the Joint Intelligence Committee in its weekly review is of a 
political/economic nature’ rather than military threats.183 Dean also commented that: 
the JIC are considering whether some part of the considerable effort put by our collecting 
agencies (particularly JIB, our friends [MI6] and GCHQ) into obtaining intelligence about the 
military organisation, capabilities, state of preparedness, etc., of the Sino-Soviet bloc could not 
be switched more profitably and successfully to these “grey” territories [such as the Middle 
East and the Colonies] where the politico/economic/cultural threat is more imminent. If some of 
the effort directed to obtain order of battle and similar types of intelligence could be dropped, 
the resources thus freed could be used to obtain intelligence about Communist plans for 
subverting and penetrating the “grey” areas [such as the Middle East, where Britain had vast 
national interests].
184
  
While a possible change in the allocation of intelligence collection efforts was being 
discussed at the JIC level, Dean noted that ‘there is a strong case for seeing what steps can be 
taken by the Foreign Office to improve immediately the organisation for collating and 
assessing Sino-Soviet intentions and plans, both general and particular, for attacking and 
increasing their influence in these “grey” territories’.185  
As the responsibility for collating and assessing intelligence rested with the Foreign 
Office, where ‘much of the necessary information is already available in departments of the 
Foreign Office’, Eden’s memorandum, setting up the new intra-departmental committee on 
subversive activities in such countries, was a welcome development for the Foreign Office.
186
 
Records of an internal Foreign Office meeting report ‘there is a need for the collation in the 
Foreign Office of all kinds of evidence bearing on Communist/extreme nationalist political 
intentions in order to foresee and if possible anticipate their plans’, and based on which ‘what 
counter-action should be undertaken’.187 Indeed, this was a prelude to the subsequent 1957 
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development that saw the JIC placed in the Cabinet Office with a representative from the 
Colonial Office as official members.
188
 
Thirdly, the memorandum defined counter-subversion as one of the ‘clandestine 
activities’ to be conducted by MI6, MI5 and the IRD, and reiterated that all counter-
subversive activities were to be directed by government policy: the Foreign and Colonial 
Secretaries were ‘responsible for all counter-subversion’ in their respective spheres. It also 
noted that ‘subject to the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary should retain sole control 
over C’s organisation [MI6]. C’s activities in support of foreign policy should remain subject 
to the Ministerial control of the Foreign Secretary’.189 This statement was mainly intended to 
prevent any further interference by the Chiefs of Staff in counter-subversive activities 
conducted by intelligence and security services. The Eden memorandum further stated that: 
in relation to counter-subversion in foreign countries, I doubt whether we need any inter-
departmental organisation at all. This counter-subversion will be used solely in support of 
foreign policy, and it will be carried out by an organisation which is already under the Foreign 
Secretary’s control.
190
 
Once the government’s counter-subversive policy was made clear, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick 
despatched a top-secret and personal letter by diplomatic bag to all ambassadorial and 
ministerial positions in foreign countries, instructing them to pay more careful attention to 
‘signs of Communist or other subversive activities’. He wrote:  
We have decided, in view of the new type of threat, that counter-subversion, i.e. clandestine 
activities whether by propaganda or by special operations, will have an increasing part to play 
in support of foreign policy…We have accordingly tried to draw up a broad list of priorities for 
such action [owing to limited resources]…Action is most urgently required in the Middle East 
and South-East Asia…Her Majesty’s Representatives are in the best position to suggest ways of 
countering dangerous activities and of reinforcing the influence of those well-disposed towards 
us and their ability to resist hostile subversive activities; and you should not hesitate to put 
forward such suggestions, whether they are for overt anti-Communist measures or for ways in 
which the policies of Her Majesty’s Government might be furthered by clandestine means.
191
 
The letter by Kirkpatrick made clear that there were limited resources available for counter-
subversive activities by clandestine means, but stated firmly that such clandestine activities 
were understood to be a means of implementing foreign policy. In addition, ‘even in cases 
where counteraction is not possible by ourselves owing to lack of resources’, Kirkpatrick also 
wrote in the letter that ‘it may still be possible to do something in consultation with our allies, 
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e.g. the Americans’.192 The relationship with the Americans in this context will be discussed 
below. 
Counter-Subversion in the Middle East 
As stated in the Introduction, Britain’s post-war policy towards the Middle East has 
been the subject of scholarly attention for some time. Despite Attlee’s attempt to retreat from 
Britain’s imperial commitments to the Middle East after the Second World War, Ernest Bevin 
reminded the Attlee Cabinet in August 1949 that ‘in peace and war the Middle East is an area 
of cardinal importance to the United Kingdom, second only to the United Kingdom itself’.193 
In addition, the defence of the Middle East was also considered by the British military as a 
pillar of Britain’s post-war defence strategy.194 The academic literature also suggests that the 
subsequent Conservative (Churchill, Eden, Macmillan) governments also put particular 
importance on the region in its foreign and defence policies. However, Britain faced 
challenges in the region – the British military presence in Egypt was seriously threatened by 
growing anti-British sentiment throughout Egypt; and then by the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian 
Agreement, under the terms of which British military forces were to be evacuated from Egypt. 
The centre of gravity of British foreign and defence policies in the region had already shifted 
from Egypt to the Iraqi-Jordanian axis.
195
 From the mid-1950s, British foreign and defence 
policies in the region depended on the Baghdad Pact, which had been formed in April 
1955.
196
  
The excerpt from a Chiefs of Staff report on Britain’s commitment to the Baghdad 
Pact shown at the beginning of this chapter clearly demonstrates the priority placed on ‘the 
security of the oil’ and the retention of ‘the good will’ of the oil-producing countries, such as 
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Iraq and Iran. The Baghdad Pact was then understood as ‘the main instrument’ to achieve 
such objectives.
197
 As will be shown in detail below, Britain’s counter-subversion operations 
had a large role to play in maintaining British interests in the region under the Baghdad Pact. 
Before going into detail about the roles of the Overseas Planning Committee and the Baghdad 
Pact in counter-subversion in the Middle East, it should be explained that there was a 
framework of counter-subversion in the region before the mid-1950s.  
The reason for Britain’s post-war counter-subversive policy in the Middle East after 
the Second World War was the need to prepare for a possible war against the Soviet Union. 
Since the Middle East consisted of both colonial (the Palestine Mandate, Cyprus and the 
Aden Colony) and foreign territories with which Britain had military commitments under 
defence treaties with Middle Eastern states, such as Egypt, Jordan and Iraq, the necessity of 
anti-Communist measures in the region also came from the defence, foreign, and colonial 
policies of the Attlee Government in the late 1940s. These seemingly diverse policies were 
all in essence directed by the Defence Transition Committee (DTC) and the 1948 
Government War Book.
198
 The 1948 War Book was a government policy, setting procedures 
for all departments, including intelligence and security services, to deal with the possible 
event of war against the Soviet Union.
199
  
In this context, the role of MI5 was to inform security authorities of ‘lists of persons’ 
who should be detained under draconian defence regulations.
200
 To ready itself, MI5 prepared 
its own in-house war book, which was constantly reviewed and circulated within MI5, 
including its own outstations, such as Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME) and Security 
Intelligence Far East (SIFE).
201
 As the following chapters (Chapters Two and Three) will 
show, without exception, the 1948 Government War Book was the key driving policy for 
MI5’s activities in the Middle East. Similar to MI5’s practice at home, SIME as the regional 
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headquarters of MI5 was the prime security authority in the region, and prepared security 
measures in case of an emergency or war.
202
 The Chiefs of Staff envisaged the possibility of a 
Soviet invasion of the region, and SIME was also particularly important here because the 
integrity of the Middle East was essential for British defence planning.
203
 In the same way, 
their activities were further directed by foreign and colonial policies in the region.
204
 
The AC (O) Committee was the most important body for stimulating and coordinating 
counter-subversive activities in the Middle East. Although the minutes of the AC (O) 
Committee meetings were heavily ‘weeded’ in the declassification process, the indices of the 
minutes clearly suggest that the committee attached special importance to the Middle East. 
Countries such as Iran, Syria and Lebanon were identified as flashpoints vulnerable to 
Communist exploitation of local conditions, such as low standards of living and unequal 
distribution of wealth.
205
 Sir Michael Wright, Assistant Under-Secretary of the Foreign 
Office, the chief expert on Middle Eastern affairs, was, for instance, frequently invited to the 
committee’s meetings to express his opinion. Wright once pronounced in June 1950 that the 
danger of the spread of Communist influence in the Middle East was ‘very real’.206  
It is important to note that a distinctive characteristic of the Middle East was that 
Communism had been made illegal in most Middle Eastern countries by the late 1940s.
207
 
Although Communist Parties had not gained popular support in the region, the Communist 
movement was by no means non-existent: as their activities were prohibited, the members of 
the Communist Parties, and their sympathisers, went underground. According to the first 
post-war comprehensive survey conducted by the JIC, these underground Communist 
movements sought to exploit nationalist elements for ‘opposition to the interests of “Anglo-
American Imperialism”’.208 Despite these activities being prohibited by local authorities, this 
was a cause of concern, especially, for the Chiefs of Staff, who had to plan a potential war 
against the Soviet Union. These local Communist Parties and their sympathisers were 
inevitably regarded as “potential fifth columnists”, whose activities might threaten an allied 
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war effort in the event of war with the Soviet Union,
209
 but it was difficult to obtain a clear 
picture of the extent of Communist influence because the movements operated underground. 
More importantly, as will be shown in Chapter Two, the local security services were 
considered ill-prepared for war, especially as far as their anti-Communist security measures 
were concerned. In addition to stimulating and coordinating anti-Communist measures 
overseas, the AC (O) Committee was the engine for facilitating security liaisons with Middle 
Eastern countries, which was one means of implementing anti-Communist measures in the 
region.
210
 
Although the Middle East held an important position in Britain’s post-war strategy, it is 
noteworthy that these counter-subversive measures in the region had not been systematically 
coordinated until the Eden memorandum was issued in late 1955. This was mainly owing to 
the fact that counter-subversion in the region was not clearly defined at the government 
policy-level. More specifically, the implementation of these measures in the region was 
mostly associated with the Chiefs of Staff, and thus oriented towards war planning. In 
addition, these measures were conducted on an ad hoc basis whenever the opportunity arose. 
However, once the Eden memorandum was issued in late 1955/early 1956, the focus of 
counter-subversion shifted away from the Soviet Union and its satellites, and became to 
preserve British interests overseas. Counter-subversive measures in the case of foreign 
countries began to be coordinated by the Overseas Planning Committee of the Foreign Office, 
with the first committee meeting noting that ‘the Middle East and South-East Asia, in that 
order, are the areas most immediately threatened and where counter-action both overt and 
covert is most urgently needed’.211  
MI5’s large role in enhancing the security of the Colonies throughout the British 
Empire was identified by Philip Murphy in an Intelligence and National Security article in 
2002. Using the transition of the Central African Federation from the Colonies to the 
Commonwealth as his case study, Murphy noted that Britain was skilfully and mostly 
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successfully exporting their security practices through the police and security services across 
the British Empire. He argued that a close link with local security services through the 
representative of MI5 was an important element in creating a ‘Commonwealth intelligence 
culture’. 212  The declassified records make clear that the practice of enhancing internal 
security overseas was not confined to the British Empire.  
The first report by the Overseas Planning Committee clearly stated that one of the 
pillars of counter-subversive measures was ‘security training’, noting that ‘We consider that 
the value of training in security and anti-communist techniques cannot be overemphasised’. 
The Eden memorandum provided the financial resources (£25,000 a year) needed for security 
training especially for foreign (not colonial) security forces, in contrast to earlier efforts 
where the finances were lacking, as will be discussed in Chapter Two. In addition to 
arranging such training courses for foreign security/police officers either in Britain or host 
countries, it had been very difficult for the Foreign Office to persuade the Treasury to 
authorise payments to despatch British security/police advisers to foreign countries to 
conduct security training on an ad hoc basis.
213
  
In addition, the Overseas Planning Committee also clearly set out the use of ‘covert 
operations’ by MI6 as counter-subversive measures. In his minute to the Foreign Secretary 
Selwyn Lloyd, Sir Patrick Dean reported that: 
We are preparing a circular letter to Her Majesty’s representatives abroad informing them that 
the increased use of clandestine means to further foreign policy has been approved and 
requesting them to bear this constantly in mind and to submit recommendations for such 
activities in consultation with the local representatives of our friends [MI6]. We recommend 
that this should be followed up by more detailed instructions as appropriate to individual posts, 
asking for more reports on Communist penetration and prospects and recommendations for 
counter-action.
214
 
This excerpt shows the linkage between the Foreign Office and MI6 concerning the use of 
‘covert operations’, in other words special political action. Moreover, the approval by the 
Eden Government of the increased use of covert operations suggests that such operations 
were considered by the Government as a useful, and cost-effective, tool to implement foreign 
policy. The term ‘cost-effective’ being used here meant that the use of covert operations was 
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less costly than sending troops overseas. This point was made by Harold Macmillan, who 
used the example of sending British troops to Kenya, British Guiana, and Cyprus, which 
incurred huge expenditures of money and manpower, to suggest to Anthony Eden a wiser use 
of intelligence, when he proposed to establish the new committees.
215
 Furthermore, 
Macmillan may even have suggested this increased use of covert operations, informing Eden 
in 1955 that:   
[T]here is sometimes reluctance to contemplate the use of covert means until it is rather too late 
for the proper planning to take place. I think therefore we should examine our present 
procedures and organisation to ensure that the possibility of using covert means to achieve our 
ends and in support of our overt policy is constantly borne in mind and the necessary planning 
carried out wherever possible well in advance.
216
 
As will be discussed later in detail, this clearly suggests that Macmillan saw the use of 
intelligence services as an instrument of policy as a valid proposition.  
Harold Macmillan and Counter-Subversion in the Middle East  
Harold Macmillan was one of the key decision makers who set the direction of counter-
subversive activities, especially in the Middle East. Concerning Macmillan’s approach to 
defending ‘British interests in the Middle East’, Nigel Ashton remarked that he ‘was not only 
the foremost of the Cabinet hawks over Suez’ but also he was ‘if anything, even more 
radical’ than his Cabinet colleagues.217 In his minute to Anthony Eden in October 1955, 
Macmillan noted that the ‘supply of oil’ from the Middle East was vital for reviving Britain’s 
exhausted economy, and therefore, maintaining Britain’s position in the region was necessary 
‘at almost any cost’.218 In addition, Macmillan was also instrumental in initiating the sharing 
of the methods and techniques of Britain’s anti-Communist measures with certain Middle 
Eastern countries. The motive behind his decision to do so was to keep Soviet influence out 
of the Middle East, ensuring that Britain’s influence was maintained.  
Macmillan’s views on the intelligence services have been noted elsewhere. 219  The 
existing literature shows that Macmillan was above all in favour of MI6’s special operations, 
                                                 
215
 TNA: PRO PREM11/1582: PM/55/142: minute by Macmillan to PM, Top Secret, 19 Oct 1955. 
216
 Ibid.  
217
 Nigel J. Ashton, ‘Macmillan and the Middle East’, in Harold Macmillan and Britain’s World Role, edited by 
Richard Aldons and Sabine Lee (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), p.37.  
218
 TNA: PRO PREM11/1582: PM/55/142: minute by Macmillan to PM, Top Secret, 19 Oct 1955.  
219
 For instance, Christopher Andrew has shown in the authorised history of MI5 that Macmillan viewed MI5 
with a degree of scepticism in the context of domestic political scandals, especially during his premiership. 
Andrew, Defence of the Realm, p.482. 
 54 
 
 
particularly in the Middle East.
220
 In his memoirs, Christopher “Monty” Woodhouse, the 
chief architect on the MI6 side of the 1953 Iranian coup (codenamed Operation 
BOOT/TPAJAX) recorded that it was Macmillan, not Anthony Eden, who was keen to know 
more about the operational details of the 1953 Iranian coup. According to Woodhouse, 
Macmillan was ‘clearly looking to the future possibilities’ of using such an operation 
elsewhere.
221
 In addition, Woodhouse also noted that, in their conversation about problems 
with the colonial insurgency in Cyprus at a party in the Ministry of Defence in December 
1954, Macmillan said to him, ‘We ought to be trying some of your [MI6] stuff there’.222 With 
a few exceptions, documentary evidence on these matters, especially associated with MI6’s 
activities, is very thin in British sources.
223
 Declassified documents from the other side of the 
Atlantic, however, demonstrate Macmillan’s favourable attitudes towards such activities. 
When US officials were deliberating a possible collaboration with the British on clandestine 
special operations in the Syrian Crisis in September 1957, the Secretary of State of the United 
States, John Foster Dulles, noted that there was ‘genuine, intimate and effective cooperation, 
stemming directly from Macmillan’.224 
Besides Macmillan’s understanding of the role of intelligence in assisting his foreign 
and defence policies, it is worth exploring the motives behind Macmillan’s suggestion for 
establishing the new committees in October 1955. One year earlier, when Macmillan was 
appointed Minister of Defence (in October 1954), it appears that he was not aware of the 
existence of the AC (O) Committee, the activities of which had been supervised by the AC 
(M) Committee under the Attlee Government. Macmillan wrote in one of his memoirs, Tides 
of Fortune, concerning Britain’s anti-Communist activities overseas, on 30 November 1954 
that: 
No one is wholly responsible – it’s partly Defence, partly Colonial Office, partly Foreign 
Office. There’s no central anti-Communist organisation with any drive in it. ‘Cold War’ alarms 
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me more than ‘Hot war’. For we are not really winning it, and the Russians have a central 
position…and a well-directed effort, with strong representation (through the Communist party) 
in every country.
225
 
Macmillan discussed the same topic with Woodhouse a few days later, in December 1954; 
Woodhouse wrote in his memoir, Something Ventured, that:   
Macmillan said to me: “I am sure there is not going to be a hot war. The danger is that we shall 
lose the cold war. What I am trying to do is to find some ways of getting everyone to coo-
operate and pull together – the Cabinet, the Foreign Office, the service chiefs, the information 
people, yourselves and so on – everyone. But you cannot do that through committees; you want 
one man in control. In fact what you really want is a Minister for Cold War. Of course, I 
understand the Foreign Secretary’s anxieties about all this, naturally: after all, I may be Foreign 
Secretary myself one day”.
226
 
There was in fact the following discussion, which was recorded and filed in Woodhouse’s 
private papers. According to Woodhouse, Macmillan seemed still occupied with his own 
remarks about ‘a Minister for the Cold War’. He recorded that: 
I said [to Macmillan] that I thought everything depended on having the right man in the right 
place: it was obviously a question of leadership, not of machinery. I asked him if he had 
thought of the possibility of a political chairman for such committees as the AC (O) Committee 
– a junior minister like Dodds-Parker. He said that the idea had not occurred to him, but 
seemed interesting. (He appeared, by the way, to be confusing the AC (O) Committee with the 
Russia Committee).
227
 
Macmillan’s unawareness of the presence of the AC (O) Committee was perhaps 
understandable. While the Attlee Government supervised the activities of the AC (O) 
Committee through the AC (M) Committee, the subsequent Churchill and Eden Governments 
discontinued such a practice.
228
 In addition, owing to the infighting between the Foreign 
Office and the Chiefs of Staff over the conduct of the Cold War, despite the fact that anti-
Communist activities overseas were still being conducted, the AC (O) Committee meetings 
for policy-discussions also became less frequent – there was no AC (O) Committee meeting 
held in 1954.
229
 Moreover, Macmillan’s discussion with Woodhouse also indicates that 
Macmillan may well have been influenced by his discussion with him. This was certainly 
possible in the case of the appointment of Dodds-Parker as Chairman of the Overseas 
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Planning Committee – this may in fact not have originally come from Selwyn Lloyd, who 
may instead have been influenced by either Macmillan or Woodhouse.
230
  
Macmillan’s view of the Cold War and how to wage it needs to be explored further. 
Macmillan’s diaries suggest that he had hoped to be Minister of Defence since 1951.231 
However, by the time Macmillan finally became Minister of Defence in October 1954, his 
ambitions had evolved in the direction of the Foreign Office. 
232
 This was the context of the 
aforementioned discussion between Macmillan and Woodhouse concerning ‘a Minister of the 
Cold War’. At a party in the Ministry of Defence, in December 1954, Macmillan, as the 
Minister of Defence, told Woodhouse:  
We are fighting the wrong war – I’m convinced of it. I’ve only been five weeks in the job, but I 
am sure what we are doing now is all wrong. We’re getting ready for a hot war that is never 
going to happen; and anyway we can’t fight it, because we have’nt [sic] got the right weapons. 
What we ought to be doing is using our brains – that’s the one thing we have got to beat the 
other side with…
233
  
Despite his vague designs for the Cold War, in addition to the use of special operations by 
MI6, the minute by Macmillan dated in October 1955 on the use of intelligence overseas 
demonstrates a clearer plan for the conduct of the Cold War. It also contains a different 
aspect of his views on the use of the intelligence and security services in the context of 
British decolonisation.  
Facing the Soviet exploitation of anti-colonial nationalist movements both in colonial 
and foreign countries, such as the Middle East, on the one hand, and the lack of economic and 
defence resources on the other, Macmillan regarded intelligence as a cost-effective tool in 
implementing British policy overseas. Macmillan noted that:  
…To accomplish this our first line of defence in these territories must be to build up wherever 
possible adequate reliable intelligence/security forces from the local population and resources 
so that…these forces are in situ and capable of preventing a relapse into Communism or 
anarchy…I am convinced that the sooner we get to work in some of these foreign territories 
and British Colonies the easier our task will be and the cheaper to us in terms of manpower 
and money.
234
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Macmillan was referring not only to the problems in the Colonies but also in Middle Eastern 
countries on which Britain’s national interests depended. Moreover, as will be discussed in 
detail in Chapters Four and Five, during exactly the same period, Macmillan decided to 
‘make available technical advice on Communist subversion’ to the members of the Baghdad 
Pact (Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan), and proposed the formation of multilateral 
intelligence/security cooperation for intelligence sharing and fighting against Communist 
problems in the Pact area.
235
  
This proposal was significant in at least two ways. Firstly, by consolidating local 
security services through intelligence sharing on the techniques and methods of Communist 
subversion, local authorities were more likely to become resistant to Communist subversion. 
Thus, pro-British regimes, e.g. Iraq in the case of the Middle East, would remain in power. 
As noted earlier, this was already being done elsewhere in the Colonies during the same 
period. A further advantage of liaising with other intelligence/security services was to obtain 
intelligence that might not otherwise be available. Sir Patrick Dean noted that it was ‘one of 
the functions of the Security Service; to obtain secret intelligence by its own means’.236 Thus, 
the arrangement for sharing intelligence with local authorities would in turn enable Britain to 
‘check the growth of Communism’ in the region.237  
Declassified records from the Overseas Planning Committee further confirm that 
bolstering Britain’s closest ally, Iraq, against subversion was at the centre of counter-
subversive measures in the region. In addition, the Baghdad Pact was considered a defence 
against the growing influence of the Egyptian leader, Gamal Abdul Nasser, who became a 
symbol of anti-British agitation in the region from 1955. The first report by the Overseas 
Planning Committee in March 1956 noted that:   
The retention of Iraq as a firm base is of the greatest importance to Her Majesty’s Government, 
and we should ensure that membership of the Baghdad Pact is seen to be more profitable than 
Egyptian “neutralism”. Although no drastic covert action is urgently needed, we recommend 
that:…our friends [MI6] and the Security Service should be asked to pay particular attention to 
forces acting in Iraq against Nuri Pasha and our interests, and to put forward suggestions for 
counter-measures.
238
 
While the report did not contain any operational details, it nevertheless indicates that one of 
Britain’s main post-war anti-Communist measures, viz. enhancing the needed security of 
                                                 
235
 TNA: PRO FO371/121283: V10710/2: letter by A.A. Dudley, Singapore, to W.D. Allen, FO, 24 Jan 1956. 
236
 A minute by Patrick Dean to the Foreign Secretary, 16 Dec 1955. Obtained under the FOIA at my request 
(REF: 1258-12), 8 Mar 2013. 
237
 TNA: PRO PREM11/1582: minute by Norman Brook to PM, 21 Oct 1955. Emphasis added.  
238
 A minute by Patrick Dean to the Foreign Secretary, 19 Mar 1956. Obtained under the FOIA at my request 
(REF: 1258-12), 8 Mar 2013. 
 58 
 
 
British territories overseas, especially after 1956, was carried out not only in the Colonies, 
but also in foreign countries in the Middle East. 
Britain’s Relationship with the Americans in the Middle East 
Britain’s relationship with the United States in the Middle East has been a subject of 
numerous studies.
239
 The literature suggests that the United States was content with Britain to 
maintain its strategic position in the Middle East until 1958.
240
 Ritchie Ovendale argued in 
his study of Britain’s relationship with the Americans in the Middle East that Britain’s 
‘paramount power’, which had been established for decades, was rapidly fading away by the 
mid-1950s, and by Britain’s invitation, the transfer of power to Americans was completed by 
the early 1960s.
241
 The relationship between Britain and the United States was not a zero-sum 
game. In the wider context of British decolonisation, Wm. Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson 
have suggested that the British Empire was ‘transformed as part of the Anglo-American 
coalition’ in the Cold War.242 Most of the existing studies give credit for this to Harold 
Macmillan, who managed a closer relationship with the United States after the Suez 
debacle.
243
 While it is undeniable that Macmillan was important in cementing the so-called 
special relationship after Suez, other works such as those by Scott Lucas and Richard Aldrich 
remind us that, despite occasional differences in policy, a close connection between the 
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British and the Americans had already existed at official and intelligence levels before the 
Suez Crisis.
244
   
Indeed, the literature also suggests that Britain had a different degree of cooperation 
with the Americans at departmental and intelligence levels. Amongst all, perhaps, the closest 
cooperation was maintained at the military level, thanks to the Second World War, which 
also included intelligence sharing.
245
 This was particularly true in the case of the post-war 
Middle East, where joint military planning saw the highest level of cooperation.
246
 Security 
intelligence reports on Middle Eastern affairs compiled by SIME were periodically shared 
with the Americans after the end of the Second World War.
247
 MI6 also enjoyed fairly close 
cooperation with the Americans. A notable example of this is the aforementioned 1953 coup 
in Iran.
248
 They cooperated on the 1953 coup once a sceptical Harry Truman was replaced by 
President Dwight Eisenhower at the beginning of 1953. The reasons for cooperation with the 
Americans on the British side were both financial and practical difficulties. When diplomatic 
relations were ended in October 1952, the British Embassy staff, including the MI6 station, 
were expelled from Tehran, where MI6’s agents were contacted and maintained by the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), such as Roger Goiran, CIA station chief in Tehran, and 
Kermit Roosevelt, who carried out the operation with US finance.
249
 
The aforementioned Overseas Planning Committee also referred to future cooperation 
with the Americans in the case of counter-subversion in foreign countries. In addition to the 
aforementioned letter by Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick addressed to all posts abroad, in his minute, 
which set out the outline of counter-subversion in foreign countries under the direction of the 
Overseas Planning Committee, Sir Patrick Dean noted in March 1956 that: 
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We must cooperate even more closely in all “cold war” activities. The Americans will certainly 
welcome a more robust attitude on our part…We should not scruple to ask them for financial 
help.
250
 
Owing to its financial difficulties, the Overseas Planning Committee encouraged invitations 
to the Americans to cooperate on counter-subversion in foreign countries. The declassified 
records further reveal that in the case of counter-subversive measures in Jordan, for instance, 
which had maintained a close connection with the British since the end of the First World 
War, a number of problems were identified, such as an influx of refugees caused the collapse 
of the Palestine Mandate and the establishment of Israel, growing Communist influence, and 
all forms of hostile propaganda from the Soviet Union and Egypt. In March 1956, Douglas 
Dodds-Parker suggested counter-measures in Jordan to Selwyn Lloyd, ‘May we discuss these 
with the Americans?’ By ticking against the line, Selwyn Lloyd appears to have approved the 
action.
251
  
A record declassified under the FOIA shows that the United States had assumed 
‘financial responsibility’ from Britain for the Jordanian Army by the beginning of 1958, and 
the American Military Attaché acted as a liaison officer with the Jordanian Army, who was 
making ‘successful’ efforts to influence the Jordanians.252 The financial assistance to Jordan 
was indeed a part of the so-called “Eisenhower Doctrine”, which provided American 
assistance to Middle Eastern states that were prepared to resist Communist threats.
253
 
Reporting on the American activities in Jordan to the Foreign Office, Sir Charles Johnston, 
the British Ambassador in Jordan (1956-60), noted that this caused him ‘no misgivings’ since 
‘our relations with the Middle Eastern side of CIA are very close at present’, and that ‘we are 
agreed that it is a Western interest to keep the Jordan Arab Army both strong and 
efficient’.254 Moreover, in his autobiography, Jack O’Connell, the former CIA station chief in 
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Jordan (1963-71), who liaised directly with King Hussein of Jordan, indicates that the CIA’s 
long relationship with Jordan started from his arrival in Jordan in the summer of 1958.
255
  
Despite the American involvement in certain areas of individual countries, such as 
Egypt and Jordan, their overall policy towards the region was mostly dominated by the so-
called Project ALPHA from 1954 until early 1956, concentrating on means of achieving 
peace between the Arab states and Israel, and their oil interest in Saudi Arabia.
256
 The 
ambiguous attitude of the Americans towards the region was clearly seen in the context of the 
US attitudes towards the Baghdad Pact – while the United States was a full member of some 
important committees of the Pact, such as the Economic and Military Committees (it joined 
in 1957), it was not yet a member of the Pact itself until 1959.
257
 More importantly, in the 
committees specifically dealing with subversive activities in the Pact area, namely the 
Liaison and Counter-Subversion Committees, which will be discussed in detail in subsequent 
chapters, the United States remained officially neutral as an ‘observer’ until its accession as a 
full member in 1959. Elie Podeh has suggested that ‘all these mixed signals created the 
impression that Washington did not consider the Baghdad Pact as a major instrument of 
policy’.258 A report by the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff confirms in August 
1958 that, ‘up to the present time’, from their point of view, ‘the United States have had no 
wish to support or protect British interests’.259 
My archival research indicates that the American accession to the Pact in 1959 as a 
full member largely resulted from British efforts to maintain the Pact as a regional 
defence/security organisation. When the Baghdad Pact lost its headquarters, after the Iraqi 
withdrawal from the Pact, Britain faced difficulties in persuading the remaining regional 
members to maintain to the rationale for and morale of the Pact. Unlike the other members 
(Turkey was a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and Pakistan was a 
member of the South-East Treaty Organisation), Britain’s was especially concerned about 
Iran, which belonged to the Baghdad Pact but not to any another Western security 
organisations. A CIA report noted that ‘the British are anxious to boost the Shah’s morale’, 
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and also recorded that the Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd insisted in September 1958 on the 
United States becoming a full member and expressed his concern that ‘Iran might go 
neutralist if the Shah does not receive the material and moral support he deems necessary’.260  
Records declassified under the FOIA further show that soon after Britain ‘lost’ Iraq, 
its closest ally in the region on 14 July 1958, Harold Macmillan reconsidered Britain’s 
position and reformulated a new policy towards the region.
261
 As will be shown in Chapter 
Five in detail, Britain’s policy towards the region had maintained a strong anti-Nasserite 
policy, paying particular attention to ‘the region-wide task of diminishing Egyptian and Saudi 
influence’, and ‘breaking the Egypt/Saudi axis’.262 However, Britain re-examined its national 
interests in the region, and decided to drop its outright anti-Nasserite policy.
263
 In order to 
maintain good relations with the Baghdad Pact members, who were unlikely to welcome such 
a policy, the British government decided that the Americans ‘should be induced to join the 
new organisation’.264 Consequently, the United States joined the Central Treaty Organisation 
(CENTO), which was the Baghdad Pact renamed, and they participated in counter-subversive 
activities as a full member from 1959 onwards.   
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how anti-Communist policy evolved throughout the period, 
especially in connection with the Middle East. The subject of anti-Communist measures was 
at the centre of debates in the British Government concerning the conduct of the Cold War 
throughout the period between the late 1940s and 1955/56, in which divergent views on the 
“Cold War” existed within Whitehall. The year 1955/56 was the beginning of the transition 
period of Britain’s post-war anti-Communist measures – in another word, counter-subversion. 
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The role of the Chiefs of Staff was considered less prominent from that year. Despite the shift 
of the balance, the important of anti-Communist measures in the Middle East was sustained 
throughout the period from 1949 to 1963. Until the mid-1950s, the Chiefs of Staff placed 
paramount importance on the region as it was the Middle East where a Third World War 
against the Soviet Union would likely originate. As a result, as will be discussed in Chapter 
Two and Three, SIME was regarded as ‘an integral part of the military machine’ in the region 
and its activities were chiefly directed by both the Chiefs of Staff and the Defence Committee 
in the event of war.
265
And, as will be seen in Chapters Four and Five, from 1955/56, counter-
subversion was seen as a tool of foreign policy – under the Baghdad Pact, regional 
cooperation in counter-subversion was regarded as necessary to check and prevent the spread 
of Communism in the region. 
This chapter has also shown that how the roles of intelligence and security services in 
anti-Communist measures were understood by policymakers in London. Winston Churchill’s 
penchant for secret intelligence and his use of it is well-known.
266
 Anthony Eden also sought 
to use MI6 as his personal tool against Nasser.
267
 However, in the field of anti-Communist 
measures overseas, including the Colonies and foreign countries, it was Harold Macmillan 
who appeared most ready to use intelligence in implementing and guiding his policies. In the 
history of British decolonisation, Macmillan is well known for his ‘Wind of Change’ speech 
made to the South African Parliament in 1960. While there is little discussion about 
Macmillan’s views on intelligence in his diaries, it is important to acknowledge that 
Macmillan’s attitudes towards British decolonisation were formulated on the basis of his 
views on the role of intelligence/security services in counter-subversion overseas.
268
  
Finally, this chapter has demonstrated that Britain’s anti-Communist measures were 
not confined only to the Colonies, but extended even to foreign countries, especially in the 
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Middle East. The role of intelligence and security services in anti-Communist measures was 
regarded as a central tool of anti-Communist policy in London. As will be shown in the 
following chapters, MI5, MI6 and the IRD had particularly large roles to play in anti-
Communist measures, but there were also implications for the internal security of the regional 
governments. While these implications will be hinted upon in following chapters, they will be 
discussed in full in the Conclusion.   
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Chapter Two 
Police Training in Anti-Communist Measures and  
the Introduction of British Security Liaison.269  
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People in the Arab world were intrigued by the Communists…The old political parties all over 
the Arab world were bankrupt of ideas and influences because the world was changing and they 
were not prepared for change. So there was a vacuum of power and the idea of Communism 
was potentially attractive…When the Communist Manifesto was smuggled into Egypt it caused 
a sensation. Intellectuals read it and thought that they had come upon a key which could open 
all the political and social doors.  
- Mohamed Heikal
270
  
Introduction 
The quotation from Mohamed Heikal, an Egyptian journalist, illustrates a common 
sentiment amongst Egyptians immediately after the Second World War. This sentiment could 
be found throughout the Middle East, where many dominant political parties were with 
Britain and were increasingly being challenged by a public growing frustrated with their local 
politics. While the idea of Communism never became popular in the region, thanks to the 
measures adopted by the strongly anti-Communist governments, frustrated anti-colonial 
nationalists adopted a revolutionary tendency which was often associated with International 
Communism and engaged in subversive activities to change the status quo.
271
 Nevertheless, 
the significance of the potential danger that these movements might be exploited by 
Communists, or that they might adopt Communist tactics – a perception resulting from the 
complex picture of the Cold War and the decolonisation process in the region – has yet to be 
adequately addressed by historians.
272
 In addition, how the local police and security services 
dealt with Communists and subversive activities in the region is largely unnoticed in the 
academic literature.
273
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The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that there was a close connection in anti-
Communist policy between Britain and Middle Eastern governments, a connection which was 
maintained through intelligence liaison.  It will show how the British government came to 
conclude that training Middle Eastern security services in anti-Communist measures was 
necessary, and the way in which these measures were implemented in the region. This 
chapter will also show that British anti-Communist policy and British concerns about the 
Communist movements in the region dovetailed neatly with the demands of Middle Eastern 
governments for British advice on anti-Communist measures. The cases discussed here are 
those of Lebanon, Iran, Iraq and Jordan, all of which illustrate the extent to which Britain 
successfully, or unsuccessfully, sought to implement anti-Communist measures in the region. 
It will conclude with some discussion of the usefulness of such an intelligence liaison in the 
region. 
Communist Movements in the Middle East and British Security/Police 
Liaison in Anti-Communist Measures 
In the 1920s and 1930s, local Communist Parties in the Middle East were founded 
under the direction of the Comintern, and adhered to a Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideological 
doctrine.
274
 While undermining the reputation of local authorities by subversive publications, 
these Communist groups attempted to infiltrate local authorities, especially focusing on the 
Army and security services. The local authorities were aware of these Communist methods 
and techniques. According to the Iraqi Penal Code, expression of approval for or 
dissemination of the doctrines of Communism would be punished by penal servitude, and if 
the offence occurred in the ‘presence of more than one member of the armed forces or the 
police’, it would be ‘punishable with death’.275 Similar measures were enforced in other 
Middle Eastern countries.
276
 By the late 1940s Communist activities were outlawed in the 
region.
277
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Despite these legislative settings, the attitudes of Middle Eastern governments 
towards Communists varied from country to country. Amongst them, Iraq, Britain’s closest 
ally, which had maintained a strong anti-Communist policy since the 1920s, was above all the 
leading anti-Communist government in the region until 1958. Despite being resilient since its 
establishment in the early 1930s, the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) was consistently 
suppressed by the Iraqi authorities.
278
 These security measures were conducted by the 
Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Iraqi Police, led by Colonel Bahjat Beg 
Attiyah since the 1930s.
279
 Meanwhile in Lebanon, which was considered to have the most 
liberal government in the region, the authorities were more reluctant to take firm action 
against Communists. Emir Farid Chehab, the Chef de Sûreté [Head of the Lebanese Sûreté 
Générale] (1948-1958), once told a Western journalist that ‘They [Lebanese politicians] will 
tell you they are fighting Communism, but it is only because they think it will please [the 
West] to hear that’.280 When Sir Michael Wright, Assistant Under-Secretary of the Foreign 
Office, the chief expert on Middle Eastern affairs, was invited to a meeting at the AC (O) 
Committee to express his opinion on Communist influence in the Middle East in June 1950, 
he insisted on the need to ‘stimulate’ the Lebanese government to take necessary action as 
they were showing ‘very little vigour in tackling this problem’.281  When Chehab visited 
Captain Guy Liddell of MI5 at Leconfield House in London in 1951, he lamented the fact 
that he had received virtually no support from his Ministers to conduct anti-Communist 
measures in the country. In addition, Chehab only had a handful of officers whom he could 
trust in his organisation, and believed that the Lebanese police had been penetrated by 
Communists or their sympathisers.
282
  
Since the Middle East was considered of paramount importance to Britain’s post-war 
strategy, in terms of its defence planning against the Soviet Union and the natural resources 
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for its post-war recovery, the aforementioned highly-secret cabinet anti-Communist 
committee, the AC (O) Committee, paid close attention to Communist activities in the region. 
The problem with the Communist movements in the Middle East, from the British point of 
view, was that, since they had been forced underground, it was difficult to obtain a clear 
picture of their extent and influence. In addition, regardless of their size and popularity, the 
danger of Communist activities was understood to be that, ‘communism does not wait until it 
secures a majority’, and ‘a small group of fanatics carry out the coup d’état’.283 General Sir 
John Bagot Glubb, Commander of the Arab Legion, also wrote to the Foreign Office in 1950 
with an Arab proverb that ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ – both Britain and pro-
British regimes were easily targeted by propaganda from Communists and the Soviet Union, 
and Communists could be seen as allies by non-Communist anti-British groups.
284
 This fear 
of the Communist menace was exacerbated by the fact that the region was full of intrigue, 
conspiracies, and assassinations by internal opponents and external enemies.
285
 Once the 
Korean War broke out in June 1950, the AC (O) Committee was particularly concerned about 
the situation in the region as, despite Communist Parties being prohibited, local authorities 
were not particularly aware of the ‘insidious nature of methods used by Communists’ outside 
the region.
286
 The Foreign Office also noted that even the most diligent security forces in the 
region, such as those of the Egyptians and Iraqis, were also considered ‘not particularly well-
conceived or effective’ as they tended to ‘make arrests too soon, thus losing valuable 
intelligence’.287 Above all, the AC (O) Committee considered that local authorities lacked 
experience in anti-Communist security measures for the event of a Third World War.
288
  
Following reports on the counter-insurgency campaign in Malaya by Sir Henry 
Gurney, the High Commissioner in Malaya, and a Foreign Office analysis of the methods and 
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techniques employed by the Communists to seize power in Eastern Europe in the late 1940s, 
the AC (O) Committee came to the conclusion that the training of foreign police officers was 
an essential element of measures to prevent the spread of Communist movements overseas.
289
 
The role of the police was considered particularly important in the Communist seizure of 
Eastern Europe – after the formation of a Democratic Front, the Soviet Union appointed a 
‘Moscow-trained’ Communist as Minister of the Interior to control the police, and created a 
‘strong secret security police’ commanded by Communists, which was extensively used 
against political opposition.
290
 Sir Gladwyn Jebb of the Foreign Office, the Chairman of the 
AC (O) Committee, commented that:  
…in countries which have been communized since the war the role of the police force has 
invariably been decisive, and it has been represented that it would help to prevent Communist 
infiltration of police forces in countries outside the Orbit if it were possible to offer increased 
facilities for the training of foreign policemen in this country.
291
 
Sir Stewart Menzies, Chief of MI6, and Captain Guy Liddell, Deputy Director-General of 
MI5, a non-permanent observing member, both saw training of foreign police a ‘definite 
advantage’ in the fight against the spread of Communism.292 The AC (O) Committee then 
decided in May 1950 that the training of foreign police was essential in anti-Communist 
measures, and tasked the Foreign Office, as well as MI6, to ‘stimulate foreign governments’ 
to ask Britain for ‘assistance in training their police in anti-Communist measures’.293  
The targets of foreign countries for anti-Communist training by the AC (O) 
Committee included a variety of countries from different regions, such as Western Europe, 
South-Eastern Europe, the Middle East, South-East Asia, and Latin America.
294
 However, the 
Middle East was given special attention. Although the minutes of the AC (O) Committee 
have been heavily “weeded”, the declassified Guy Liddell diaries make clear that training of 
foreign police officers from the Middle East was prioritised over any other countries, for 
which MI5 would be responsible.
295
 After providing anti-Communist training to a number of 
Middle Eastern police officers, a different approach was adopted by 1951. Working to a 
different standard and practice, the Middle Eastern counterparts could not be trained 
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alongside forces from other regions, such as Western Europe. Moreover, since most Middle 
Eastern security officers did not understand English at all, anti-Communist training in Britain 
had ‘little chance of improving national security services’ in the Middle East. Guy Liddell 
then instead suggested the AC (O) Committee anti-Communist measures be implemented 
‘through local liaison by Security Service trained personnel or by Police advisers’.296  
While the minutes of the AC (O) Committee meetings do not record its specific 
objectives in detail, they suggest that the introduction of the British adviser had at least two 
objectives. The first objective was to try to control the spread of Communism. The second 
was to obtain information on Communist movements in the region. Chairman of the JIC, Sir 
Patrick Reilly, also a permanent member of the AC (O) Committee, recorded:   
Apart from the obvious value of this to our general anti-communist effort, any such 
strengthening of links with foreign police authorities can be of great advantage both to [MI6] 
and the Security Service, by paving the way to the exchange of information and operational 
liaison.
297
  
Thus, by 1951, the posting of security advisers to local governments had become the 
preferred method for advising local authorities on more effective administrative and 
legislative measures against the local communist problem. It also functioned to check the 
spread of Communism in the region through liaison with the local police of ‘strategically 
important countries’.298  
In addition to the introduction of British security advisers in the region, the AC (O) 
Committee decided in June 1951 to use Britain’s closest ally in the region, Iraq, to encourage 
other Middle Eastern authorities to take ‘legislative and administrative action to combat 
Communist activities’ through the sharing of Iraqi experience and information. The British 
Ambassador in Baghdad was instructed to suggest that the Iraqi government cooperate with 
other local authorities to ‘take steps to segregate and re-educate politically persons held on 
charges of Communist activities’.299  
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The Lebanese Sûreté Générale and Ousting the French influence  
Lebanon is normally regarded as part of the French sphere of influence owing to its 
colonial legacy, but was in fact one of Britain’s ‘strategically important countries’ and hosted 
one of Britain’s secretly placed security/police advisers. In post-war Lebanon the internal 
security system was inherited from the French Mandate, in which the Sûreté Générale, the 
Lebanese Security Service, was responsible for internal security, including counter-espionage 
and counter-subversion.
300
 As a result of the Lebanese government’s reluctance to take strong 
measures against the Communist threat, Britain considered Lebanon to have the most 
insufficient anti-Communist measures. In addition, the complexity of the Lebanese security 
apparatus also hampered effective security work. One such ‘petty annoyance’ which Emir 
Farid Chehab, Head of the Sûreté Générale, complained about to Major David Beaumont-
Nesbitt, Assistant Military Attaché at the British Embassy in Beirut, was that his official 
telephone line in the Sûreté was ‘tapped by agents of the President’s brother’.301  Major 
Beaumont-Nesbitt was in fact serving as the representative of MI5 in Lebanon and Syria, 
seconded from the Army on a temporary basis. He reported to MI5 headquarters on the status 
of the Lebanese security apparatus that ‘the mechanics of this preposterous operation, if true, 
are, as one may imagine, highly complex and there are the usual wheels within wheels, the 
agents concerned being simultaneously employed by various organisations’.302  
The British had compelling reasons for more robust anti-Communist measures in 
Lebanon. Lebanon housed the highest number of Communist party members (12,000) and 
sympathisers (50,000) in the Middle East.
303
 The Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) was also 
believed to have been cooperating very closely with the Syrian Communist Party (SCP) 
under a Joint Higher Committee. The strength of the SCP was estimated at around 2,000 to 
2,500 members.
304
 A JIC report stated that the LCP also ‘kept in close touch with the Soviet 
Legation’, through which it was believed that the Soviets maintained close ties with regional 
Communist Parties.
305
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It is noteworthy that, by the time the anti-Communist measures in Lebanon were 
discussed at the AC (O) Committee in London, the Lebanese had already approached Britain 
for advice. In March 1949, the Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hamid Franjieh, 
approached Sir William Houstoun-Boswall, the British Minister in Beirut, to ask for a British 
expert on anti-Communist measures. Houstoun-Boswall then reported the Lebanese request 
to London with great secrecy as ‘nobody including the chief of secret police knows anything 
of this move which it is desired to keep secret and quite unofficial’.306 The reason for the 
secrecy was not only due to the sensitivity of the subject, but also to the presence of a French 
security adviser to the Lebanese government in Beirut. As shown in a recent study on the 
British-French rivalry in Lebanon, countering French influence in post-war Lebanon had 
been a concern of the British since before the end of the war.
307
 The Lebanese approach thus 
presented the British with a unique opportunity to establish influence in the French sphere by 
placing a senior British police officer in the heart of the Lebanese government with access to 
the Lebanese Prime Minister and the chance to impart personal advice on anti-Communist 
measures.
308
 L.G. Thirkell, a senior official of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, 
in charge of Syrian and Lebanese affairs, noted that appointing such an expert without 
informing the French ‘would arouse the worst suspicions’, but it was decided not to tell them 
as notification would ‘invite serious criticism and such an appointment would presumably 
have to be kept secret or have some form of cover’.309  
Soon after the approach, a meeting was held in the Foreign Office, where it was 
decided that “the best man” for the assignment, Graham Mitchell of MI5, was to be sent to 
keep the Lebanese government on track.
310
 Mitchell’s mission was to secure a position in 
Lebanon - his failure to do so might cause the Lebanese government ‘to approach another 
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Power instead, such as the Americans or even the French’.311 In November 1948 the Foreign 
Office had in fact also contemplated sending Graham Mitchell, ‘a specialist on communism’, 
to countries such as Iran, Iraq, Transjordan, Lebanon and Egypt, to ‘tender advice to those 
countries on communist methods and tactics’.312 This earlier proposal was eventually turned 
down as there were no requests made from the local authorities. In addition, it was also noted 
that ‘[s]hould the Egyptian Government ask for our assistance at any time in this matter, the 
representative of SIME would be able to provide it’.313 
Mitchell’s visit in May 1949 was an appreciable success. During the visit, he 
convinced the Lebanese Prime Minister, Riad el-Solh, that the Communist movement was a 
‘formidable enemy’, able to act as ‘a fifth column in the event of war with Russia’. He also 
managed to obtain an oral promise to appoint a British adviser to the Head of the Sûreté 
Générale, Farid Chehab. This was in fact an objective of his visit to boost intelligence 
collection on the Communist movement in the region. Mitchell wrote in his report that: 
[r]epeated reports from various sources have emphasised that from the Russian Legation in 
Beirut there springs a multitude of espionage and other subversive activities…British control, 
direct or indirect, of a local Security Service [Sûreté Générale] working on efficient lines would 
therefore hold out a promise of producing material of considerable intelligence value.
314
  
In addition, Mitchell noted later in his report that it was essential to meet with Farid Chehab, 
with the permission of Riad el-Solh, to discuss the subject as Farid Chehab was ‘thoroughly 
friendly to British interests and ready to co-operate’. Farid Chehab was above all ‘a close 
contact of our [MI5] representative in Beirut’.315  
Farid Chehab, still remembered as ‘Bay al Amn al Aam [Father of the Sûreté 
Générale]’ in Lebanon, retained the post of Chef de Sûreté until September 1958.316 He 
served his country diligently, but most of all, Farid Chehab was an anti-Communist, believing 
with Britain that Communism was a real threat which was detrimental to the values and 
traditions of the Middle East. He once noted to a Middle East correspondent of TIME, Keith 
Wheelock, in 1954 that: 
If it comes to war, the Middle East will fall to the Communists inevitably. Just as inevitably 
you’ll have to take it back. The West could not abide Russia controlling the Middle East. It’ll 
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be a lot easier to take it back if the people are on your side. If they’re not on your side it will be 
almost impossible to take it back.
317
  
Moreover, as Mitchell rightly noted earlier, Farid Chehab was clearly pro-British, as opposed 
to being pro-American - he regarded the Americans as being ‘temperamentally incapable of 
understanding the complexities of the Levant’.318 Farid Chehab had an intimate relationship 
with the British: after his imprisonment by the Vichy French, he had, though indirectly, 
cooperated with Colonel Sir Patrick Coghill, the head of the British Security Mission in 
Lebanon during post-war independence from French rule; in August 1947, he attended a 
three-month training course, including counter-espionage, at Scotland Yard’s Superior Police 
Training College in Britain. Once he was back from Britain, he was appointed Head of the 
Sûreté Générale.
319
 
Written recommendations were left by Mitchell with Riad el-Solh regarding steps to 
take in combating Communism. It is noteworthy that Mitchell suggested Riad el-Solh 
enhance the capabilities of the Sûreté Générale – giving Farid Chehab a ‘free hand’ for 
internal security; allowing him to have a technical liaison with the Minister of Posts and 
Telegrams with the ‘object of putting at the disposal of the Sûreté means for the interception 
of communications of suspects’; and to set up effective control of frontiers and of ‘Russian 
and satellite aliens’ by ensuring that ‘no alien enters or resides in the Lebanon’ without the 
knowledge of the government. These were deliberately written in French to conceal 
‘evidence of British origin’.320 In his report Mitchell recommended that the Foreign Office 
respond quickly should the Lebanese formally request an adviser, and to make the necessary 
appointment while ‘the iron is hot’. If not, Mitchell wrote that an alternative possibility was 
to insert a ‘technical officer at a lower level’ into the Sûreté to ‘be elevated gradually by 
Farid [Chehab] as opportunity offers’. 321  Soon after Mitchell’s visit, administrative 
developments indeed emerged: Farid Chehab acquired a new building for the Sûreté Générale 
and strictly compartmentalised sections were established for organisational efficacy.
322
  
After initial hesitation by the Lebanese President, Bechara El Khoury, who favoured a 
French connection, a formal request for an adviser from the Lebanese government eventually 
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reached the Foreign Office via the British Embassy in Beirut.
323
 J.M. Kyles, the former 
Commissioner of Police in Sudan, a fluent Arabic speaker with some twenty years of 
experience in Palestine, was appointed Security Adviser in May 1950.
324 
A letter sent by 
George Clutton, Head of the African Department of the Foreign Office, to Khartoum in 
September 1949, during the search for a suitable candidate for the post, reiterates the 
advantage of placing a British security adviser in Beirut:  
Lebanon is, as you probably know, the chief centre of communism in the Middle East; and such 
an appointment would have the double advantage of putting the Lebanese security services into 
some sort of shape to deal with the local Communist menace and of providing us with first-
hand information about communist activities in the Middle East straight from source.
325
 
J.M. Kyles was tasked by the AC (O) Committee to ‘stimulate’ the Lebanese government ‘to 
repress’ the Communist menace. 326  On September 1950, about four months after the 
appointment of Kyles, Riad el-Solh issued a new secret decree for the formation of a special 
Anti-Communist Bureau, to be headed by Farid Chehab as the Chef de Sûreté.
327
 Shortly 
after its establishment, Farid Chehab was once again in Britain, this time particularly for 
training in anti-Communist measures.
328
  
Nevertheless, anti-Communist measures in Lebanon through both J.M. Kyles and 
Farid Chehab ended with mixed results. Following the formation of the Anti-Communist 
Bureau, Sir William Houstoun-Boswall despatched a letter to Ernest Bevin:  
Mr Kyles, the Police Adviser whose task, as you can well imagine, is not an easy one here, has 
been trying to influence the authorities to work along more systematic lines. The trouble is, as 
you will not be surprised to hear, that Mr Kyles’ advice is very rarely sought and when given is 
not acted upon…But now they have at least begun – if only dimly – to appreciate the very real 
danger presented by Communism. And I do not propose to allow them again to relapse into 
their pipe dream that Communism must be dead just because it is outlawed.
329
 
This indicates that the influence of a British security liaison officer in the implementation of 
legislative measures was limited as the final decision was always in the hands of the 
Lebanese government. In fact, the anti-Communist Lebanese government was short-lived. 
When Riad el-Solh was assassinated in July 1951, the implementation of these anti-
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Communist measures became more strained. It also caused the termination of Kyles’ 
advisory post.
330
 When Farid Chehab met with Guy Liddell during his training in anti-
Communist measures in Britain in June 1951, he told Liddell that Kyles’ advice had rarely 
been sought owing to constant changes in government policy, which also cut the manpower 
of Chehab’s organisation from ‘200 to 100’, of which Chehab felt he could rely on ‘barely 5 
per cent’ as the organisation, he believed, had been penetrated by Communist 
sympathisers.
331
 In addition, Farid Chehab noted that he received little support from his 
ministers, and even when he reported that someone in the government was ‘working for the 
Russians’, no action was taken. 332  As will be shown later, however, through the close 
connection made through the appointment of the Security Adviser to Farid Chehab, he 
became one of the most important supporters of British anti-Communist measures in the 
region.  
Iranian G-2 and General Razmara   
After Lebanon, the next move was made in Iran. Here again the initial approach came 
not from the British but instead from the Iranian side. General Hadj Ali Razmara, the Chief of 
the Iranian General Staff, secretly contacted the military attaché at the British Embassy in 
Tehran in January 1950.
333
 Before this Iranian approach, as noted earlier, the Foreign Office 
had already contemplated sending Graham Mitchell of MI5 to Tehran in November 1948 to 
‘obtain information about Communism’ in Iran by sharing the British experience of 
combating Communism in Malaya with the Iranian authorities. This proposal was 
nevertheless rejected due to the lax security of the Iranian government at the time; it was 
feared that news of the contact might leak to the Russians.
334
 In addition, in March 1949, 
when the Iranian Police informally contacted Scotland Yard requesting counter-espionage 
training for their police officers in Britain, MI5 had also considered the opportunity ‘desirable 
to exploit’, but a formal request was never made by the Iranian government.335 Iran had 
indeed been a cause for Cold War concerns since the end of the Second World War, where 
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the strength of the Tudeh Party was estimated at 10,000 to 12,000 members, according to JIC 
estimates from early 1950.
336
 The approach made by General Razmara was thus Britain’s 
opportunity to train the Iranians in anti-Communist measures, as well as to obtain information 
about Communist activities in Iran.  
 Razmara’s decision to approach the British came after debriefing a Soviet walk-in, 
named ‘Vassilev’, who defected to the Iranian authorities with some documents on the 
subversive activities of the Tudeh Party.
337
 Convinced that Iran’s own methods of fighting 
against Communism in the country had been insufficient, General Razmara hoped to improve 
his own security organisation, a counter-espionage organisation within the Iranian General 
Staff, named the Deuxième Bureau (also called the ‘G-2 organisation’), with help from 
Britain.
338
  Despite the presence of a large American military mission in Iran, Razmara later 
noted to Haldane-Porter of MI5 that he did not consult with the Americans on this matter 
since the Americans had ‘no understanding of the Asiatic mentality’, and it would therefore 
be ‘a waste of time to have a resident American Adviser’ in Tehran.339   
 After Razmara’s initial approach, a discussion was soon held at the Foreign Office, 
where Sir Francis Shepherd, the British Ambassador to Iran (1950-52) and representatives of 
MI5’s Overseas Section, Sir John Shaw and Haldane-Porter, were also present. As no one 
was available from MI5 Headquarters at the time, it was considered that Brigadier William 
Magan, Head of SIME, regional headquarters of MI5, would be an ideal candidate to be 
despatched to Tehran for a discussion with General Razmara, as Magan spoke Persian and 
knew the country well from his experience there during the Second World War.
340
 Magan’s 
                                                 
336
 TNA: PRO CAB134/3: AC (O) (50) 18: report (annex) by JIC, ‘Communist Influence in the Middle East’, 
21 Apr 1950. 
337
 TNA: PRO FO371/82314: EP1017/3G: letter by Colonel D.K. Betts to Brigadier V. Boucher of DDMI, 
‘Defection of Soviet Subject’, WO, No.307 of 27 Jan 1950, which states that ‘Vassilev was, I understand, 
deputy manager of the Soviet controlled transport company named “Iransovtrans” which operates in Persia. The 
C.G.S. [General Razmara] said that Vassilev brought with him a number of letters which showed that certain 
Soviet controlled commercial concerns in this country were falsifying the figures submitted to the Persian 
Minister of Finance, in order to turn over undeclared profits to the financing of Soviet propaganda and 
espionage in this country’.  
338
 Razmara regarded his own G-2 as ‘the only effective organisation in the country’ in combating the continued 
underground activity of the Tudeh Party. This was owing to the fact that the police, he believed, had been 
penetrated by the Communists. See TNA: PRO FO371/82314: EP1017/3G: letter by Colonel D.K. Betts to 
Brigadier V. Boucher of DDMI, WO, No.518 of 28
 
Jan 1950. 
339
 TNA: PRO FO371/82314: EP1017/11G: report by Haldane Porter of MI5, ‘Report on visit to Tehran’, 14 
Apr 1950 [thereafter Haldane-Porter Report]. 
340
 Note that Magan’s wartime experience in Iran as a liaison officer of the Intelligence Bureau in India with the 
Persian government can be found from Magan, Middle Eastern Approaches. See also Middle East Centre 
Archive (hereafter MECA), St. Antony’s College, Oxford: Private Papers of W.M.T. Magan and Alan Roger 
(MAGAN/ROGER), Collection GB165-0199: letter by Magan to Denis Wright, 3 Feb 1981. 
 79 
 
 
task was to find out whether the long-term appointment of a British residential adviser was 
necessary.
341
 The proposal was, nevertheless, turned down by Foreign Secretary Ernest 
Bevin, who was content to advise the Iranians on anti-Communist measures in principle, but 
unhappy with the ‘likelihood that the Russians would know who Mr Magan is’.342 It was then 
decided that Haldane-Porter, a senior officer of MI5’s Overseas Section, whose real identity 
was ‘certainly not known to the Russians’, instead travel to Tehran via Cairo in late March 
1950 in the guise of ‘a member of the Foreign Service’.343 The US Embassy in Tehran was 
informed of Haldane-Porter’s visit in advance.344 
In the course of his four-day-long discussions with General Razmara, which were 
conducted in French owing to Razmara’s lack of fluency in English, Haldane-Porter was fully 
briefed on Razmara’s G-2 organisation with a chart of its organisational structure; it had been 
given particular responsibility for watching and countering the activities of the Tudeh Party 
under a special law passed after the attempted assassination of the Shah in February 1949.
345
 
However, from Haldane-Porter’s view, ‘G-2’ was an ‘ambitiously large’ organisation – while 
being responsible for intelligence collection and analysis for the Iranian military services, it 
also functioned as an internal security service, for which the responsibility included 
espionage, counter-espionage, anti-subversive activities, and censorship. Haldane-Porter was 
also informed of the activities of the Tudeh Party, and the difficulties Razmara was facing in 
countering their activities – ‘Russian agents of all kinds were continually being sent across 
the Persian [Iranian]/ Soviet frontier with money, with arms, and with propaganda 
material’.346 During the discussions, he was also handed classified documents from G-2 of 
up-to-date reports on the activities of the Tudeh Party, and on a member of the Soviet 
Embassy in Tehran, Daniel Semyonovich Komissarov, a Russian Iranologist, who was 
believed to be connected with the Tudeh Party.
347
  
General Razmara then requested his military officers be trained in anti-Communist 
measures in Britain, and that a British security adviser be stationed in Tehran. The discussion 
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also touched upon what the British government could receive in return. In the current 
arrangement, the British military attaché had been granted limited access to ‘some Russian 
defectors’ in Iranian hands. General Razmara agreed to extend the existing arrangement to 
allowing the British completely free access to ‘any Russians who either defected from the 
Soviet Union into Iran or were captured by the Iranians’ in Iran. Haldane-Porter was also 
promised that General Razmara would prepare for him ‘a long detailed report’, setting out 
‘the sum of’ Razmara’s ‘knowledge of the Tudeh Party’. Haldane-Porter commented on the 
rationale behind this arrangement in his report: 
In all our discussions on the subject of Russians, Razmara adopted a surprisingly sensible and 
realist attitude. He said that the Soviet Union was a very big, powerful country which could 
easily occupy Persia [Iran] by force; he was therefore not really interested in what went on 
inside the Soviet Union, except in the immediate area of the Soviet/Persian frontier. We, 
however, were extremely interested in the Soviet Union and he was glad to help us in obtaining 
information about it.
348
 
General Razmara’s mentality, which Haldane-Porter described as having ‘an exaggerated but 
understandable phobia of the Russians’, perhaps also added to his rationale.349  
Besides the appointment of a British security adviser, Haldane-Porter later proposed 
to MI5 headquarters that a Russian-speaking assistant military attaché should be appointed to 
the British Embassy in Tehran for the purpose of this new arrangement, instead of using a 
representative from either MI5 or MI6. This was owing to the fact that, to Haldane-Porter’s 
surprise, General Razmara was unaware of the presence of an MI6 officer operating in 
Tehran at the time.
350
 Thus, without raising General Razmara’s suspicions, Haldane-Porter 
noted that the appointment of a ‘genuine’ Russian-speaking assistant military attaché was 
ideal, someone who would be able to use ‘his knowledge of Russian to interrogate Russians 
in Persian [Iranian] hands’ in addition to carrying out his normal duties as an assistant 
military attaché.
351
 The name of the appointment is unclear, but it was probably Alexis 
Kougoulsky Forter, a former RAF officer, who had emigrated from Russia. Alexis Forter had 
been in the Middle East in the late 1940s as a junior SIME officer, and, according to available 
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evidence, he was also present in Tehran in the tumultuous year of 1953 not as an MI5, but an 
MI6 officer. He later became the Head of Station in Baghdad in the late 1950s.
352
 
Appointing a British security/police advisor to Tehran, however, did prove difficult 
owing to an agreement with General Razmara, who insisted on absolute secrecy about the 
arrangement, except the Shah of Iran. In addition, General Razmara also made it clear that 
there would never be formal contact between the British and Iranian governments. The 
maison de rendezvous for the intelligence liaison was to be somewhere in Tehran, where an 
Iranian military official, chosen by General Razmara, and the British security adviser ‘could 
meet frequently for the discharge of their business’.353 Razmara also noted that the adviser 
should be protected by diplomatic immunity as a member of the British Embassy staff in case 
of arrest by the Iranian Police.
354
 Given the growing anti-British sentiment throughout Iran as 
a result of the internal political situation at the time, Razmara’s obsessive secrecy was 
understandable. Razmara was above all a military officer, but also a calculating politician. 
Stephen Dorril has noted that Razmara was ‘well aware that any suspicion of British 
meddling and influence could spell political suicide’.355 
The main difficulty of this arrangement from the British point of view was MI5’s 
chosen candidate – Sir William “George” Jenkin, former Deputy Director of the Intelligence 
Bureau in India (1930-50).
356
 As there were ‘large Indian and Pakistani Embassies in Tehran’ 
whose staff were well aware of Sir George Jenkin’s career in India, creating a diplomatic 
cover for him – without a risk of exposing his contact with the Iranians – was ‘impossible’.357 
While concern was also expressed that the appointment of Sir George Jenkin ‘might 
stimulate’ the Russians to ‘greater activity there’, the AC (O) Committee, nonetheless, 
recommended to Ernest Bevin the appointment of a British adviser to the Iranians on anti-
Communist measures.
358
 However, Bevin turned down the proposal for appointing Sir 
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George Jenkin as ‘there might be a risk that the Russians would be given a good excuse for 
complaining strongly to the Persians [Iranians] about our activities’.359 
The AC (O) Committee strongly endorsed the arrangement of the appointment as a 
‘valuable means of combating subversive Russian activities’ in Iran. In addition, 
consideration was given to the fact that General Razmara was the most likely to become the 
next Prime Minister of Iran.
360
 On 26 June 1950, five days after Clement Attlee approved the 
proposal, General Razmara indeed became Prime Minister.
361
 Although archival records do 
not provide the name of the security adviser in Tehran, available evidence suggests that a 
possible substitute for Sir “George” Jenkin was John Albert Briance, the former head of the 
Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Palestine Police until 1948.
362
 Guy Liddell 
noted in his diaries that John Briance was operating in the guise of Political Adviser in Iran 
and provided ‘90 per cent’ of the information on the internal political situation, mostly 
concerning the activities of the Tudeh Party, in Iran.
363
 Christopher “Monty” Woodhouse also 
noted in his memoir, Something Ventured, that, when he visited Tehran during the turmoil of 
1952, there was ‘a useful liaison, approved by the Shah, with the chief of the Security Police, 
who was well informed about the Tudeh Party’, which seems to suggest that Woodhouse was 
also referring to John Briance.
364
 
  During his tenure as premier, Razmara was an ardent anti-Communist, acting as the 
Minister of the Interior and controlling the Iranian Police at the same time. Razmara 
undertook a series of both legislative and administrative initiatives to counter subversive 
activities, including the improvement of prison discipline to control the activities of Tudeh 
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prisoners; the creation of a law giving the government discretion to proclaim Martial Law; 
and taking action against subversive publications. Sir Francis Shepherd, British Ambassador 
to Tehran, reported to Ernest Bevin that ‘these measures have been reasonably effective’.365 
In addition, as agreed with Haldane-Porter, Razmara sent four hand-picked Iranian officers 
(two from the Police, and two from G-2) to Britain in late October 1950, but the knowledge 
of the purpose of these Iranian officers was even concealed from the Iranian Embassy in 
London.
366
 These Iranian officers stayed for one year for anti-Communist training, all the 
expenses of which were paid by the Iranian government.
367
 The course was particularly made 
by MI5 to fit their purposes.
368
 Sir Francis Shepherd noted to Sir Michael Wright that ‘on 
return they would be capable of setting up a competent unit for dealing with subversive 
activity.
369
 He also noted that: 
…we have already provided them [the Iranians], at their request, with an expert to advise the 
General Staff on these matters [anti-Communist measures], and he is now busily and 
successfully at work…The responsibility for watching and checking Tudeh activities is also 
shared by the Police, and here again we are helping by arranging for two police officers (and 
two army officers) to undergo a course of training in the United Kingdom. These two measures 
should go far to keep the Persian Government fully aware of the insidious nature of Communist 
methods and of ways of dealing with them.
370
 
Nevertheless, the Iranians’ effective anti-Communist measures did not last long – Razmara 
was assassinated on 7 March 1951, two days after he refused to nationalise the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company in the face of pressure from the National Front, led by Dr Mohammad 
Mossadeqh. This abrupt end to Razumara’s premiership was a clear setback for anti-
Communist measures in Iran. In addition, the appointment of John Briance, presumably the 
security adviser to Razmara, did not last longer either. According to the Liddell Diaries, once 
the post of John Briance had been withdrawn by 1952, any information on internal political 
matters ‘practically dried up’.371  
Just before Razmara was assassinated, there had been a series of propaganda 
campaigns by the left-wing press, such as ‘cartoons’ showing Razmara’s and the Shah’s close 
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and secret association with ‘the Union Jack’.372 After his assassination, ‘Pravda’, one of the 
main Soviet arms for propaganda, also seized the opportunity to damage British influence in 
Iran, stating that the assassinator of Razmara was largely influenced by ‘imperialist’ – Britain 
and United States – plots, though its reason for stating this was obscure.373 By June 1952, 
correspondence of the Foreign Office indicates that the Iranian armed forces had also been 
penetrated by the Tudeh Party.
374
 The available evidence suggests that either further security 
training of the Iranians or the appointment of a new security adviser did not take place at least 
until the mid-1950s, though there was evidence of the presence of MI6 officers in Tehran 
before and after the Iranian coup in August 1953.
375 
However, as will be shown in Chapter 
Four, a different form of security was provided to the Iranians once Iran joined the Baghdad 
Pact in 1955.  
The Iraqi Connection and Concerns about American Influence 
 As noted earlier, Iraq had maintained a strong anti-Communist stance throughout the 
period since the 1920s until 1958. However, there was growing concern in Whitehall about 
the regional influence of the United States, whose participation in strengthening the Iraqi 
Police in anti-Communist measures troubled British policymakers and prompted the 
appointment of a security/police adviser to the Iraqi government. While CIA-MI6 
collaboration in support of the Iranian coup of August 1953 is an example of the Anglo-
American special intelligence relationship at work in the region at the time, Britain was less 
receptive, at least in early October 1953, to the idea of cooperation in the field of security 
building in Iraq, which was essentially regarded as a British province. The British and Iraqis 
engaged in intimate cooperation on security matters,
376
 the foundation of which was the close 
connection between MI5 and the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Iraqi 
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Police.
377
 This connection was strongly backed by the regional foreign and defence policies 
of the early 1950s, when the focus of British strategy shifted from Egypt to Iraq.
378
  
Given this robust security cooperation, it is no surprise that Iraq was not on the AC 
(O) Committee’s priority list of countries in need of anti-Communist measures in the early 
1950s. The JIC estimated that there were only approximately 2,000 active members of the 
Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) in 1950, far lower figures than those for Lebanon and Iran.
379
 
Since the outlawing of the ICP in January 1947, its members had been severely suppressed 
and its most influential leaders had all been imprisoned or executed.
380 
Their foe, the Iraqi 
CID, was regarded as the ‘most efficient’ anti-Communist force in the region and maintained 
a strong liaison with their representative of MI5, which was noted to be ‘probably closer than 
anywhere else in the Middle East’.381 When Sir Henry Mack, the British Ambassador in 
Baghdad, was asked by the AC (O) Committee in October 1950 to report any 
recommendations for strengthening legislative and administrative measures against 
Communists, he was content with the measures adopted by the Iraqi authorities, and wrote to 
Ernest Bevin that:  
In my opinion these laws and administrative measures have proved an effective check on 
communist activity and influence in Iraq…The Iraqi Criminal Investigation Department, which 
owes much to the tradition established by British officers who served in it up till 1947, is by 
Middle Eastern standards a fairly efficient organization. Doubtless it could be improved if 
British officers were reintroduced, but the political difficulties in the way of this are very great, 
and moreover to find a suitable man would not be easy. Even if these difficulties were 
overcome there would be a risk of prejudicing the present close relation between the Criminal 
Investigation Department and the representative of the [Security Service].
382
 
This situation and British attitudes towards the co-operative Iraqi CID would, nevertheless, 
change in 1953, with a growing Communist influence in the county and, more importantly, a 
growing American interest in Iraqi affairs.  
Despite the ICP’s small membership, underground Communist activities persisted in 
Iraq, and in October 1953 the British Embassy in Baghdad was approached by the Iraqi 
Minister of the Interior, Said Qazzaz, who asked for British experts to reorganise the Iraqi 
                                                 
377
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Police and the CID. Whitehall was alarmed to learn that Said Qazzaz was also prepared to 
engage the Americans, who were able to provide support free of charge through the Truman 
Administration’s Point Four Program, providing financial aid for development.383 Sir John 
Troutbeck, the British Ambassador in Baghdad, warned the Foreign Office that this was not 
only ‘the thin edge of the wedge of American penetration in what has been our province’, but 
would also lead to the dislocation of the Iraqi CID and police, with ‘results potentially 
disastrous to the security of the whole country’.384 The Iraqi move was also flagged by Roger 
Lees, MI5’s representative in Baghdad, serving in the guise of the Assistant Air Attaché to 
the British Embassy in Baghdad,
385
 who commented that it would be ‘a great pity if the 
reorganisation of the Iraqi police were to fall into the hands of the Americans’.386 Moreover, 
Sir Hugh Stephenson, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (Middle East) (JIC/ME), 
also raised his concerns about this matter, stating that ‘from an intelligence point of view and 
in our concern with Communism, we are largely dependent in Iraq on our CID liaison’.387  
The British not only had to provide the advisers free of charge if they were to compete 
with the Americans, but they also had to avoid financial and political complications in the 
Iraqi Parliament. Anti-British sentiment in Iraqi politics added to a growing concern that the 
Iraqis were leaning towards the Americans. While waiting for a formal request from the Iraqi 
government backed by the Iraqi Cabinet, there was a clear increase in British concern over 
American influence in Iraq. In his telegram, Sir John Troutbeck commented from Baghdad 
that:  
An American might well come as a temporary visitor…under the cover of “Security Adviser to 
the American Embassy” or something similar rather than as an employee of the Iraq 
Government…The most effective way therefore of preventing the appointment of an American 
is for us to evince a more active desire to help the Iraqi Minister of the Interior on the 
issue…Otherwise, an American adviser – or at least a temporary adviser – may be here before 
we know it. There are various signs that the Americans are prepared to move rapidly to redeem 
their diminished prestige here at our expense.
388
 
                                                 
383
 On the Point Four Program: cf. Vaughan, Failure of American and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle 
East, p.111. Also see TNA: PRO FO371/98276: E11345/7: minute, 25 Jan 1952, enclosing ‘United States 
Economic and Social Interest in the Middle East’, undated; NARA: RG59: 511.80/4/1653, Clark to Sanger, 16 
Apr 1953, enclosing ‘Information Policy for the Point IV Program’, 3 Mar 1953. 
384
 TNA: PRO FO371/104719: EQ1641/9G: letter by Troutbeck to Falla, 13 Oct 1953.  
385
 Although no reference to his career in MI5 was stated, his career as Head of the Special Branch in India a 
few years earlier can be found from his autobiography. Roger Lees, In the Shade of the Peepul Tree (private 
publication, 1998), p.89.  
386
 TNA: PRO FO371/104719: EQ1641/9G: minute by Patricia M. Hutchinson, 19 Oct 1953.  
387
 TNA: PRO FO371/111043: VQ1641/5: letter by H.S. Stephenson of BMEO to R. Allen, 24 Jan 1954. 
388
 TNA: PRO FO371/104719: EQ1641/13G: letter by Troutbeck to Falla, 24 Nov 1953.  
 87 
 
 
Despite the insignificance of Communist activities in Iraq, the Foreign Office recognised the 
advantage of placing a British security/police officer in the Iraqi government, and they came 
to the conclusion that ‘if we do not provide free assistance, there is a very strong probability 
that the Americans can and will’, and above all, the maintenance of order and stability in Iraq 
was ‘essential for our oil and other interests’.389 The Foreign Office decided to forestall the 
possibility of the appointment of an American security adviser to the Iraqi Police and go 
ahead without the Iraqi budget being in place, asking the Treasury to provide funds for the 
security adviser. This meant that a British adviser would be sent to Iraq free of charge.
390
 
Indeed, around this time, while the United States also considered Iraq ‘to be entirely within 
Britain’s political sphere and in a manner consistent with British objectives’, the US 
Ambassador Burton Berry was trying to ‘exert a more positive role in guiding Iraq’s future 
planning’.391 
Meanwhile, the Foreign Office searched for potential police/security advisers, 
enquiring about suitable candidates for the post to the Home and Colonial Offices. All 
enquiries to the Home Office were consistently turned down without any positive 
recommendations, and the case of Iraq was no exception to this.
392
 The hunt by the Foreign 
Office thus, as had always been hoped, relied on the Colonial Office, through which suitable 
candidates from the colonial police were recommended. Although MI5 only had an advisory 
role in this process, the Foreign Office sometimes appeared to expect MI5 to play a more 
active role.
393
 This was mainly owing to the secrecy of MI5’s activities; they were mostly 
compartmentalised from other departments. The appointment of a security/police adviser in 
the Iraqi case is an illustrative example of the extent to which the nature of security/police 
advisers’ work differed from that of representatives of MI5.  
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When the initial approach was made by Said Qazzaz in October 1953, the 
representative of MI5, Roger Lees (1951-53), was due to be replaced. Sir John Troutbeck, the 
British Ambassador in Baghdad, suggested to the Foreign Office that a successor to Roger 
Lees should be competent to advise the Iraqis on the reorganisation of the CID. In this way, 
he hoped, the Iraqi requirements would be met ‘without any extra burden on either their or 
H.M. Government’s budget’.394 However, MI5 already had their own chosen candidate as the 
successor in Baghdad, who had served in the ‘British Police on Special Branch duties’ and 
was thus competent to advise on anti-Communist work, but who had ‘no special 
qualifications for advising on the organisation of the CID or criminal work’.395 The MI5 
officer being referred to was perhaps Norman Himsworth, who was to replace Roger Lees as 
Security Liaison Officer (SLO) with Said Qazzaz, the Iraqi Minister of the Interior.
396
 
Instead, upon his departure, Roger Lees made arrangements with Said Qazzaz that his 
successor would advise the CID ‘unofficially on anti-communist work’, and reported that ‘the 
head of the CID has been instructed accordingly’.397 
Both MI5’s and MI6’s suggestion to the Foreign Office for the two posts in Iraq was 
their favourite candidate, the aforementioned Sir “George” Jenkin, on whom H.P. Goodwyn 
of MI5, liaising with the Foreign Office, commented that ‘a man of his calibre would best suit 
all purpose’ and ‘could do both jobs’.398 Following interviews with the candidates conducted 
by Paul Falla, head of the Levant Department of the Foreign Office, with the help of Lloyd 
Thomas, an expert from the Home Office, the Foreign Office decided to send only one, not 
two, advisers to Iraq. The chosen candidate was not Sir “George” Jenkin, but Duncan 
MacIntosh, the retiring Commissioner of Police in Hong-Kong (1946-1952). This was mainly 
owing to a note from the Colonial Office describing Sir “George” Jenkin as ‘rather too much 
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of a specialist to take the lead of a general mission on Police re-organisation’.399 In addition, 
Sir “George” Jenkin was described as ‘somewhat highly-strung, shy and reserved’, whereas 
MacIntosh was considered to have a ‘blend of astuteness and friendliness’, which would 
‘earn the confidence, and goodwill of the Iraqi authorities’. Above all, MacIntosh was 
regarded as a ‘first-class all-rounder’, who thus could manage not only the CID but also the 
police post.
400
  
Although his appointment was delayed due to the dissolution of the Iraqi Parliament 
and general elections in Iraq, MacIntosh finally arrived as Security/Police Adviser in 
Baghdad in October 1954 after the thirteenth government was formed under the premiership 
of Nuri el-Said. Said Qazzaz remained as the Minister of the Interior and was still ‘eager for 
MacIntosh’s cooperation in his campaign against the Communists’.401 Sir Robin Hooper, 
Counsellor at the British Embassy in Baghdad, observed two months after his appointment 
that MacIntosh was liked by the Iraqis and was making progress in the Iraqi police and the 
CID: 
his advice is being sought and readily taken. He has made far-reaching recommendations for 
the re-organisation of the C.I.D. and the uniformed branches of the Police Force, 
including…the creation of a Special Branch and integrated reporting of political and subversive 
activities between the various districts...[and] there is a marked desire among junior officers of 
the Police Force to better themselves now that they see that the Government is taking steps to 
reform and improve the Police Force, which has for so many years remained virtually 
stagnant.
402
 
MacIntosh’s post as the Security/Police Adviser in Iraq ended when the Iraqi Revolution 
occurred in July 1958.    
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Jordan’s Arab Legion and the Anti-Communist Triangle 
 The Jordanian case was unique in the region as the Arab Legion, the chief external 
and internal security force of the country, was commanded by a British officer, General Sir 
John Bagot Glubb, until March 1956. As a recent study has shown, British personnel were 
involved in training the Arab Legion and developing Jordanian military intelligence.
403
 A less 
well known fact is, however, the British involvement in developing Jordanian civilian 
political intelligence, especially anti-Communist and counter-subversion measures. There 
was in fact the far from negligible regional security contribution made by Colonel Sir Patrick 
Coghill, the Director-General of Intelligence of the Arab Legion, who was responsible for 
internal security in Jordan and foreign liaison.  
As a relatively small country in the region, where there were also limited areas for 
inhabitants owing to its terrain, Communist activities were almost non-existent in Jordan. 
According to a JIC estimate in 1950, members of the Communist Party in Jordan numbered 
less than fifty.
404
 While the AC (O) Committee  rightly considered the Communist problem in 
Jordan far less significant than elsewhere, this assessment differed from the perception of the 
Jordanian government. Since late 1950 Jordanian police officers constantly attended ‘special 
training’ courses in anti-Communist measures in Britain, and the Jordanian government 
requested that Britain exchange any information on Communist activities.
405
  
At Jordan’s request, Colonel Sir Patrick Coghill, the wartime head of the British 
Security Mission in Lebanon (1941-45), was appointed in April 1952 as security/police 
adviser to Jordan in anti-Communist measures and helped with the reorganisation of the 
Criminal Investigation Department of the Arab Legion.
406
 His formal title was the Director-
General of Intelligence of the Arab Legion (1952-56), but he was also known as the Head of 
                                                 
403
 Ronen Yitzhak, ‘The Beginnings of Transjordanian Military Intelligence: A Neglected Aspect of the 1948 
War’, Middle East Journal, vol.57, no.3 (2003), pp.449-468. 
404
 TNA: PRO CAB134/3: AC (O) (50) 18: JIC report (annex), ‘Communist Influence in the Middle East’, 21 
Apr 1950. 
405
 TNA: PRO FO371/81904: E1018/7G: diplomatic despatch by Sir A. Kirkbride, Amman, to Ernest Bevin, 20 
Oct 1950; PRO FO371/81989: E1642/7: letter by Chancery at British Legation, Beirut, to FO, 8 Jul 1950; PRO 
FO371/91790: ET1016/4G: minute by J.M. Hunter of FO, 28 Sep 1951; PRO KV4/473: the Liddell Diaries, 8 
Oct 1951. 
406
 TNA: PRO FO371/91790: ET1016/4G: letter by Furlonge of FO to Amri Abdul Majid Haidar, Envoy 
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, the Jordan Legation, 29 Oct 1951. 
 91 
 
 
the Jordanian CID.
407
 Colonel Coghill’s career has not been thoroughly documented, and this 
is particularly true of his anti-Communist/anti-subversive work in Jordan. Owing to the 
nature of his work, perhaps, he has received inadequate attention from historians, but his role 
as the Director-General of Intelligence was significant in a number of ways. Jordan had no 
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union or other Eastern bloc countries, and technically 
nationals of those countries were not allowed to enter Jordan. Colonel Coghill was 
responsible for internal security concerning the movements of foreign nationals and 
subversive activities in the country. In addition, Major-General James Lunt, the Second-in-
Command of the Arab Legion, recalled that the Free Officers Movement within the Arab 
Legion was kept under ‘a close watch’ by Coghill.408 
Moreover, despite Communist activities being nearly non-existent in Jordan, 
subversive activities included not only those associated with Communists, but also those of 
the Egyptians and Saudis, who were seen by Coghill as ‘the worst’ subversive activity in the 
country.
409
 According to Coghill’s letter to the War Office in late 1955, the Egyptians were 
propagating hostile attacks on King Hussein of Jordan as one of the ‘imperialists’ and 
‘colonisers’ in the region, and also were trying to attempt a provocation of the Israelis by 
organising sabotage groups to be infiltrated from Jordan into Israel as if they were 
Jordanians. Likewise, the Saudis were bribing the Jordanians, including the royal family, 
politicians and newspapers, to weaken the Hashemite influence.
410
 These activities, perceived 
as subversive, were indeed in part instigated by Soviet and Egyptian propaganda, particularly 
their call to arms against ‘imperial powers’, and they presented a potential danger to be 
exploited by local Communists.
411
  
 In his capacity as the Director-General of Intelligence, Coghill reorganised the 
Jordanian Police, within which he also headed the CID, and a selected number of Jordanian 
police officers were sent to Britain for training in anti-Communist/anti-subversive 
measures.
412
 It is noteworthy that Coghill sent his senior (Jordanian) officers for 
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security/police training not only in Britain but also another Middle Eastern country, Libya. 
Coghill’s choice of Libya in fact had a solid and logical foundation for both technical and 
political reasons. Libya in the post-war period hosted an ‘advanced’ police school, which 
Coghill described as ‘extremely efficient’, run by a retired superintendent of the British 
Metropolitan Police, Arthur Giles.
413
 On the technical side, Coghill’s (Jordanian) officers 
often found difficult to understand the meaning of security training courses in Britain as 
having a good knowledge and command of English was essential for attending such security 
training courses in Britain. In addition, although it is uncertain to what extent the conduct of 
police work would differ on the basis of different legal systems, Coghill noted in his memoirs 
that the Jordanian legal system was principally based on the code of Napoleon, inherited from 
the Ottoman Empire, the whole approach and procedure in the courts of which was different 
from the use of Britain.
414
 Moreover, while there were some police training facilities in Egypt 
and Iraq, Coghill avoided sending his officers to these countries for political reasons as, it 
was noted, both Iraq and Egypt had their own designs on the internal affairs of Jordan. For 
these reasons, security/police training in Libya, where training was conducted by a British ex-
police officer in Arabic, was ideal for Coghill’s purpose.415  
More importantly, perhaps, Colonel Coghill’s work with his Arab counterparts was 
one of most important factors in developing regional security liaison for Britain. While 
archival evidence on this aspect remains tentative, his private papers testify that Colonel 
Coghill collaborated closely with Farid Chehab, Head of the Sûreté Générale, and Bahjat 
Attiyah, the Director of the Iraqi CID, by exchanging information on anti-Communist and 
anti-subversive matters in the region. Based on his personal relationship, firstly with Farid 
Chehab, and later with Bahjat Attiyah, the security liaison between Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan 
became gradually institutionalised and became known in Coghill’s own words as the ‘Anti-
Communist Triangle’. 416  This security liaison involved not only intelligence sharing on 
security matters in Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan, but also intelligence sharing on subversive 
activities elsewhere, most of which were instigated by Egypt and Syria.
417
 It also included a 
‘specially strict’ surveillance request on the leading figure in anti-British activities in the 
region, Haji Amin al-Husseini, the ex-Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, whom Colonel Coghill 
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called ‘the most evil power in Palestine Arab Nationalism’.418 As the Director-General of 
Intelligence of the Arab Legion, Coghill’s role in anti-Communist work was appreciated not 
only by the Jordanians but also by the Iraqis. Before the aforementioned Duncan MacIntosh 
took up the post of Security/Police Adviser in Baghdad, Said Qazzaz, the Iraqi Minister for 
Interior, insisted that MacIntosh ‘should break his outward journey at Amman to discuss his 
work with Coghill’.419 It was no exaggeration when Colonel Coghill described the presence 
of the Arab Legion in his report to the War Office as ‘one of the principal key-stones’ in 
providing stability to Middle Eastern security as a whole.
420
 
One of the most important contributions of the Jordan-Lebanon-Iraq anti-Communist 
triangle was perhaps their stimulation of the coordination of anti-Communist measures with 
neighbouring Arab states by establishing closer liaison between the regional security services. 
One aspect of this regional initiative came to the fore in 1954 as the foundation for a covert 
cooperation effort in ‘the fight against Communism and Zionism’ under the Arab League, 
with participants from Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and other countries.
421
 Behind this 
regional collaboration, as mentioned earlier, the AC (O) Committee acted as a facilitator, 
seeking to enhance the anti-Communist measures of Middle Eastern governments by ‘means 
of improving liaison and the exchange of information’ between the relevant governments.422 
In addition to Iraq, Britain’s closest ally in the region, the Lebanese Sûreté Générale was also 
chosen to lead the initiative.
423
 A senior official at the Foreign Office noted that Farid Chehab 
appreciated ‘the need for and the value of liaison between themselves and their counterparts 
in other Arab States’ and that the Lebanese initiative ‘would be less likely to arouse 
suspicion’ if it came from any other Arab state.424 This regional collaboration under the Arab 
League was particularly efficient in combatting Communist, and also ‘anarchist’, activities 
inside their territories. The united anti-Communist campaign led to the discovery of several 
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underground Communist cells in the region.
425
 The cooperation between the Jordan-Lebanon-
Iraq ‘Anti-Communist Triangle’ even extended beyond the Arab states. As will be discussed 
in detail in Chapter Four, the Turkish and Iranian security services cooperated with the 
‘Triangle’ on subversive activities in the region from the mid-1950s onwards.426   
 There were, however, certainly limitations to Coghill’s anti-Communist measures 
owing to the unstable conditions of Jordanian politics, where anti-British sentiments were on 
the rise. That Coghill’s position was filled by a British officer had often been a cause of 
political confrontation between the Jordanian government and political opposition groups.
427
 
Eventually, the Jordanian Police was separated from the Arab Legion, and was placed under 
the Ministry of the Interior from July 1956. This move was initiated by King Hussein in 
response to a recommendation by the Jordanian Cabinet Committee on the reorganisation of 
the government, and also due to public pressure to separate civilian and military functions.
428
 
Once it was announced by the Jordanian government, the Foreign Office noted that Coghill 
would be deprived of ‘a most valuable observation post on communist activities, not only in 
Jordan but in the Middle East as a whole’.429 It also considered the appointment of another 
Police Adviser to the Jordanian Police.
430
 Before the separation of the Jordanian Police was 
brought into effect, Coghill’s post as the Director-General of Intelligence of the Arab Legion 
abruptly ended as Sir John Bagot Glubb was dismissed from the Arab Legion in March 1956.  
 Despite the volatile political climate in Jordan, especially over Jordan’s connection 
with Britain, there was in fact a request from the Jordanian government for a British 
security/police adviser to the Jordanian Police three years after the dismissal of Colonel 
Coghill. The aforementioned Duncan MacIntosh, who had been the Police/Security Adviser 
to the Iraqi Police, and the Iraqi CID, escaped from the Iraqi Revolution and was appointed as 
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the Police Adviser in Jordan in October 1958.
431
 A letter by Sir Roderick Parkes, British 
Ambassador in Amman (1962-66), indicates that, despite opposition by ‘dyed-in-the-wool’ 
traditionalists and conservatives, as Police Adviser (1958-62) MacIntosh achieved his aim to 
reorganise the Jordanian security services ‘on an independent, logical and modern basis’ 
using his experience in Hong Kong as his principal model. In addition, the CID’s public 
security functions were separated out to form a new department responsible for ‘all internal 
security matters outside the province of the uniformed police’, including sections dealing 
with Communists and liaising with foreign services. This department was established and 
later named ‘the General Intelligence Department [Dairat al-Mukhabarat al-Ammah]’ in 
accordance with Act 24 of 1964.
432
 Sir Roderick Parkes commented on MacIntosh’s 
achievement in a letter: 
I cannot finish this letter without warm tribute to MacIntosh. His health has suffered recently, 
yet the energy, single-mindedness of purpose and wisdom with which he has carried out a 
singularly difficult assignment have impressed me deeply. He is due to go at the end of January, 
when his six-month contract comes to an end. All those Jordanians who have been in touch 
which him will be sorry at his departure. I shall share their feelings.
433
 
Indeed, archival evidence suggests that even after MacIntosh’s retirement from the post, 
training of Jordanian police officers as a part of anti-Communist measures continued.
434
 In 
addition, as noted in Chapter One, the British anti-Communist policy in Jordan allowed the 
Americans to participate in the internal affairs of Jordan from the mid-1950 onwards, and 
since then, the United States has enjoyed its own influence over the Jordanian government.
435
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Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the training of Middle Eastern security services, primarily 
focusing on the introduction of British security/police advisers to Middle Eastern 
governments on anti-Communist measures. Training of Middle Eastern security services in 
anti-Communist measures is a recurrent theme of Britain’s anti-Communist policy in the 
region throughout the period and will be further discussed in subsequent chapters in different 
contexts – protective security (Chapter Four), propaganda (Chapter Five), and the extent to 
which Britain was able to influence Middle Eastern anti-Communist measures through this 
training (Chapter Six). This chapter has shown the intimate connections between Britain and 
Middle Eastern states, such as Lebanon, Iran, Iraq and Jordan, which developed in the context 
of the Cold War. The AC (O) Committee was a driving engine for intelligence liaison with 
Middle Eastern states and also for facilitating anti-Communist measures in the region. 
Sending a British security/police adviser was considered to be the best way to improve the 
internal security of Middle Eastern states.  
It is important to point out that the cases presented in this chapter are not necessarily 
selective – Britain did not have a police/security adviser in every single Middle Eastern 
country. For instance, placing a British security/police officer in Syria was once considered, 
but the country was too unstable for such liaison to be established.
436
 Owing to the flow of 
illegal Jewish (and possible Communist) immigrants from the Eastern Bloc into the newly 
established state of Israel, MI5 also contemplated liaison with the Israeli authorities in 1951, 
but there is no archival evidence to suggest that MI5 established its liaison with them.
437
 In 
addition, as will be shown in Chapter Three, Britain maintained a close connection with the 
Egyptians through the representative of MI5 until the early 1950s on anti-Communist 
matters: there was no need to place a security/police adviser there. Moreover, more 
importantly, it was not a one-way street: British anti-Communist policy and British concerns 
about the state of Middle Eastern security also dovetailed neatly with the demands of Middle 
Eastern governments for British advice on anti-Communist measures. At the time, Britain 
was seen by Middle Eastern governments as their most reliable ally in fighting subversive 
elements in their countries. This was mostly due to their reputation for organisational 
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reliability, as well as personal relationships developed through Britain’s involvement in the 
region over many years. Above all, their relationships were based on common interests, anti-
Communist measures in the region. 
Placing security/police officers in the heart of Middle Eastern governments was 
indeed advantageous for Britain: the local security services, including police forces, were 
unique local assets for intelligence and security purposes, and security liaison with them was 
invaluable in at least two ways. Firstly, as Communist movements in the region were illegal 
in these countries, intelligence collection on them was carried out by the local security 
services, with physical surveillance of the suspects and premises, probably even utilising its 
power to tap telephones and intercept other communications such as censorship. Security 
liaison with regional police forces meant that Britain was able to access intelligence on 
Communist activities in the region, including police records, which would otherwise have 
been inaccessible. Secondly, from British analysis of the Communist seizure of Eastern 
Europe following the War, a strong security service was regarded as essential to forestall 
Communist subversion. Thus, the training of the security services was seen as the best way of 
containing the spread of Communism in the region. In addition to the training of the security 
services, placing security/police advisers was regarded as the best way to influence the 
conduct of anti-Communist measures by Middle Eastern states.   
The main problem with these relationships for Britain was that they were based on a 
non-institutionalised agreement in a hostile environment, where anti-British sentiment was 
commonplace, and thus an institutionalised arrangement was impossible for Middle Eastern 
leaders who were risking their political careers by associating so closely with Britain. As a 
result, although some personal connections were maintained, the posts of British Security or 
Police Advisers were abruptly ended in the face of a crisis.  
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Chapter Three 
The Defence of the Realm in the Middle East438 
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In the minds of many people, it [the British Secret Service] has become a dark legend, an 
organisation of fantastic power, whose tentacles extend everywhere. The reality was a little 
different. Nobody will deny the power and ability of the Secret Service, but it is a long way 
from being the “all-seeing eye” of popular legend. What keeps the British Secret Service 
functioning is simply money, and the irresistible temptation which money represents to rogues 
and traitors.  
- Anwar El Sadat.
439
  
Introduction 
The authorised history of MI5, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorised History of 
MI5, confirmed that the security service’s roles and responsibilities were not confined to 
Great Britain, but included the maintenance of internal security throughout the British 
Empire.
440
 It also records that MI5 maintained a regional headquarters in the Middle East, 
SIME, until 1958.
441
 Before the authorised history appeared, the most detailed reference to 
SIME could be found only in the context of the Second World War from the official history 
of British Intelligence in the Second World War and the works of H.O. Dovey.
442
 Academic 
studies concerning the post-war activities of SIME are nearly non-existent, however some 
reference to SIME can be found in the literature, such as memoirs and biographies.
443
 These 
works hardly shed any light on the post-war activities of SIME, let alone the implications of 
its activities for the British presence in the post-war Middle East.
444
 By virtue of the 
Waldegrave Initiative on Open Government of 1992, a series of files related to MI5 has now 
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been gradually declassified.
445
 These materials, including files documenting the activities of 
SIME from 1939 to the early 1950s, concern a range of subjects, including not only 
Communist and fascist leaders, but also anti-British figures such as Haji Emin al-Husseini, 
the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem,
446
 and information on anti-British and nationalist groups, such as 
the Ikhwan al-Muslimeen of Egypt, known as the Muslim Brotherhood.
447
 The declassified 
materials also suggest that the territorial coverage of SIME included not only the Colonies, 
but also foreign countries in key geographical locations, such as Egypt and Iraq.
448
  
The purpose of this chapter is to examine for the first time the activities of the hitherto 
unexplored SIME after the Second World War until its closure in 1958. It will show how 
SIME, as the regional headquarters of MI5, became an integral part of the military machine 
which was chiefly directed by the military planning of the Chiefs of Staff, and also show the 
extent to which MI5 cooperated in the post-war Middle East with MI6 and its Middle Eastern 
counterparts. By examining declassified records, this chapter will argue that having 
increasingly become an instrument of the Cold War, the role of SIME was not to defend 
British interests against anti-British movements, but was instead quite narrowly focused on 
the fight against Communist movements in the region. It will further argue that the activities 
of SIME were largely limited owing to the fragile nature of intelligence liaison in the post-
war region, which was increasingly hostile to the British military presence. In addition, it will 
examine the shift in thinking regarding the conduct of the Cold War amongst policymakers as 
implied by the story of SIME’s closure in 1958. As a result of the prospect of war against the 
Soviet Union being reduced, SIME became obsolete in the eyes of military planners. 
However, MI5 remained involved in maintaining regional security thereafter.  
SIME in the Second World War 
SIME is a relatively unknown organisation in British Intelligence, and its activities 
can only be found in the context of the Second World War in the literature.
449
 While it is 
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unnecessary to repeat the whole wartime story here, it is necessary to illustrate its roles and 
activities during the war. A former British Army officer, who served under the Middle East 
Command during the war, once described SIME as ‘MI5 behaving rather like MI6 and doing 
it better’.450 This is rather misleading because, while it certainly maintained connections with 
MI5, SIME was never the regional headquarters of MI5 during the war: it was staffed and 
administered by the British Army and operated entirely under the direction of the General 
Headquarters of the Middle East (GHQ/ME). The exception was the Defence Security 
Officer (DSO) in Cairo, Colonel (later Brigadier) Raymond J. Maunsell, an army officer on 
the MI5 payroll.
451
 SIME’s connections with MI5 developed on an ad hoc basis throughout 
the war, especially, in the context of SIME requiring technical advice on counter-espionage 
in the region. As the war progressed, and the “double-cross” operations to deceive the Axis 
Powers, in particular Italy and Germany, got underway, as a counter-espionage organisation 
in the theatre, SIME received instruction from MI5 for the enhancement of its security 
practices.
452
 Thus, MI5’s direct commitment to regional security did not precede the post-war 
reorganisation of the British intelligence community, through which its overseas 
commitments expanded substantially.
453
  
Secondly, Michael Howard, an official historian of British Intelligence in the Second 
World War, has described the nature of wartime security work in the region as ‘an 
intelligence officer’s paradise and a security officer’s hell’.454 This was owing to the fact that 
the Middle East was virtually borderless from a security perspective and consisted of a 
diverse collection of Crown Colonies, Protectorates, Mandated territories and neutral 
countries, where the provision for maintaining internal security differed significantly. The 
complexity of maintaining regional security over these territories fostered the organisational 
development of SIME and led to an increase in its activities. While SIME originally started in 
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December 1939 as a spinoff from the DSO in Cairo, it expanded rapidly in size and in 
territory covered. At the height of the war in 1941, SIME was staffed by ninety officers and a 
hundred others, mostly from the Army.
455
 A number of military officers were posted as DSOs 
throughout the region to liaise with local authorities and to advise on internal security in 
territories covering the Balkans, the Middle East and North Africa, including Greece, Turkey, 
Cyprus, Palestine, Syria/Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Transjordan, Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, Egypt, the 
Canal Zone, Eritrea and Aden.
456  An example of Britain’s proactive security measures 
through SIME can be found in the context of Egypt, where the DSO in Cairo closely 
cooperated with the Egyptian security forces such as the Cairo City Police. Anglo-Egyptian 
joint security cooperation in fact resulted in the rounding up of Abwehr agents in what was 
known as Operation ‘Condor’.457  
The wartime conditions also made it necessary for Britain to exercise executive 
powers enforced with military support, and some reluctant local governments were indeed 
threatened with military measures. Notable examples were the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran 
and the overthrow of the anti-British Prime Minister of Iraq, Rashid Ali, in 1941.
458
 The 
security measures taken by local governments included the detention of enemy agents and 
suspects who were likely to spy for the Axis Powers or turn to sabotage; the security 
examination of new arrivals in the region from neutral or enemy occupied territory; and 
border control conducted with the field security force of the military police.
459
 For security 
purposes, detention camps were established in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Cyprus and Egypt, 
strictly under the control of the Middle East Command, under whose direction SIME 
operated. According to one set of figures from November 1944, a total of 32 German 
intelligence officers who had parachuted into the region were detained, and 1,719 ‘fifth 
columnists’, who might have acted in favour of the enemy powers, were interned.460 11,171 
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refugees and travellers were examined in the first six months of 1944, excluding all the 
Jewish refugees who were examined by either the Palestine Police or SIME.
461
  
Thirdly, it is important to note that SIME only functioned as the regional centre for 
collation and dissemination of security intelligence. Apart from a special section which 
controlled double-agents against the Axis Powers, SIME never ran its own agents for use as 
intelligence sources nor conducted counter-intelligence operations especially in the post-war 
period.
462
 SIME had instead two main sources of intelligence and was entirely dependent on 
them: MI6 and the outstation DSOs.  As enemy agents mostly crossed the borders from 
neutral countries such as Turkey,
463
 SIME needed the close cooperation of the regional 
headquarters of MI6, also known as the Inter-Services Liaison Department (ISLD). Official 
historians have noted that a close relationship between SIME and ISLD was naturally 
maintained due to the ‘excellent personal relations between the officials concerned’.464 In 
addition, SIME shared with ISLD intercepted materials from enemy wireless 
communications, technically termed as ISOS (Intelligence Section, Oliver Strachey) 
materials – Oliver Strachey was responsible for solving, decrypting and circulating German 
intelligence messages at the Government Code & Cipher School (GC&CS); these decrypts 
were named after Strachey and issued as the ISOS series.
465
 These decrypts of Abwehr hand-
ciphered messages proved vital for SIME’s counter-espionage work during the War 
especially in the context of “double-cross” operations against the Axis Powers.466  
The main functions of the DSOs were not only to advise local authorities on any 
measures for internal security, but also to collect intelligence from local security services, in 
most cases the police, through liaison. For instance, intelligence obtained by the DSO in 
Cairo, Colonel Raymond Maunsell (later first Head of SIME, 1939-1944), included copies of 
‘full surveillance reports on suspects both of European and Arab/Egyptian origin’ from a 
Special Section of the Cairo Police and the Ministry of the Interior, which formed a list of 
suspects earmarked for arrest and internment on the outbreak of war. In addition, under the 
supervision of DSO Cairo, British-Egyptian censorship provided Colonel Maunsell with the 
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opportunity to examine a special ‘dirty tricks’ section concerned with ‘secret censorship’ of 
both private and diplomatic mail.
467
 It is important to reiterate that the wartime situation 
necessitated the very close and friendly cooperation of SIME with MI6 and local 
governments. The post-war conditions were entirely different. 
SIME and Post-War Imperial Defence in Middle East  
Except for Cyprus, Aden, and the Palestine Mandate, the Middle East predominantly 
consisted of independent countries. Intelligence organisations that had thrived in the region 
during wartime thus had to be dismantled in peacetime, returning prime responsibility back to 
MI6.
468
 The first casualty of the post-war reorganisation in the region was the Combined 
Intelligence Centre Iraq/Iran (CICI), a comparable organisation to SIME under the control of 
the Royal Air Force: CICI’s networks were taken over by MI6. 469  Despite working 
predominantly within foreign territories, SIME in the post-war period was nevertheless 
preserved as an inter-service organisation and became the regional headquarters of MI5. 
However, while key executive positions (the Head and Deputy Head of SIME) and 
strategically important outstations (Egypt, Iraq and the Palestine Mandate) were held and 
maintained by MI5 officers, SIME was not a civilian but a military organisation, the majority 
of staff being seconded from the Army, Navy and RAF on an ad hoc basis. The Head of 
SIME reported not only to the Director-General of MI5, but also to the Middle East Defence 
Committee, later renamed the British Defence Co-ordination Committee in the Middle East 
(BDCC/ME), with regard to its local policy and executive action.
470
 The purpose of 
maintaining SIME into peacetime was purely due to the needs of the Chiefs of Staff. In 
addition to British military commitments to the region under defence treaties, there were also 
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a number of strategic reasons for SIME’s continuance in the developing Cold War climate: 
the integrity of the region was regarded by the Chiefs of Staff as a pillar of British imperial 
defence, and the maintenance of the region in peacetime was thought essential; in particular, 
Egypt was considered the keystone of Middle East strategy where adequate forces could be 
based to fight a full-scale war against the Soviet Union. In either offensive or defensive 
strategic roles both in peace and war, the presence of the British armed forces in the area was 
thus thought essential.
471
  
As MI5 had become ‘in loco parentis’ towards SIME owing to the closeness of the 
liaison relationship during the war,
472
 it was thus logically assumed by the Chiefs of Staff that 
SIME would pass into the hands of MI5, whose commitment in the region was understood as 
the ‘fourth defence force’.473 In addition, the outgoing Commander-in-Chief Middle East 
Command, General Sir Bernard Paget, the key decision-maker regarding the fate of post-war 
SIME, noted that an effective intelligence system in the region should be ‘one organisation 
for security, one for political intelligence and one for military intelligence, i.e. MI5, MI6 and 
MI [Military Intelligence]’. 474  Having been dissatisfied with the recent transition of its 
networks in Iran from CICI to MI6, he preferred to preserve SIME and also welcomed SIME 
‘becoming part of a larger Imperial Security Organisation’ under the authority of MI5.475  
When Sir Dick White, Deputy Director of B (counter-espionage) Division of MI5 and 
later both the Director-General of MI5 and ‘C’ of MI6, visited the region concerning the fate 
of SIME, he was ‘not at all impressed by the general organisation of SIME’ as, since the end 
of the War, it had mostly been staffed with junior officers, who had no knowledge about 
intelligence and security. However, White reluctantly accepted the fact that a new separate 
security organisation to maintain a British military presence in the region would be 
‘inadvisable’. 476  A formal recommendation was made through the Joint Intelligence 
Committee in the Middle East (JIC/ME) and this was approved by the Joint Intelligence 
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Committee (JIC) in London and the BDCC/ME.
477
 Thus in September 1946, SIME finally 
came under the authority of MI5, and SIME was the regional headquarters of MI5 thereafter. 
As the regional headquarters of MI5, SIME functioned similarly to MI5 at home but 
had different commitments. Like the wartime SIME, it was responsible for the collation and 
dissemination of security intelligence relating to counter-espionage and counter-subversion 
which might have had implications for British authorities throughout the region. Its 
intelligence customers included the Army Commander-in-Chief Middle East; the Naval 
Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean; the Royal Air Force Commander-in-Chief Middle East; 
the Naval Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet; and British Ambassadors, Ministers, High 
Commissioners and Governors.
478
 In his memoir, Brigadier William Magan, Head of SIME 
(1947-1951), noted the responsibility of SIME: 
My task consisted in knowing in as much detail as possible the threats to the area as a whole 
and in ensuring that we had the means, the knowledge and the understanding to counter them. 
To that end it was my responsibility to pass to MI5 the information of which they needed to be 
informed, and to feed to local authorities the information of which they needed to be aware, 
[and a]lso to advise the individual territories on their security organisation and practices. In 
many of the territories we had our own SIME representatives to liaise with and advise the local 
authorities.
479
 
More importantly, the difference between SIME and MI5 was that, although MI5 enjoyed no 
commitments to a particular department,
480
  SIME was ‘an integral part of the military 
machine’ in the Middle East. It was in fact distinctively associated with the military forces 
and planning in the region and had its own commitments to the post-war strategy of the 
Chiefs of Staff.
481
  
However, operating in peacetime did influence SIME’s work. Their activities were 
largely restricted and the number of SIME personnel was kept to a minimum: capped at 
twenty-five staff of all ranks under the inter-service agreement reached before the end of the 
war. 
482
 Although the territorial coverage remained equal to the territory under the BDCC/ME 
Command, the number of its outstations, in other words, the physical presence of DSOs, was 
reduced to a few strategically key stations such as Egypt, Iraq, the Palestine Mandate and 
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Cyprus.
483
 The purpose of maintaining its own representatives at these outstations was to 
liaise with local security services, especially on advice regarding security measures in the 
event of war. According to the recent declassified diaries of Guy Liddell, Deputy Director-
General of MI5, in the event of war, staffing at SIME would be increased by at least 50 per 
cent through secondments from the War Office.
 484
 Moreover, it was also envisaged that in 
the event of war, when British military forces were to reoccupy those countries in the region 
with which Britain had a defence treaty, SIME was expected to ‘keep its links going 
wherever possible, [so] that Middle East Command should have a proper security 
organisation at its back’.485  
SIME faced difficulties operating on foreign soil, but these difficulties arose in 
securing cooperation from other departments of the British government. This was particularly 
true in the case of Iraq, where the RAF’s wartime CICI had been forced to close down and 
was replaced by a new Army-oriented SIME outstation. When one of the ‘best’ MI5 officers, 
John (“Jack”) Percival Morton, former officer of the Indian Police, the Delhi Intelligence 
Bureau (DIB), was despatched from London under cover of Assistant Air Attaché to establish 
his DSO office within the British Embassy in Baghdad in 1947, he had to cope with 
opposition from the RAF staff at the Embassy.
486
 As the RAF maintained its own 
headquarters at Habbaniya, a major regional airbase, Iraq was considered RAF territory and 
Morton’s association with the Army-oriented SIME made him ‘rather friendless’.487 Owing to 
a lack of cooperation from these staff, the DSO’s records of the Registry, all necessary for 
Morton’s security work, were kept fifty miles away in Habbaniyah due to the ‘lack of suitable 
and secure accommodation in Baghdad’.488 The reason for Morton’s physical presence in 
Baghdad was indeed to maintain the close connection with the Iraqi CID.
489
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In addition, Morton’s DSO cover was publicly blown by Douglas Laird Busk, the 
Counsellor at the British Embassy in Baghdad, who was ‘cynical about intelligence’.490 The 
main reason for this uneasy relationship with the British Embassy in Baghdad was perhaps 
that Morton was seen as an intelligence officer comparable with the wartime CICI operative, 
who had been responsible for not only internal security, but also tribal and political 
intelligence. During the war, the local CICI operatives, named Area Liaison Officers (ALOs), 
had operated to collect ‘raw material’ from their several stations in Iraq, but had caused 
troubles for the diplomats in their political dealings with the Iraqis who ‘increasingly’ 
resented ALOs’ presence. 491 The issue was resolved after an investigation by Sir Edward 
Bridges, Permanent Secretary to the Treasury and head of the civil service (1945-56), who 
understood Morton’s liaison work and ‘the intelligence value’ Morton received from his Iraqi 
counterparts.
492
 Owing to the importance of ‘the special strategic position’ of the region, it 
was agreed at an inter-departmental meeting chaired by Sir Edward Bridges that ‘the work of 
SIME was essential and should continue’.493  
The Relationship between SIME and MI6 
As SIME operated in foreign countries, it is important to note the extent to which 
SIME and MI6 worked together in the region. It is commonly understood that MI5 and MI6 
had since 1931 (if only in principle) operated under the so-called ‘three mile limit’ rule.494 As 
the authorised history of MI5 shows, however, in the complex post-war British 
decolonisation period, the jurisdictions of the Services were re-defined by the Attlee 
Directive of 1948, which gave MI5 authority for imperial security throughout the British 
Empire.
495
 Nevertheless, the Middle East was an exception to this and SIME was not strictly 
defined by either role or directive. It operated on an ad hoc basis, governed by the broadly-
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defined SIME Charter, which stated that ‘SIME will maintain close relations with MI6’.496 
The official history of MI6 records that there was tension with MI5 over the issues of the 
post-war role of SIME and their jurisdiction over the Middle East in the late 1940s.
497
 
According to the Liddell Diaries, nevertheless, in order to avoid duplication of their work, an 
agreement over the division of labour was reached between MI5 and MI6 in 1950 through 
Dick White of MI5 and Jack Easton of MI6, and was referred to as the ‘White/Easton 
Agreement’.498 From 1950 onwards, MI6 took charge of the field of counter-espionage in the 
region, with an MI6 officer heading the counter-espionage division of SIME, often referred to 
as the Joint Intelligence Division (JID), which was composed of both MI5 and MI6 officers 
on secondment.
499
 Thus, while intelligence on any espionage activities of foreign states was 
dealt with by MI6, intelligence on any subversive activities in the region was chiefly handled 
by MI5. SIME was responsible for the final collation of security intelligence (any intelligence 
on espionage, sabotage, and subversion) as the regional headquarters of MI5.   
Unlike at their headquarters in London, the working relationship between the Services 
on the ground seems to have been less problematic.
500
 While SIME was the regional hub of 
security intelligence, MI6 was an intelligence collector on the ground. Moreover, because the 
headquarters of SIME was housed within (sequentially) the Army headquarters in Cairo 
(1939-1946); Fayid, in the Canal Zone of Egypt (1946-1953); and Cyprus (1954-1958), it 
cooperated closely with the British military in the region. SIME officers, including the 
representatives of MI5 working in the guise of DSOs, mostly used the cover of military 
ranks.
501
 MI6 was, on the other hand, operating with civilian cover mostly associated with the 
Foreign Office, though occasionally with the Ministry of Defence. The regional headquarters 
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of MI6 in the post-war period was in Beirut, operating under the cover name of the Combined 
Research and Planning Office (CRPO) with which SIME worked well.
502
  
The good relationship between SIME and CRPO on the ground was not without 
reason: their organisational differences and activities, and the way in which they collected 
intelligence were mutually beneficial, not competitive. This was due to the division of overt 
and covert means of intelligence collection in the region. MI5’s networks consisted entirely 
of ‘overt’ security liaison officers, whose presence was declared to the host governments and 
was thus accepted by their local counterparts, mostly the local police or secret police. MI6, on 
the other hand, was a covert intelligence network, operating without the knowledge of the 
host governments.
503
 This special arrangement gave MI5 access to particular, and otherwise 
unobtainable, intelligence. Indeed, as the formation of Communist parties was illegal in most 
Middle Eastern states, any activities associated with them were handled by the local police. 
Thus MI5’s special overt liaison, especially its ‘close and useful relations’ with ‘the local 
police’, was praised by the local MI6 representative as a ‘considerable help’ with regard to its 
own intelligence requirements.
504
 It is noteworthy that, as Guy Liddell noted in his diaries, 
the demarcation between MI5 and MI6 in the post-war period was in fact not geographical 
but functional.
505
  
MI6’s covert networks in the region also provided SIME with intelligence otherwise 
unobtainable from its local counterparts through DSOs. This was the reason for the close 
regional relationship between SIME and MI6. Though it was indeed necessary for 
intelligence collection, it nonetheless remained a sensitive issue. There was tacit 
understanding amongst the intelligence and security services that while an 
intelligence/security liaison was maintained, they would not be spying on each other.
506
 Once 
the existence of covert activities by MI6 became known to local authorities, a common 
pretext was rightly or wrongly given that they were operating in host countries under the 
‘third country rule’, whereby MI6 stations are ‘supposed to target neighbouring states, rather 
than the host nation’.507 In his memoir, Kim Philby also testified in relation to his role as 
Head of Station in Turkey that ‘They [the Turkish intelligence/security organisations] knew 
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of us, and tolerated our activity, on the understanding that it was directed solely against the 
Soviet Union and the Balkans, not against Turkey’.508  
As available documents testify, the reality was, nevertheless, that owing to the 
constraints on MI5’s overt contact with local authorities, MI6 was also operating in line with 
the requirements of SIME to collect security intelligence, in other words, intelligence on 
subversive activities, in the region.
509
 In the late 1940s, for instance, when Kim Philby was in 
Istanbul, he was asked by William Magan, Head of SIME, to provide another officer from 
MI6 to fill the vacuum in Eastern Turkey.
510
 Moreover, while the DSO in Baghdad, a 
representative of MI5, was closely cooperating with the Iraqi CID as an overt contact, Magan 
also requested an MI6 representative to be posted in Northern Iraq, where the Kurdish tribes 
were a cause for concern for SIME.
511
 This reflects the fact that MI5 and MI6 officers were 
often working in the same country.
512
 The main sources of intelligence for SIME in the post-
war period thus remained both MI6 and the local authorities.
513
 
Limitations in Intelligence Collection and Counter-Subversion 
Unlike MI6, MI5 indeed collated intelligence from all available sources and was also 
an intelligence assessment body. The authorised history of MI5 shows that, despite its 
organisational predisposition being anti-Soviet and anti-Communist, MI5 was more cautious 
in its assessment of the danger of Communist movements in Britain than its own intelligence 
customers.
514
 MI5 was also careful when analysing intelligence sources. One such instance 
was when MI5 received a report from its own representative saying that the Indian 
intelligence service, the so-called ‘Bureau’ or ‘IB’, had seized a document in Abadan, Iran, 
recovered in the round-up of the Communist cells in 1952, which indicated ‘plans for the 
future of the Communist movement in Asia and the Middle East’, and claimed that ‘the 
Communist movement all over the world was centrally directed by the Cominform in 
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Russia’.515 The origins of the sources were carefully examined, and MI5 disregarded the 
news as being unreliable and possibly coming from MAUVE (a codename for any reports 
from Russian émigrés which were unreliable and unverified).
516
 As the regional headquarters 
of MI5, SIME also adopted a similar approach to MI5 and remained the security authority in 
the region. When anti-British riots broke out in Egypt in early 1952, despite the insistence of 
some officials at the British Embassy in Cairo that they must have been plotted either by the 
Soviet Union or Communists, SIME refuted the assessment made by the British Embassy 
staff on the grounds that ‘no acceptable evidence has been produced in support of them’.517 
SIME’s source was ‘a senior official in the Special Section of the [Egyptian] Ministry of the 
Interior’, and the information provided by him was checked against all available 
intelligence.
518
  
While the quality of intelligence reports on regional security was maintained, SIME 
faced limitations in intelligence collection in the post-war period. Despite the close 
cooperation on counter-espionage between SIME and MI6, the quality of intelligence 
obtained by MI6 seems to have been less than satisfactory during the late 1940s and early 
1950s. According to the Liddell Diaries, intelligence from MI6 in the region was ‘practically 
valueless’, and MI6 was ‘clearly employing a number of agents who were MAUVE’.519 
Anthony Cavendish has also claimed in his auto-biography that the sources of MI6 on the 
Soviet Union were mostly MAUVE and that MI6 obtained no valuable intelligence from 
them in the early 1950s.
520
 They indeed suffered from a fatal defect: Kim Philby, a Soviet 
mole, was placed at the heart of MI6 as Head of R5 (counter-espionage), the Head of Station 
in Istanbul, and later in the United States to liaise with the Americans.
521
 An example of his 
disruption of MI6’s work was the Volkov affair of 1946, in which Kim Philby was personally 
involved in disrupting a defection by Konstantin Volkov, an NKGB officer stationed in 
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Turkey, who was sent back to Moscow due to Philby’s intervention.522 Donald Maclean, a 
Soviet mole within the Foreign Office, was also present at the British Embassy in Cairo as 
Head of Chancery (1948-50), to which DSO Cairo was also attached.
523
 According to Major 
A.W. Sansom, the Security Officer at the Embassy, Maclean certainly enjoyed his privileged 
position as he ‘openly went home with a brief-case stuffed with secret material whenever he 
pleased’.524 
SIME had a problem with intelligence collection not only through MI6, but also with 
local authorities through the liaison of the DSOs. As the intelligence liaison was not 
institutionalised under diplomatic regulations or treaty, intelligence collection was very 
delicate and problems compounded by limitations in the intelligence exchange between the 
representatives of MI5 and the local security services. MI5’s intimate relationship in the late 
1940s and early 1950s with its Egyptian counterparts illustrates this point. With thirty-years 
of personal experience of Egypt and extensive inside knowledge of the Egyptian police, 
Colonel Geoffrey Jenkins, the DSO Cairo (1943–48), enjoyed ‘excellent relations’ with the 
Egyptian police and was able to obtain ‘much useful intelligence’ from the Egyptians through 
his liaison.
525
 The intelligence obtained by Colonel Jenkins included, for instance, 
documentary evidence of secret negotiations between the Wafd Party, a nationalist political 
party in Egypt, and the Russians suggesting ‘future collaboration’.526 However, Alex Kellar 
of MI5 described the relationship between Colonel Jenkins and his Egyptian counterpart thus:  
While admitting that the Egyptian police as such are unlikely to pass information to Jenkins that 
may harm Egyptian interests… their liaison with Jenkins on Communist, Russian and Jewish 
matters has nevertheless been, and should increasingly be, of considerable value to us. 
Egyptians of the present ruling classes, and their counter-parts in the rest of the Arab countries, 
hate the Zionists and fear the Russians and the increasing influence and strength of the 
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Communists within their frontiers. We can therefore always be certain of their willingness, 
while they remain in power, to exchange intelligence with us on all these topics.
527
 
Intelligence liaison was thus concerned with specific issues of common interest. Intelligence 
sharing also occurred on the basis of mutual benefit to both parties. For instance, Sir Alistair 
Horne, a former SIME officer recalls that whilst the Egyptian Police provided intelligence to 
SIME on ‘Communist activities’, SIME supplied the Egyptians with information on ‘hashish-
traffickers’.528  
In addition to the Cairo Police, Colonel Jenkins maintained a ‘close and friendly’ 
relationship with the Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of the Interior, and with the 
Director-General of Public Security throughout the war. Once new appointments were made 
after the war, Colonel Jenkins had to convince the Egyptians of the raison d’être of the 
intelligence liaison and rebuild mutual trust with the Egyptians. For instance, a new but 
sceptical Director-General of Public Security questioned the extent of Jenkins’s intelligence 
activities in Cairo, concerned that he was ‘seeking intelligence about Egyptian politics’, 
particularly about the activities of anti-British figures. Jenkins’s first task was then to win 
‘the goodwill’ of the new Director-General of Public Security.529 In this context, the extent to 
which SIME was able to obtain intelligence through its own sources (MI6 and DSOs), and to 
warn its intelligence customers in the region was indeed limited. A notable example of the 
limits of its intelligence collection was the Egyptian coup of 1952. Despite the DSO Cairo 
being in close contact with his Egyptian counterparts during the turmoil of early 1952, SIME 
had no intelligence forewarning of the Free Officers’ coup in 1952.530  As the Egyptian 
authority was also caught by surprise by the coup d’état, the DSO Cairo’s sources also 
seemed to have been unaware of the plots in the Egyptian Army. A similar case can also been 
seen from the Iraqi Revolution. Despite SIME being acutely aware of the existence of 
disaffection in the Iraqi Army as early as the early 1950s, information on which had been 
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passed from the Head of SIME to his Iraqi counterparts in the CID of the Iraqi Police,
531
 no 
prior warning of the coup was provided.
532
  
In a similar vein, there were also severe limitations on SIME’s counter-subversive 
activities in the post-war Middle East. During the war, SIME had executive and law 
enforcement powers through which security measures were undertaken in each country in the 
region. However, Britain no longer enjoyed executive powers over the local authorities in the 
post-war era. One of the problems in the early post-war period was that SIME was strongly 
associated with the military planning of the Chiefs of Staff. As an integral part of the military 
machine, SIME preserved its own wartime detention camps under the direction of the Chiefs 
of Staff until the late 1940s, which, admitted William Magan, Head of SIME, was a 
continuation of its ‘own mistaken wartime policy’.533  
Moreover, another problem was the extent to which SIME was able to obtain 
cooperation from local authorities which had changed since the war. Rising regional anti-
British sentiment in the post-war years made SIME’s task even more difficult. Sir John Shaw, 
Director of the Overseas Section of MI5, for instance, informed the JIC that the Egyptian 
Police, SIME’s closest ally in the late 1940s and early 1950s gradually became ‘hostile’ and 
SIME received ‘no help’ from 1952 onwards.534 Unlike at home, where the role of MI5 was 
to defend its own government against subversion, SIME was not necessarily conducting 
counter-subversion for the benefit of local governments. William Magan once explained to 
his successor, Colonel (later Brigadier) Robin ‘Tin-eye’ Stephens (1951-1953),535 that: 
Security Intelligence presents a difficulty because it cannot be exactly defined for SIME 
purposes. You have only to consider the impossibility of drawing a line by definition between 
an Arab political party and an Arab subversive organisation to see the problem. A broad 
definition of Security Intelligence, however, gives rise to that part of the intelligence division of 
the organisation which concerns itself with subversive individuals and bodies – “subversive” 
also, of course, cannot be exactly defined.
536
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The complexity of the demarcation line between subversive and anti-British elements was a 
cause of confusion even among MI5 officers. With intense disturbances and street riots 
occurring, all of which were ultimately associated with anti-British and nationalist sentiments 
throughout the region, Colonel Stephens requested MI5 Head Office to send more MI5 
officers to the region as ‘links’ to local authorities in places where MI5 was not 
represented.
537
 His request was, however, turned down by MI5 Head Office as it was 
considered unnecessary.
538
  
It is noteworthy that Colonel Stephens’ request generated a discussion in MI5 Head 
Office regarding MI5’s commitments to safeguarding British interests overseas. In this 
regard, MI5’s role overseas in the wider context of counter-insurgency in the British Colonies 
merits brief attention here. The person considered to be at the centre of this discussion was 
William Magan, former Head of SIME, who had just been employed as a full-time officer at 
MI5 Head Office after coming back from the region.
539
  It is worthwhile mentioning William 
Magan here in particular as not only did he have extensive experience in the region but he 
was also soon promoted by Sir Dick White in 1953 to Director of E Branch (the overseas 
department in charge of external affairs, liaising with all Colonial, Commonwealth, and 
friendly foreign countries) and remained in executive positions for fifteen years until his 
retirement.
540
  
According to Magan, maintaining law and order, including the suppression of 
disturbances, riots, and terrorist activities even when directed by a political organisation, was 
outside MI5’s remit and should be dealt with by the relevant local authorities. The police 
were responsible for maintaining law and order but the armed forces should also maintain 
their own link with the local authorities as they might be deployed ‘in aid of the civil power’. 
In the case of ‘purely local indigenous subversive political persons, movements, parties and 
organizations’ in British territory, this was again the concern of local authorities and military 
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forces. The position of MI5 in this context was that it should only be informed if they were 
categorised as ‘conspiratorially political subversive’, and/or if they had the ‘possibility of 
outside influence, such as contact with a hostile foreign power’.541 Referring to the roles and 
responsibilities of SIME, Magan further commented that:  
[O]ur resources, whether at home or overseas, are inadequate for a one hundred per cent 
fulfilment of our tasks. This is an inherent feature of all defence forces. We must, therefore, 
follow the age old military principle of concentrating on the main objective. I have thus always 
held the view that the wise thing is to stop the holes of the big rats properly even if this meant 
ignoring the little rats, and risking the odd nip from them.
542
 
‘The big rats’ referred to by Magan were the Russians and Communist movements; he 
considered anti-British movements and disturbances as ‘little rats’. This meant that SIME, as 
the regional headquarters of MI5, was supposed to be concerned with ‘conspiratorially 
political subversive’ activities, mostly those associated with external threats such as 
International Communism and the Soviet Union.  
The Primacy of Cold War Concerns over Anti-British Nationalist 
Movements. 
Magan’s approach to MI5’s responsibilities in the British territories overseas indicates 
that MI5’s post-war concern was primarily associated with the Soviet Union and the Cold 
War, but MI5 had to deal with the new challenge of Zionist extremists and terrorism in the 
immediate post-war period.
543
 It was a learning environment for MI5 regarding its own 
commitments overseas at the time. During the period of the transition from war to peacetime 
SIME was mostly ill-equipped to cope with the flow of ‘illegal’ Jewish immigration and 
countering Jewish terrorist activities in Palestine. Moreover, it is important to note that the 
prime responsibility for internal security in the Palestine Mandate lay not with MI5 or SIME 
but the Palestine CID, which had the intelligence and executive powers necessary to deal 
with the situation.
544
 Despite a shortage of personnel at SIME Head Office to deal with Soviet 
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incursions,
545
 SIME’s chief concern was the infiltration of Soviet agents into the region 
amidst the flow of illegal Jewish immigrants.
546
 SIME was in fact right to be worried about 
the Soviet penetration of Palestine. Records from the Soviet archives smuggled out of Russia 
by a former KGB archivist, Vasili Mitrokhin, show that there was indeed a series of attempts 
to exploit the situation by the KGB, whose task was to ‘ensure that large numbers of its 
agents were included in the ranks of the Soviet Jews allowed to leave for Israel’.547 
Since MI5 had taken over SIME from the Army as in loco parentis, one of the ways 
in which MI5 sought to improve SIME’s security measures was to institute the MI5 standard 
practice of record-keeping at SIME’s Registry. 548  Records declassified in 2009 show a 
gradual but clear shift in SIME record-keeping by the early 1950s, and also demonstrate the 
extent to which SIME and its outstations (DSOs) collected and collated intelligence 
according to specific principles. The SIME Central Registry stored all information on 
identifiable officers and proven or suspected agents of foreign intelligence and security 
services, regardless of nationality; and the DSOs were instructed to record all information on 
identifiable Communists, Communist sympathisers, and also nationalists at their own 
Registries.
549
 In 1953, SIME only had four outstations: Cairo, the Canal Zone, Cyprus, and 
Baghdad. The largest outstation was still DSO Cairo, which also had the largest Registry, 
containing an estimated 50,000 card-indexes, covering 40,000 individuals.
550
 DSO Baghdad 
was the second largest outstation, and its Registry contained 33,000 cards concerning about 
20,000 individuals. As it inherited records from the wartime organisation, CICI, Roger Lees 
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of MI5, DSO in Baghdad, noted that a large number of people were carded on ‘tenuous 
grounds or for reasons which are now no longer of interest to us [MI5]’, but he stored ‘all 
persons of security interest’, about 12,000 of whom were ‘communists or communist 
suspects’.551 On a much smaller scale, there was the DSO in the Canal Zone, whose main 
responsibility was to protect the presence of the British Army there. The records held 
‘approximately 2,050 cards’, mostly referring to ‘nationalists and “thugs”’.552 The DSO in 
Cyprus stored approximately 10,000 cards of which 5,500 were Communists or Communist 
sympathisers; and ‘about 1,500 cards connected with nationalists’ and 3,000 more on 
suspects.
553
  
At the SIME and DSO Registries records were kept on those involved in ‘subversive’ 
activities against the British and local authorities. It is notable that while keeping records on 
‘subversive’ elements for their own security purposes, the prime concern of SIME, and thus 
MI5, was their direct connection to the Soviet Union and the spread of Communist 
movements in the region. A declassified MI5 file on the Iraqi counterpart of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the Jamiyat al Adab al Islamiya, also known as the Moslem Ethical Society 
(MES), shows that SIME recognised the full subversive potential of the MES as a strong anti-
British force and as a ‘nationalist movement’, but whose fate was largely dependent on 
whether the local authorities were able to resist them.
554
 While the MES was militant and 
subversive in character and notably anti-British, the DSO Baghdad, Jack Morton of MI5, 
nevertheless, judged that the MES was of ‘little security interest’ to SIME as it was a 
religious and theological group. SIME’s prime concern was whether any leading members of 
the MES were in contact with Soviets who might exploit them; or whether the MES could 
emerge as ‘an effective barrier against Communism’.555  
Prime Importance: War Planning 
It is clear from its authorised history that MI5 – the people and the service – was 
predominantly anti-Soviet and anti-Communist.
556
 However, setting a higher priority on 
keeping records on Communist elements rather than anti-British nationalists and groups 
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shows SIME had a clear and logical foundation beyond anti-Communism. All post-war 
activities associated with MI5, and indeed SIME, were subordinate to British government 
policy. The central components of this policy were the Defence Transition Committee (DTC) 
and the 1948 Government War Book.
557
 As briefly noted in Chapter One, the 1948 War Book 
was a government policy, setting procedures for all departments, including the intelligence 
and security services, to deal with an emergency situation in the event of war with the Soviet 
Union.
558
 As Britain’s only security service, the role of MI5 in the event of war was to inform 
security authorities of ‘lists of persons’ who should be detained under draconian defence 
regulations.
559
 As an essential requirement, MI5 also prepared its own in-house war book, 
which was constantly reviewed and circulated within MI5 and its own outstations.
560
  
Without exception, the 1948 Government War Book was the key driving policy for 
MI5’s activities in the Middle East. SIME was particularly important in this as the integrity of 
the Middle East was essential for British war-making, and the Chiefs of Staff envisaged the 
possibility of a Soviet invasion of the region.
561
 For this reason, SIME Headquarters and its 
outstations were all attached to British military bases and, under instruction, SIME and DSOs 
prepared security measures and their own ‘Arrest Lists’ in each country for ‘the event of war, 
or other emergency’ taken from their own Registries.562 The lists consisted of a short list of 
subversive individuals and organisations who were the most likely to engage in subversive 
activities to disrupt allied war efforts against the Soviet Union. They were particularly 
designed to grant the DSOs ‘information sufficient to neutralise them, for which purpose it 
will normally be adequate to be able to identify their principal directing personalities’.563 
Amongst all other activities, the preparation of arrest lists of those who would be detained in 
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the event of war or an emergency was an ‘important SIME commitment’ in post-war imperial 
strategy in the Middle East.
564
  
However, implementing these security measures was difficult primarily because the 
territorial coverage of the BDCC/ME Command consisted of mostly foreign countries, with 
the exception of Cyprus and later the Aden Colony. Since these security measures inevitably 
required the cooperation of local authorities, a good security liaison with local authorities was 
essential. A glimpse of these liaisons with local authorities on such security measures can be 
seen in the case of Iraq, in which DSO Baghdad became the main outstation of SIME in the 
1950s after the wane of the intimate relationship with the Egyptians in the early 1950s.
565
 The 
relationship between the representative of MI5 and the Iraqi CID, led by Colonel Bahjat Beg 
Attiyah, originated from the establishment of the DSO Baghdad in 1947.
566
 Their close 
relationship necessitated intelligence-sharing on certain topics. For instance, following the 
roundup of some 160 Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) members, including those of the 
Executive Committee, in 1949, the Iraqi CID duly passed intelligence on the linkage between 
the ICP and the Russians to Philip Bicknell Ray of MI5, the DSO in Baghdad (1949-51). 
Detailed reports (over 300 pages) on the ICP members, the party composition, and their 
activities, made by Philip Ray for MI5 Head Office and the Foreign Office show that the 
Iraqi CID interrogated the leading ICP members and obtained confessions from them to the 
effect that the ICP leaders had direct connections with the Russian Legation in Iraq. ICP 
members had received financial support and propaganda materials, named the ‘Al Qa’ida 
Press’, from the Legation; the latter were also shared with the members of the Tudeh Party.567 
It was also discovered that the Russians had made contact with the ICP through a small group 
of Armenians and that the ICP had also intended on agitating among minority circles such as 
the Kurds.
568
  
The relationship between the representative of MI5 and the Iraqi CID grew even 
closer in the 1950s as a result of the joint war planning. Guy Liddell noted in his diaries that 
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the relationship between the DSO Baghdad, Philip Ray,  and his counterpart, the Director of 
the Iraqi CID, Bahjat Attiyah, was ‘extremely close’, and that Bahjat Attiyah had a 
‘tremendous respect for all the advice and help which Ray had given him’.569 Philip Ray was 
instructed by the BDCC/ME through the Air Officer Commanding (AOC) Iraq Command to 
discuss arrangements with the Iraqi authorities for ‘the preparation of lists of security 
suspects to be arrested on the outbreak of war’. Philip Ray’s approach was dependent on ‘the 
general deterioration in the international situation’ rather than war planning against the Soviet 
Union as envisaged by the Chiefs of Staff.
570
 As instructed, Philip Ray also cooperated with 
Bahjat Attiyah on a war plan covering travel control, censorship, interrogation and the 
protection of vulnerabilities, leading to the combination of the arrest lists of both parties.
571
 
The number of suspects who were destined to be arrested for interrogation in ‘special’ camps 
at the outset of war was estimated at 2,000 in the first stage, and would consist mostly of 
those who were associated with the ICP and Soviet Union. Any underground Communist 
members and suspects, or other persons likely to engage in subversive activities, were 
destined to be detained and interrogated automatically by the Iraqi CID under the existing 
legal framework.
572
 
The security measures in place in the event of a war in Iraq expanded towards the mid-
1950s and extended beyond mere intelligence liaison. As these security measures required the 
highest level of cooperation, in March 1952 Sir John Troutbeck approached the Iraqi Prime 
Minister, Nuri al-Said, regarding the security plans for war. Agreeing to the suggestion in 
principle, Nuri al-Said preferred using the police as opposed to the armed forces to ‘concoct 
the planning on the Iraqi side’, mainly due to volatile Iraqi sentiments towards the West, 
particularly Britain. Nuri al-Said worried that the disclosure of war planning would cause ‘a 
serious political storm’ in which his government would be accused of ‘dragging the country 
into war on the side of the Western Powers’.573 He decided to delegate the task to Alwan 
Hussain, known as Alwan Pasha, Director-General of Police, who would later hand the task 
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over to Bahjat Beg Attiyah, the Director of the CID. On the British side, Sir John Troutbeck 
nominated Roger Lees of MI5, DSO Baghdad (1951-53), the successor to Philip Ray, to be 
the British counterpart for security planning in the event of war in Iraq.
574
  
After an initial discussion between Roger Lees and Bahjat Beg Attiyah on the security 
planning to effect the Iraqi Prime Minister’s orders, Lees reported that: 
After several meetings [with Bahjat Attiyah] and after examining old files covering the last war 
to see whether any aspects of the planning were covered then, which could be adapted for our 
present needs, it became apparent to me that a completely fresh approach in our present 
planning would be necessary. I therefore met both Alwan Pasha and Bahjat Beg and it was 
agreed that I should draw up a detailed scheme for their consideration.
575
  
While keeping an updated combined-arrest list, the security plan, contemplated by DSO 
Baghdad and the Iraqi CID, was for ‘the laying of the foundations of sound security under 
peace-time conditions, on which efficient war-time measures could be immediately 
introduced on the outbreak of hostilities’. For this purpose, the Director of the Iraqi CID, 
Bahjat Attiyah, was given training by the British in ‘protective security matters’ during his 
visit to London in June 1952.
576
 Guy Liddell also noted his meeting with Bahjat Attiyah in 
his diaries when Bahjat Attiyah was in Britain.
577
 In addition, after the examination of Lees’s 
proposed scheme, Alwan Pasha gave orders to set up a ‘special planning section’ under cover 
of the Iraqi CID. This small and compartmentalised section was headed by Colonel Yusef 
Peters, Commandant of Police, assisted by two Assistant Commandants.
578
 Colonel Peters 
was also given ‘detailed instruction’ on the security measures in Baghdad, ‘paying particular 
attention to the oil industry’. During his visit in May 1953 to Basra, Kirkuk and Khanaqun, 
where the major oil refineries were situated, Colonel Peters was accompanied by ‘a British 
officer’, presumably DSO Baghdad, Roger Lees, and detailed advice was given on 
‘protective security matters to the managers of oil companies and other important 
installations’. These security measures included the coverage of ‘the oil producing, refining 
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and storage centres, public utility installations, such as water and electricity, and certain 
Government departments’.579  
A report by a senior RAF commander clearly states that the security planning between 
Roger Lees and Bahjat Attiyah was carried out in ‘great secrecy’, continuing even after the 
resignation of Nuri al-Said in July 1952 without the knowledge of subsequent Prime 
Ministers, Ministers of the Interior or Ministers of Defence.
580
 As a result of this close liaison 
with the Iraqis, the security plan was submitted by Roger Lees to the Local Security Board 
and also approved by Sir John Troutbeck.
581
 Although what benefit the Iraqis would derive 
from this cooperation is uncertain, a document states that, in the event of war, the Iraqis 
agreed on the provision of a small group of British interrogators to the detention camp where 
all suspects on the combined-arrest lists would be detained, and, more importantly, the 
provision of British representatives to the central censorship headquarters, controlling postal 
and telecommunication censorship throughout Iraq.
582
 The report reached Sir Hugh 
Stephenson, Chairman of JIC in the Middle East, who was ‘extremely gratified’ to learn of 
such substantial progress despite the ‘difficulties inherent in the unstable political state in the 
country’, according to a letter sent to the Local Security Board.583 As already discussed in 
Chapter Two, it was in this context that Britain was reluctant to allow the Americans to 
appoint their own security advisers to the Iraqi Police and the CID. The security plan was 
constantly reviewed as to whether it was still ‘valid and workable’ until at least 1955.584  
In addition to SIME, MI6 was also operating in the region under the direction of the 
1948 Government War Book. The limited literature on MI6 suggests that MI6 incorporated 
the wartime sabotage organisation, Special Operations Executive (SOE), in the post-war 
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reorganisation of the British intelligence community in the late 1940s,
585
 and, based on the 
lessons of the war, largely those of SOE, the Directorate of War Planning (D/WP), later 
renamed the Special Political Action Section (SPA), was formed in MI6 to establish stay-
behind networks in foreign countries.
586
 Recent declassified files of the Permanent Under-
Secretary’s Department (PUSD) confirm that the preparations for war planning were also 
underway in MI6 from the late 1940s.
587
 JIC records in 1952 indicate that MI6 was tasked by 
the Chiefs of Staff to create a stay-behind network in independent foreign countries of the 
Middle East.
588
 Regardless of the intentions of the regional governments to cooperate in the 
event of war, the minutes of the JIC/ME meeting in September 1952 show that the British 
pressed ahead with war planning, which included establishing stay-behind networks in Egypt 
589
 - one of which was established in the early 1950s, headed by James Swinburn.
590
 In 1956, 
after the Egyptian Government, which had been aware of the Swinburn network since 1953, 
became more hostile to Britain, the stay-behind network was rounded up, although John 
McGlashan, an MI6 officer, who had been involved in plotting to assassinate Nasser, was 
successfully smuggled out of Egypt.
591
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SIME Wound UP: A Shift in Conducting the Cold War  
The authorised history of MI5 briefly notes that SIME was closed down in 1958.
592
 
However, this does not necessarily mean that the roles MI5 had played in the region were 
regarded as insignificant. On the contrary, the importance of MI5 in fighting the Cold War 
was most certainly recognised by the British Government by the mid-1950s. As Foreign 
Secretary, Harold Macmillan, for instance, made available ‘technical advice on Communist 
subversion’ to the signatory powers of the Baghdad Pact, later renamed the Central Treaty 
Organisation (CENTO), and proposed multilateral intelligence/security cooperation.
593
 As 
will be shown in detail in Chapter Four, the British delegation was led by MI5. Regular 
biannual meetings were held for the exchange of information on Communist activities with 
its American, Turkish, Pakistani, and Iranian counterparts, and continued until the dissolution 
of CENTO in 1979. Moreover, SIME was only one of many other imperial or quasi-imperial 
intelligence organisations being wound up during the same period.
594
 The closure of SIME 
should therefore be understood in the wider context of British decolonisation and, more 
importantly, the Cold War, towards which competing approaches existed within Whitehall. 
The process of winding down SIME had already begun when Sir Dick White assumed 
the position of Director-General of MI5 in late 1953. The number of personnel was 
substantially reduced and the three supervisory posts (Head of SIME, Deputy Head, and 
Head of the Counter-Intelligence Section) were merged into one post.
595
 SIME was then 
staffed with 13 officers, and 25 female staff.
596
 In addition, while senior MI5 officers 
complained that the Head of SIME was ‘bound to be handicapped in fulfilling his advisory 
responsibilities to the BDCC (ME)’, Sir Dick White also abolished the counter-espionage 
section, the JID, headed by an MI6 officer in late 1955.
597
 In his mind, SIME had 
unnecessary burdens, such as the collation of intelligence in the region, which could be 
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transferred to London, White sought to reduce SIME to a ‘security advisory role’. 598  In 
addition, despite maintaining a good relationship between SIME and MI6, Sir Dick White 
was also concerned about MI6’s activities in the field of counter-espionage for which MI5 
was officially responsible. This was not only in the Middle East but also elsewhere where the 
JIDs of the regional headquarters of MI5, headed by MI6 officers, were ‘geared almost as 
much to the broader objects of MI6’.599 It is noteworthy that the reference to ‘the broader 
objects’ of MI6 was to its ‘cold war’ activities, associated with clandestine activities 
including paramilitary operations, often referred to as ‘special political action’ or ‘disruptive 
action’. 600  William Magan explained the reasons for closing the JID of MI5’s regional 
headquarters to his officers overseas that Dick White was ‘worried about the extent to which 
the JID may be involved in steering MI6 stations and concerned in “cold war” activities’.601 
The problem for MI5 was that the clandestine operations of MI6, its so-called ‘cold war’ 
activities, were often a cause of concern regarding their maintenance of a good liaison 
relationship with local authorities who were not informed of such clandestine activities.
602
 In 
March 1955, SIME only had a total of 12 staff (5 officers and 7 female staff), and was 
outnumbered by MI6, the strength of which was four times larger (total 56 staff at all ranks – 
12 officers, plus 2 in SIME, 27 secretaries, and 15 operators) than SIME.
603
 
Not only were MI5 concerned about the activities of MI6 in their territory, but there 
was also an undergoing shift in thinking with regard to the conduct of the Cold War in the 
same period. More precisely, as suggested in Chapter One, there was a growing concern 
within Whitehall at the way in which the Chiefs of Staff were involved in the decision-
making process.
 
 Since the end of the Second World War, the Chiefs of Staff had been one of 
the key decision makers regarding the conduct of the Cold War and in directing the activities 
of the intelligence and security services, including the clandestine operations of MI6. 
However, with the advent of thermo-nuclear weapons, it gradually became clear to British 
policymakers by the mid-1950s that a war with conventionally armed forces against the 
Soviet Union seemed unlikely and that the presence of a large military force in the region was 
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thus less important. In addition, the Britain’s defence policy became more focused on 
European defence and the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) at expense of committing 
military forces to the Middle East at the outbreak of war.
604
 This was the context in which 
General Sir Gerald Templer conducted his review of intelligence organisations overseas, 
including the Colonies.
605
  
As a result, any attempt at directing intelligence-related activities overseas, especially 
in foreign territories, by the Chiefs of Staff was often considered as interference in matters 
which were ‘essentially the business of the Foreign Secretary’. 606  Moreover, Sir Ivone 
Kirkpatrick, the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office, was concerned with ‘the 
inflated size’ of intelligence staff at regional headquarters, particularly those who were 
associated with the military planning of the Chiefs of Staff, which he regarded as 
unnecessary.
607
 Furthermore, Sir Norman Brook, the Cabinet Secretary, also considered 
‘large regional intelligence organisations [as] being outmoded’.608 At a JIC meeting in March 
1955 concerning intelligence organisations in the Middle East, Sir Patrick Dean, Chairman of 
the JIC, noted ‘some duplication’ between London and the Middle East in ‘the collation of 
intelligence’ and suggested that ‘it would be better if this was done in London’.609 Sir Dick 
White also added that the work being done by SIME ‘could be done as easily from the 
UK’.610  This is the context in which SIME was closed down in 1958.  
It is noteworthy that during the same period, the balance between civilian and military 
uses of intelligence had continually been an issue in the British Government and the JIC was 
moved to the Cabinet Office from 1957 onwards.
611
 Moreover, as noted earlier, there was a 
gradual shift of Britain’s defence policy in the mid-1950s from the retention of the region to 
European defence and a wider commitment, often termed ‘East of Suez’, and reducing 
conventional defences, which was at the heart of the 1957 White Paper.
612
 However, while 
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British military forces were gradually retreating from the region, MI5 and MI6 nonetheless 
continued to serve Britain’s foreign and colonial policy in the region. In addition to the 
aforementioned activities of MI5 under the auspices of the Baghdad Pact, the authorised 
history of MI5 notes that representatives of MI5 remained in SIME’s former territory to liaise 
with local authorities after its closure in 1958.
613
  
Of course, the closure of SIME in 1958 does not necessarily mean that MI6’s 
activities were also reduced accordingly. As Sir Dick White left MI5 to succeed Sir John 
Sinclair as “C” of MI6 in 1956, he found it difficult to rein in the ‘cold war’ activities of MI6, 
especially in the Middle East. These activities were led by so-called ‘barons’, senior MI6 
officials who extensively engaged in special operations designed at changing world affairs by 
clandestine means.
614
 Jack Easton, Deputy ‘C’, warned the newly appointed ‘C’, Dick White, 
‘I’ve had to stop a lot of operations in the Middle East. Too many are suspiciously unsafe’.615 
Available evidence makes clear that these activities were still favoured by civilian 
policymakers at the time, as well as politicians such as Harold Macmillan.
616
 Owing to the 
inaccessibility of MI6’s archives, the question of how Sir Dick White saw the closure of 
SIME in 1958 from his new position at MI6, and how he reconciled the balance between 
security/counter-intelligence on the one side and ‘cold war’ activities on the other, remains 
open. 
Conclusion  
The role of intelligence and security services is subordinate to government policy. 
The records of MI5 show that SIME was above all an instrument of the Cold War and 
operated in the Middle East under the direction of the Chiefs of Staff. As noted in Chapter 
One, in the early period of the Cold War up until the mid-1950s, the presence of British 
military forces in the region was above all concerned with a potential war against the Soviet 
Union. This chapter has shown that while SIME was placed under the authority of MI5 in the 
post-war period, it was regarded as ‘an integral part of the military machine’ in the region – 
the fate of the wartime SIME was then determined purely by Cold War concerns and its 
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activities were driven by war planning directed by the Chiefs of Staff.
617
 In addition, its anti-
Soviet orientation was not only determined by MI5’s organisational predisposition, but was 
also driven by government policy during the period. Moreover, the gradual demise of SIME 
from 1953 to 1958 also reflects the shift in the conduct of the Cold War in Whitehall, as 
discussed in Chapter One. 
The story of SIME in the post-war period is also revealing regarding the nature of 
intelligence liaison and the subject of intelligence sharing in an un-institutionalised form. 
This chapter has highlighted that intelligence sharing between the British and their Middle 
Eastern counterparts was based on mutual benefit but was strictly confined to one particular 
subject, Communist movements. In order to fulfil its task, SIME worked closely with its 
sister service, MI6, and its local counterparts. Unlike in the wartime period, it was limited 
with regard to its intelligence collection and security measures because the region was 
comprised mostly of foreign countries where SIME’s performance was largely dependent on 
local authorities, whose concerns only matched British interests in prioritising the fight 
against the Soviet Union and Communist movements in the region. Despite close cooperation 
especially in the field of anti-Communist security measures, the biggest difficulty faced by 
SIME was the maintenance of a good liaison with local authorities in a volatile and politically 
hostile environment which was often detrimental to intelligence liaison. In spite of these 
difficulties, SIME and the DSOs under the direction of the Chiefs of Staff maintained their 
relationship with the local authorities and worked with them on security measures in event of 
war. It is noteworthy that despite the closure of SIME, the knowledge of these security 
measures, including compiling the arrest lists, still remained with the local authorities.  
This chapter has also shown that towards the mid-1950s, MI5 grew increasingly 
concerned with MI6’s activities in their territory. While the representatives of MI5 closely 
worked with MI6 on counter-intelligence in the region, it was concerned that clandestine 
operations conducted by MI6 would potentially undermine its own relationships with local 
authorities, which had been built on mutual trust. This practical but important concern – from 
MI5’s point of view to liaise with its Middle Eastern counterparts – was not recognised by the 
policymakers in London. However, these incompatible counter-subversive measures, 
between security liaison and special political actions, were still carried out in the region under 
the direction of government policy. MI6’s involvement in the region, and its implications for 
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MI5’s liaison with its Middle Eastern counterparts, will be discussed in Chapters Four and 
Six respectively. 
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Chapter Four 
Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation and  
the Security of Systems 
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In my personal view the Iranians individually are security conscious and are probably well able 
to take care of their own secrets; but the protection of common secrets is another matter. Here 
the slothfulness, venality and love for intrigue and personal animosities of the average Iranian, 
as well as his unwillingness to assume responsibility, are all hazards along the road to good 
security. 
- Roger Lees
618
 
Introduction 
The Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), formerly known as the Baghdad Pact 
(1955-58), was once described as ‘the unknown alliance’ by Air Marshal Sir Neville Stack, 
British Representative of the Permanent Military Deputy (1970-72) to CENTO.
619
 This 
notion is reinforced by Elie Podeh, a Middle Eastern historian, who pointed out a decade ago 
that studies of the regional alliance were ‘marginal’ in the historiography of American history 
in the Middle East.
620
 His point is equally relevant outside American scholarship: the only 
existing literature addresses the formation of the Baghdad Pact 
621
 and even when some 
studies focus on the intelligence and security aspects of the signatory countries, they tend to 
neglect the Baghdad Pact and CENTO.
622
 
Similar to the other Cold War treaty organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), CENTO was a 
military alliance against the aggression of the Communist bloc. However, a lesser known fact 
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is that CENTO was also concerned with the internal affairs in the Pact area to contain the 
spread of subversive activities, and strong ties were maintained between the security services 
to counter this threat. Below the highest body, the Council of Ministers, CENTO was 
comprised primarily of ‘four major’ Committees: the Military Committee, the Economic 
Committee, the Counter-Subversion Committee, and the Liaison Committee.
623
 It is 
noteworthy that the latter two committees – the Counter-Subversion and Liaison Committees 
– were distinctively political in nature, their activities were more secretive, and more 
importantly, they were mostly concerned with the internal affairs of the Pact signatories.  
This chapter will show the numerous forms of multilateral intelligence/security liaison 
directed against Communist and subversive activities in the region. While mainly focusing on 
the Liaison Committee under the Baghdad Pact, other forms of intelligence liaisons will also 
be discussed. This chapter will highlight the nature of the intelligence/security liaison 
between Britain and Middle Eastern states, including any obstacles or preconditions 
associated with the subject of intelligence liaison. In addition, it will also show that since any 
form of intelligence cooperation requires a secure organisation, a by-product of the 
multilateral intelligence and security cooperation under the Baghdad Pact was the formation 
of the Iranian national intelligence and security organisation, known as SAVAK, in 1957. 
Moreover, owing to the lax security of the Pact, Britain was the most reluctant to share its 
own intelligence with the Pact members and sought to exchange intelligence on a bilateral 
basis.  
Prelude to the Security Cooperation under the Baghdad Pact and the 
Formation of Liaison Committee 
The formation of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 has been studied elsewhere.
624
 Elie Podeh 
in particular has shown that the formation of the Baghdad Pact resulted from the desires of 
the Iraqi and Turkish governments to establish their positions in the region, converging with 
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the interests of both Britain and the United States.
625
 It is noteworthy that high level policies 
were not the only contributing factor in the formation of the Baghdad Pact, there was also a 
security dimension at work. As briefly discussed in Chapter Two, before the establishment of 
security cooperation under the Baghdad Pact, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq had collaborated on 
informal security cooperation on subversive activities in the region since the early 1950s 
under the so-called ‘Anti-Communist Triangle’.626 This security cooperation was gradually 
institutionalised following Coghill’s appointment in Jordan in 1952 and grew out of a 
realisation amongst the Triangle countries that subversive activities in each country were 
directly connected with, or indirectly instigated by, external actors such as the Soviet Union, 
Egypt, Syria or Saudi Arabia.
627
  
According to Coghill’s diaries, the three members of the ‘Anti-Communist Triangle’ 
had also attempted to involve the Syrian government under Adeeb al-Shishakli in anti-
subversive measures in early 1953 as it was believed that most subversive activities in 
Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq were originating from Syria. After attempting for over a year, 
however, they decided to abandon this plan as the Syrians were ‘far too unreliable’. 628 
Meanwhile, the Egyptian leader, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, contemplated establishing a 
similar form of security cooperation on his own initiative, ‘an Anti-Communist Bureau in 
Cairo’, during the same period and called a conference in Cairo inviting all members of the 
Arab League.
629
 Before sending their own delegations to the Cairo conference, Coghill, 
Chehab and Attiyah had met together in Beirut to ‘hammer out the line to take to ensure the 
failure of the conference to set up such a Bureau’, which was believed would ‘only increase 
the power of Egypt’.630 Nevertheless, ‘thanks to the blunt rudeness of the Syrian delegate’, 
Coghill recorded that the Egyptians failed to establish their own Anti-Communist Bureau.
631
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The culmination of the Jordan-Lebanon-Iraq ‘Anti-Communist Triangle’ activity was 
a multilateral secret discussion held in Baghdad in January 1956 – the group of three 
(Coghill, Chehab and Attiyah) met with the Heads of the Turkish and Iranian Security 
Services to discuss and exchange intelligence on subversive activities in the region.
632
 While 
there had been bilateral talks on the subject between most of these countries, this was the first 
multilateral discussion between the Arab and non-Arab security services in the region.
633
 
Before this meeting, Coghill, Chehab and Attiyah had conducted a preliminary conference 
together streamlining how they would make the meeting successful to gain ‘mutual 
confidence in one’s opposite number’ by showing a united front against subversive activities 
in the region, which was, Coghill noted, ‘the only way of making this sort of liaison work’.634  
There was a similar on-going arrangement around the same period under the Baghdad 
Pact. At the inaugural meeting of the Pact Council held in Baghdad on 21 and 22 November 
1955, the Iraqi Foreign Minister raised the dangers of Communist infiltration in the Middle 
East, particularly in Syria.
635
 The idea of forming ‘joint anti-subversion machinery’ under the 
Pact was then discussed.
636
 Harold Macmillan, then Foreign Secretary, suggested establishing 
multilateral intelligence and security cooperation on this matter. He also proposed that Britain 
‘make available technical advice on Communist subversion’ to the members from its 
experience in the Far East, where Britain had also been involved in a similar arrangement 
under the SEATO.
637
 In addition to Iraqi concern about the spread of subversive activities, 
despite its more robust counter-measures after the 1953 coup, Iran also had its own problem 
with the resilience of the Tudeh Party.
638
 The Iranian Ambassador in Baghdad, who 
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represented Iran for the Baghdad Pact, was willing to learn ‘practical measures for combating 
Communist subversion’ from more experienced countries such as Britain.639  
Based on the policy laid out by the Baghdad Pact Council meeting, a discussion to 
form ‘joint anti-subversion machinery’ between the regional counterparts, later known as the 
Liaison and Counter-Subversion Committees, was then followed by the meeting of the 
Security Committee, where the representatives of the security services of the signatories 
came together for the first time. Directed under the policy suggested by Macmillan, Philip 
Kirby-Green, Head of SIME (1955-58) and Britain’s representative at the committee 
meeting, who had been fully briefed on similar arrangements in the NATO and SEATO 
before leaving for Baghdad, gave a proposal in detail to form such an anti-Communist 
committee at the meeting. Kirby-Green’s proposal was supported by Britain’s closest ally, 
Bahjat Beg Attiyah, the Director of the Iraqi CID; A.M.S. Ahmad, a Pakistani counterpart; 
and an American ‘observer’.640  
The Liaison and Counter-Subversion Committees were formally established after 
agreement was reached by the Council of Deputies of the Baghdad Pact on 25 January 1956. 
These committees under the Pact were intended for collaboration in anti-Communist 
measures between the signatories, including an ‘observer’, the United States. 641 The purposes 
of the Liaison Committee, consisting of the security services of the signatories, were to 
‘facilitate exchange of information relating to Communist subversive activities and Soviet 
bloc espionage’ and ‘recommend ways and means by which security services can best 
discharge their tasks’. The Liaison Committee also aimed to ‘facilitate and encourage 
bilateral liaison and practical cooperation between the security services’.642 Throughout the 
period between 1956 and 1963, with some exceptional cases, the meetings were routinely 
held in a signatory twice a year. 
The security services of the regional members had their own reasons to welcome 
Kirby-Green’s proposals for multilateral intelligence cooperation in countering Communism 
in the region. As noted earlier, there had been ‘informal’ security cooperation on subversive 
activities between the regional security services (Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, and Iran) 
around the same period. At the first meeting of the Liaison Committee of the Baghdad Pact in 
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April 1956, a copy of the ‘convention’ outlining the cooperation in anti-Communist 
measures, signed by the members (the Jordanian, Lebanese, Iraqi, Iranian and Turkish 
security services) of the so-called ‘Club’ at their meeting on 14th January 1956 was submitted 
by the Turkish delegate as a foundation for their security cooperation. It was later, 
nevertheless, withdrawn in favour of one submitted by the British government, which was 
seen as a more experienced ally in this field.
643
  
British Concern about the Security of the Baghdad Pact 
At the inaugural meeting of the Baghdad Pact, a by-product of the discussions was the 
creation of a Security Committee, often referred to as ‘the Security Organisation’ in Foreign 
Office correspondence.
644
 The Security Committee was formed under and directed by the 
Secretary-General of the Baghdad Pact.
645
 The purpose of the Security Committee was to 
ensure proper standards of protective security for the Baghdad Pact, including the 
maintenance of information security (classification of documents and physical access to 
classified records) and vetting procedures under the security regulations of the Pact.
646
 The 
Security Committee routinely conducted security inspections of the registries of the signatory 
powers, where classified CENTO documents were handled and held, and recommended 
improvements in protective security for each country.
647
  Setting security standards was 
particularly important for multilateral intelligence liaison as information security was a 
prerequisite for the efficacy of the alliance. 
Protective security was the domain of MI5. Philip Kirby-Green, the Head of SIME, 
was duly chosen by General Sir Gerald Templer, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to 
attend the first meeting of the Security Committee in December 1955 to discuss security 
practices with his counterparts in Baghdad.
648
 At his first meeting, Kirby-Green learned that 
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there was no comparable protective security in the member states, and he was then asked by 
his counterparts to provide such security training to them using Britain’s experiences in 
NATO and SEATO.
649
 After the meeting, Kirby-Green warned in his telegram to the 
Ministry of Defence that, owing to ‘no adequate security’ and ‘no proper vetting procedure’ 
in some regional member states, ‘any information passed to other deputies and planners may 
be in Moscow in a matter of days’.650 With an urgent request by the Foreign Office, MI5 was 
instructed to improve the standards of protective security in the Baghdad Pact. Michael 
Clayton of MI5, an expert in protective security, was then despatched to Baghdad on 17 
January 1956. Clayton remained as Deputy Security Officer of the Security Committee until 
1958, providing training in protective security to the security officers of the member states of 
the Security Committee.
651
  
Philip Kirby-Green estimated that it would take at least six months to get a minimum 
standard of security within the Baghdad Pact.
652
 However, his estimate was far from a reality. 
Despite a series of lectures by Clayton on protective security during his tenure as the Deputy 
Security Officer (1956-58) to his Middle Eastern counterparts at the Security Committee, 
there was not much improvement in the protective security regime.
653
 Concerning the state of 
security at the Registry of the Pact headquarters, Sir Michael Wright reported to the Foreign 
Office in November 1956 that there was ‘little appreciation of how to classify documents 
correctly’ amongst non-British civilian staff, and classified documents were ‘frequently lost’ 
and handled inadequately.
654
 In addition, when Clayton was to end his official duty as the 
Deputy Security Officer at the Pact headquarters towards the end of 1957, despite some 
improvement in protective security at the CENTO headquarters, the state of security of the 
individual member states remained far below the minimum standard.
655
 Despite the British-
made structures of protective security (including security regulations, vetting procedures, 
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physical access to classified documents), there had been little improvement in the protective 
security of the regional members.
656
 
In 1961, when James Robertson of MI5 inspected the state of security of all regional 
alliances, including NATO, SEATO and CENTO, he observed that the representatives of the 
CENTO Security Committee had received little ‘support forthcoming from [their] superiors’, 
and also that recommendations for improving security in the signatories were ‘hardly carried 
out’, except for ‘inspections of CENTO registries in member countries’.657 After a year’s 
attempt at improving the protective security of the Pact, Britain decided to abolish the 
Security Committee in 1963 as the chief organisation to maintain the security of the Pact, and 
instead proposed that the Liaison Committee take over this task. After a series of lengthy 
discussions with the signatory powers, the proposal was eventually accepted and from 1963 
onwards the Security Committee became the Security Sub-Committee under the Liaison 
Committee of the Pact.
658
 
A combination of several factors appear to have prevented the improvement of the 
Pact’s protective security. First and foremost, the regional Pact members totally lacked the 
idea of protective security as an element of essential security measures and so it was never 
prioritised by those states – they were overwhelmingly concerned with countering subversive 
elements in their countries. Sir Roger Hollis, the Director-General of MI5, once reported at a 
1960 JIC meeting that the regional members were ‘concentrating unduly on the threat’ 
against the internal security of their countries, while, Hollis thought, ‘they should give greater 
attention to [protective] security’.659 Moreover, it is noteworthy that, in addition to the lack of 
security awareness amongst the regional members, Philip Kirby-Green also identified at his 
first encounter with his regional counterparts that some members had no understanding of the 
difference between security, counter-intelligence and counter-subversion.
660
 As will be 
discussed further in Chapter Five, this difference in the understanding of security was a cause 
of the difficulties in coordinating anti-Communist measures from the British perspective.  
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Secondly, there was also a structural issue at the levels of both CENTO (as the Pact 
was renamed after the Iraqi Revolution in 1958) and regional members. Unlike the Liaison 
Committee, where very senior officers of the security services were represented and who 
were also responsible for the internal security in their countries, the Security Committee was 
composed of middle-ranking security officers of the member states, who were seconded to 
the Pact headquarters in Baghdad (1955-58) and Ankara (from 1959 onwards). As a result, 
the regional representatives to the Security Committee were considered ‘international civil 
servants’ by their own governments and thus ‘cut off’ from direct contact with their own 
governments.
661
 Despite an attempt to reorganise the structure of the Security Committee by 
Michael Clayton, who demanded that regional representatives wear ‘two hats’ for both 
international and national roles, there was also a problem at the national level. The problem 
was that, even if these representatives were in close contact with their national governments, 
there were ‘no effective’ security authorities in their countries ‘with whom they could 
correspond and from whom they could obtain such briefs’.662 As a result, it was thought that 
it would be better for the Liaison Committee, comprising higher ranks of the security 
services, to take over the duty of protective security in the Pact.  
Thirdly, the final problem associated with the lack of security was that there was often 
departmental infighting over internal security in the regional countries. This, in addition to 
the second problem above, was the main reason that Britain insisted that the Shah of Iran 
establish the national security organisation, later known as SAVAK, and provided training in 
protective security to the Iranians. However, even after SAVAK nominally assumed full 
responsibility for internal security from the military in 1957, a conflict of jurisdiction with the 
military was reported in August 1961, when the security organisation of the military still 
sought to represent Iran at the Liaison Committee of the Pact.
663
 These kinds of problems 
were also common among the regional members. In the case of Iraq, which hosted the 
headquarters of the Pact until 1958, there had been antagonistic relationships between the 
police and the military. As a result, the CID, which was part of the police, responsible for the 
internal security of the country, was unable to inspect the security of the military, which 
                                                 
661
 TNA: PRO CAB176/60: JIC/528/57: annex A, ‘state of security in Baghdad Pact organisation’, by A.C.I. 
Samuel of FO to Sir Michael Wright, Baghdad, 14 Dec 1956. 
662
 TNA: PRO CAB176/60: JIC/528/57: annex B, ‘state of security in Baghdad Pact organisation’, by R.S. 
Crawford, Baghdad, to A.C.I. Samuel of FO, 12 Feb 1957. 
663
 TNA: PRO FO371/157497: EB1693/4G: letter by C.A.G. Simkins of MI5 to P.G.D. Adams, Security 
Department of FO, 16 Aug 1961. The whole file has been declassified under the FOIA at my request (REF: 
0894-11), 27 Oct 2011. 
 142 
 
 
might have contributed to the failure of the Iraqi government to forestall the coup plot by a 
small group of Iraqi Army officers in July 1958.
664
 While Turkey and Pakistan, both of which 
were members of NATO and SEATO, were considered to have better security, the 
responsibility of the military for internal security in these countries was still a concern for the 
British.
665
 
The available evidence suggests that Britain was right to be concerned about the 
security of the multilateral intelligence liaison – classified information was indeed leaking to 
Egypt from the Iraqis.
666
 In addition, there were also leaks to the Soviets from one regional 
member state’s embassies abroad. According to a KGB defector, Ilya Dzhirkvelov, a 
conversation between Turkish diplomats led to a discovery of a KGB officer in Azerbaijan, 
A. Guseinov, who was about to defect to the West in Turkey in late 1955. The conversation 
had been recorded through a listening device planted in the Turkish Embassy in Moscow. 
Similar to the defection attempt by Konstantin Volkov in 1946, which was intercepted by 
Kim Philby, Guseinov would have provided fruitful information on Soviet activities in the 
Middle East. According to Dzhirkvelov, Guseinov was carried to Moscow semi-conscious on 
a stretcher by a special KGB team. Guseinov’s wife, who was the main conspirator in the 
plan to defect to the West, leapt from a third-floor window and killed herself.
667
 Nevertheless, 
Britain indeed had more experience in protective security than other members, but it is 
interesting to note that it also had defects in its own security. George Blake of MI6, another 
Soviet mole, was at the time compromising secrets of Britain’s NATO allies.668 
The British Contribution to the Origins of SAVAK 
 According to the existing historiography, the Iranian national security and intelligence 
service, known as SAVAK, was established in 1957 under the auspices of the CIA and 
Mossad.
669
 Britain’s involvement in this process is little discussed. Mansur Rafizadeh, a 
former SAVAK officer clearly states in his memoirs that SAVAK was created on ‘the joint 
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advice of the CIA, British intelligence service, and Mossad’.670 Supporting this testimony, the 
available documentation clearly attests that the formation of the Iranian national intelligence 
and security organisation was largely a British initiative and MI5 was instrumental in 
establishing SAVAK, arising from their concerns with the state of protective security in Iran, 
which would affect the efficacy of multilateral intelligence liaison under the Baghdad Pact as 
a whole. 
Concerning the state of security, at the first meeting of the Security Committee in 
1955, Philip Kirby-Green identified Iran as the weakest link in protective security.
671
 While 
Michael Clayton was in Baghdad to provide courses on security practices, he was then also 
tasked to assess the standards of security in Iran. Roger Hollis, the Deputy Director-General 
of MI5, asked Clayton if the Iranian government would need to establish an organisation 
‘officially charged with full responsibility for enforcing security’. Hollis also assured Clayton 
that MI5 was willing to accommodate a ‘limited number of senior Iranian security officials’ 
for training in Britain if necessary.
672
 Clayton was then told by the Iranian representative on 
the Deputy Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact, General Hadjazi, that Iran had ‘no 
security organisation’ at all.673  
Despite the presence of the American Military Mission in Iran, one of whose tasks was 
‘the production of an adequate security system’, the state of security in Iran was inadequate. 
Although there had been three organisations responsible for security (the aforementioned ‘G-
2’, the counter-espionage organisation of the Iranian armed forces; the Special Branch of the 
Iranian Police; and the Military Governors’), none of these organisations had any 
responsibility for protective security in civilian departments, including the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Discussing the matter with his Iranian colleagues in Baghdad, Clayton soon 
reported back to Hollis: 
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I judge that knowledge of protective security practice is limited to the army only. I cannot say 
how effective it is. There is certainly no national security authority as we know it, and no 
system of interdepartmental security co-ordination…I agree that the first essential is to establish 
[a] national security authority, but consider that unless we advise on how this should be done 
and additionally give detailed instruction on methods to implement details of regulations, the 
prospect of any reasonable degree of security in Iran in the foreseeable future is very remote.
674
 
The matter was also discussed in Baghdad between Sir Michael Wright, the British 
Ambassador in Baghdad, and Francis Marten, a diplomat at the British Embassy in Tehran, 
who was on his route to Britain through Baghdad. They agreed that training a few Iranians in 
Britain was ‘not enough’, and instead suggested the Foreign Office ‘despatch a fully qualified 
officer to Tehran from London’ to advise the Iranians on improving the security matters. Sir 
Michael Wright concluded that ‘unless some such arrangement is made, the prospect of a 
fundamental improvement in Iranian security standards, on which the ability of the Baghdad 
Pact to undertake serious planning of sensitive matters depends, is remote’.675  
Training of the Iranians in protective security in either London or Tehran was, however, 
not sufficient to solve the security problems in the forthcoming meetings of the Baghdad 
Pact. To solve this short-term problem, the Iranian authority was urged to set up an inter-
departmental organisation responsible for co-ordinating the activities of the various 
intelligence and security organisations in the country. As a result, the Iranian Chiefs of Staff 
established a new joint staff of the armed forces, named J-2, which was also given 
responsibility for national security matters.
676
 However, under the security regulations of the 
Pact, it was also essential for Iran to have a “national security authority” responsible for the 
security of Baghdad Pact classified information.
677
 The matter was then referred to the British 
Ambassador in Tehran, Sir Roger Stevens (1954-58), who responded to the request from the 
Foreign Office that he would ‘take next suitable opportunity to impress on the Shah the 
importance of security’ and to ‘ask him about Iranian plans for establishing a “national 
security authority”’.678  
Concern about the lack of a unified national security service and of the efforts to 
coordinate intelligence between the departmental services in Iran was also noted at the first 
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meeting of the Liaison Committee in April 1956. After the meeting, Philip Kirby-Green, the 
British representative on the Liaison Committee, reported that:  
The Liaison Committee will face continuing trouble both in the day to day cooperation between 
the Iranian and the other member security services and also in the committee owing to the 
absence of a unified security service in Iran, and the resulting jealousy of departments including 
those of the Military Governor, G.2 [Military Intelligence], the police and the newly formed J.2 
[Joint Staff of the armed forces] etc., which produces a very complicated position. Ultimately 
essential that the functions of these departments be co-ordinated and their respective spheres 
demarcated, but hesitate to recommend that pressure to this end be exerted immediately as only 
the Shah himself can resolve this problem and, if done hastily might well result in the creation 
of yet another department and confusion become worse confounded. Full details of the various 
powers and functions often over-lapping, of these departments can best be given by Her 
Majesty’s Embassy in Tehran.
679
 
As a result, at the request by the Iranian government through the Baghdad Pact, MI5 
despatched Roger Lees, formally DSO in Baghdad (1951-53), to Tehran in May 1956 to 
advise the Shah on enhancing the state of security in Iran.
680
 In addition to his career in the 
Middle East, Lees was considered well qualified for the task following his long career in the 
Indian Police (over twenty years until 1948), with a supervisory role in the Special Branch 
(Patna).
681
  
Lees visited Tehran twice during the period between 1956 and 1957, in which the 
Iranian national security and intelligence organisation was being established. During his first, 
three-month visit to Tehran in 1956, Lees, in the guise of the first secretary at the British 
Embassy, was personally assigned by the Shah himself to give security advice to General 
Haj-Ali Kia, the Chief of Military Intelligence. At the time, Military Intelligence was 
temporarily responsible for supervising the implementation of the security regulations of the 
Baghdad Pact.
682
 Once SAVAK was established and assumed responsibility for the internal 
security of Iran, taking over from Military Intelligence, Roger Lees was then assigned to 
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advise the first Head of SAVAK, General Teymour Bakhtiar (1957-61), and to train the 
SAVAK officers in protective security.
683
  
From the outset, Roger Lees’ objective was to ‘train the Iranians in the proper 
implementation of the Baghdad Pact Security Regulations’.684 His role in Tehran was thus 
primarily limited to providing the Iranians with an effective security system in the country 
through his advice and the training of senior Iranian officers in protective security. During his 
first visit, he supervised the setting up of a registry system and trained the Iranians in 
handling classified documents and vetting procedures, and also drafted a set of ‘national 
security regulations’. All of his recommendations and drafts were approved by the Shah 
himself and implemented accordingly.
685
 During his second, six-month visit to Tehran, his 
primary task was to ensure that the newly-established SAVAK would meet the security 
requirements of the Baghdad Pact, including arrangements for the protection of classified 
documents, which were constantly inspected by the members of the Security Committee of 
the Baghdad Pact.
686
 Meanwhile, Iranian female staff at the Registry of SAVAK were trained 
in London in protective security.
687
 At the end of his visit, Roger Lees wrote to the Head 
Office of MI5 in 1957 that: 
I did…find, among those Iranians with whom I was working, a genuine desire to establish a 
sound security system in the country. It remains to be seen whether this keenness is reflected in 
those who actually have to give effect to the security procedures, and whether the Iranian 
national characteristics, which militate against collective security, can at least be neutralised. In 
my personal view the Iranians individually are security conscious and are probably well able to 
take care of their own secrets; but the protection of common secrets is another matter. Here the 
slothfulness, venality and love for intrigue and personal animosities of the average Iranian, as 
well as his unwillingness to assume responsibility, are all hazards along the road to good 
security.
688
 
This was Britain’s contribution to the establishment of SAVAK. The British contribution 
mainly came from the need to raise Iranian security standards to meet the security 
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arrangements of the Pact and assign the responsibilities necessary to establish sufficient 
national security in Iran.
689
  
During the same period, the CIA was also in Tehran to provide training to SAVAK 
officers not in protective security but foreign intelligence collection, counter-intelligence, and 
intelligence analysis.
690
 Mansur Rafizadeh, a former SAVAK officer, also noted that, unlike 
the CIA and Mossad, both of which were actively involved in interfering with SAVAK’s 
operations, by ‘consent of the three foreign [American, Israeli and British] intelligence 
groups, Britain had no active involvement’ in SAVAK’s operational aspects.691 It is beyond 
the scope of this research to explore the reasons for the Americans and Israelis’ active 
involvement in establishing or training SAVAK – it has been suggested that while the Israeli 
involvement concerned their common enemy – post-coup Iraq –692 the United States was 
more interested in Iran’s strategic role in the Cold War given its geographical proximity to 
the Soviet Union.
693
 In addition to Sir Patrick Dean’s involvement in the collusion with the 
French and Israelis in the Suez debacle, there is also evidence to suggest that British 
Intelligence began to rebuild its relationship with the Israeli counterparts towards the late 
1950s.
694
  
It might have been the case that Britain was not interested in the internal affairs of 
Iran. Britain’s major ally in the region was Iraq, not Iran, at the time of SAVAK’s 
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establishment. However, Britain also had long regarded Iran as within its sphere of influence. 
While Operation Ajax/Boot to overthrow Mossaddegh was a joint-venture with the 
Americans, the development of the events leading up to the coup from 1951 until August 
1953 clearly shows that the coup was chiefly initiated by the British, and that the American 
involvement came from British, and Iranian, necessity – the logistics, the money, and the 
oil.
695
 This was the continuation of the tradition sustaining Britain’s influence in Iran, while 
there was also a great deal of economic necessity – oil revenue was a major source of 
Britain’s economic recovery in the post-war period.696 Britain became more actively involved 
in the internal affairs of Iran after losing its closest ally in the Iraqi Revolution. As part of 
Britain’s policy towards Iran, General Hussein Fardust, a childhood friend of the Shah, who 
supervised the development of the Iranian Intelligence Community, came over to Britain 
from 1959 onwards for his personal training in intelligence and security matters, including 
techniques and methods of espionage, counter-intelligence, and also protective security.
697
 
British-Iranian intelligence liaison will be discussed further in Chapter Six.  
Multilateral Intelligence Liaison: the Liaison Committee 
The Baghdad Pact was not only a Cold War defence treaty against the Communist 
bloc, but also an alliance for the maintenance of the internal security in the Pact area. The 
regional member states were above all eager to tackle subversive activities in their countries. 
Their eagerness mainly came from the views of Middle Eastern policymakers that political 
developments and crises were orchestrated by external powers.
698
 These conspiratorial views 
were also exacerbated by the nature of Middle Eastern politics in which political 
assassinations, plots and intrigues were chronic, and any crisis in a country alarmed and 
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influenced policymakers’ perceptions in another country. 699  There were therefore good 
reasons for the regional members to cooperate on subversive activities, a common enemy in 
the region. 
From the mid-1950s onwards the security services of the signatory powers probed 
into the activities associated more specifically with the Soviet Intelligence Service in the 
region. The aforementioned Ilya Dzhirkvelov stated in his memoirs that a new department 
was established in the First Chief Directorate of the KGB at the beginning of 1955 to spy on 
the Soviet Union’s ‘frontiers’, including Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, India and China. 700 
Amongst them, Turkey was the main target as it was a member of NATO and maintained 
close contacts with the Americans and British. Dzhirkvelov was personally involved in 
organising a network of agents in Turkey from 1955 onwards.
701
 In addition, during the 
periods between the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet Union pursued two ways of achieving its 
objective: while seeking to exploit anti-colonial sentiment in the region, such as radical Arab 
Nationalism, to eliminate Western influence in the region, the Soviet Union still regarded 
Communist Parties as the instrument for the Communist cause in the region, despite anti-
Communist sentiment throughout the region.
702
  
Available records suggest that the members of the Liaison Committees might have 
cottoned on to the Soviet offensive in the region in the late 1950s through CENTO 
intelligence sharing. In May 1957, the Turkish representative reported on the methods and 
techniques employed by the Soviets, demonstrating that from at least 1956 the Soviet Union 
targeted the ethnic minorities in Turkey for both espionage and subversion purposes. They 
included the use of a former young Nazi officer, named Wilfried Herbrecht, and an 
Armenian-born reserve officer of the Turkish military service, named Arman Vartanian, to 
obtain information on NATO defence plans and the cryptographic system used in NATO 
communications.
703
 In addition, Herbrecht also confessed to the Turkish authorities that the 
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Soviets instructed him to contact a group of Kurds to instigate subversion against the Turkish 
government for Kurdish independence.
704
 
The Liaison Committee focused more on Soviet subversive activities than espionage. 
The main discussion between the security services of the member states was thus on the 
Communist movements in the Pact area. One of the advantages of intelligence-sharing under 
the Pact was that the members shared their knowledge of Communist activities, which 
enabled the member states to obtain a wider picture of the threats posed by International 
Communism in the region.
705
 The subjects of their information exchange included, for 
instance, the strength and activities of the Communist Parties; propaganda broadcasts by 
various radio stations of the Eastern bloc countries aimed at an instigation of subversive 
activities in the Pact area; and any scheduled Communist-sponsored international 
meetings.
706
 The information exchanged between the member states also included a list of 
known Communist members in the region. This was considered more important after the 
withdrawal of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact; thereafter the members of the Iraqi Communist 
Party (ICP) operated freely and became more active in the region.
707
 In addition, as 
international organisations and groups were regarded as sources of Communist subversion, a 
‘watch list’ containing forthcoming Communist and non-Communist meetings or events, was 
regularly exchanged for relevant authorities to ‘take action’ against it.708 Moreover, their 
discussions also extended to counter-measures by the respective governments which had 
proved effective against Communist activities. The consensus amongst the regional member 
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states regarding ‘effective’ measures against any Communists and their sympathisers was 
‘heavy penalties in accordance with the Criminal Code’.709  
 Apart from the RAF bases in Habbaniya, Iraq, and also those in Cyprus, Britain faced 
no direct threat to its security in the Pact area. However, this does not necessarily mean that 
MI5 was not involved in the discussions with their regional counterparts on internal security 
in the Pact area. Declassified records under the FOIA show that, unlike the Americans, who 
were mostly a passive participant as an ‘observer’ (at least until 1959), 710  MI5 actively 
contributed to discussions about the methods and techniques of Communist bloc espionage 
and subversion, and Communist activities. Alex Kellar of MI5, who chaired the Liaison 
Committee in January 1961 on a routine basis, used his chairmanship to include a report on 
‘communist penetration of the labour movement’ in the Pact area, and ‘the student problem’, 
covering the ‘causes and nature’ of unrest among students in the ‘Afro-Asian area’.711 In 
addition, as Chairman of the NATO Special Committee, Kellar also made available classified 
NATO documents to his counterparts, who were keen on finding out more about ‘Soviet Bloc 
intelligence operations’ against regions outside the Pact and the way in which other security 
services were coping with ‘their own student communities within and without their countries 
and in and around the CENTO area and Europe’.712 Moreover, as the Chairman of both 
NATO’s and CENTO’s Committees, Kellar decided to exchange security reports between the 
CENTO Liaison and NATO Special Committees on the grounds, as he noted, that ‘what was 
sauce for the goose was sauce for the gander’, meaning that the intelligence exchange would 
be valuable to the both parties.
713
 The regional members welcomed Kellar’s suggestions.714  
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Limitations of Intelligence Liaison 
Despite the advantages of cooperation on anti-subversive measures in the Pact area, 
there was an inherent problem with regional intelligence and security liaison under the 
Liaison Committee. Although the regional members maintained their anti-Communist stance 
throughout the period, their focus on subversive activities often extended to non-Communist 
activities, which caused difficulties in coordinating anti-Communist measures in the Pact 
area. While a collective effort for anti-Communist measures was mostly conducted in the 
form of propaganda under the Counter-Subversion Committee,
715
 the difficulty of 
coordination was also apparent at the Liaison Committee, where the threat assessment reports 
from each representative were shared and a consensus on the threats was sought between the 
committee members.  
It is noteworthy that there was a peculiar aspect to CENTO’s Liaison Committee, 
which Alex Kellar noticed as the Chairman of his first meeting in 1961. Kellar noted to the 
Foreign Office that their discussions were ‘more of the kind that one would expect from a 
political committee’, and that the intelligence assessments submitted by his regional 
counterparts ‘trespass[es] much too much on the preserves of the political experts’.716 The 
implication of this peculiar nature of the Liaison Committee was that the intelligence 
assessments by the regional members were heavily influenced by the policy of their own 
governments. A senior official of the Foreign Office also commented on the differences 
between the CENTO Liaison Committee and the NATO Special Committee, which were 
‘endemic’, and noted that:  
The three CENTO Regional countries are governed by dictatorships, established in two cases 
through coup d’état. Their Intelligence Services have no continuing tradition of semi-
independent non-political action to compare with those of most of the European countries 
grouped in NATO. The senior officers depend for their appointments and for funds on their 
ability to keep in favour of a very small ruling minority. They are thus intensely involved in 
politics, both internal and foreign, in a way quite distinct from the members of NATO’s Special 
Committee. This is a disadvantage; but it cannot be helped.
717
 
                                                 
715
 The Counter-Subversion Committee will be discussed in Chapter Five. 
716
 TNA: PRO FO371/157497: EB1693/3G: report by A.J. Kellar of MI5 to P.G.D. Adams, Security Department 
of FO, 17 Jan 1961. The whole file has been declassified under the FOIA at my request (REF: 0894-11), 27 Oct 
2011. 
717
 TNA: PRO FO371/157497: EB1693/5G: minute on CENTO Counter-Subversion and Liaison Committee’s 
report by C.F.R. Barclay, 2 Feb 1961. The whole file has been declassified under the FOIA at my request (REF: 
0894-11), 27 Oct 2011. Emphasis original.  
 153 
 
 
This comment highlights the nature of the relationship between the British and the Middle 
Eastern counterparts throughout the period. As will be discussed further in Chapter Five, the 
security services of the regional members were loyal to their own governments and thus 
strongly committed to suppressing subversive activities in their countries by any means 
necessary.  
 The difficulty of reaching a consensus on internal threats amongst the member states 
also came from the limitations in intelligence sharing. Despite their security cooperation at 
the highest level, the Liaison Committee was a place for sharing intelligence-based 
assessments between the Pact members. The problem with the limitations in intelligence 
sharing was the fact that the protection of intelligence sources was a prerequisite for any 
intelligence liaison, especially multilateral cooperation. As any intelligence services had their 
responsibilities for the security of their own sources, the only solution for multilateral 
intelligence liaison, according to John Bruce Lockhart, the Deputy Chief of MI6 (1961-66), 
was thus to only share intelligence in ‘a collated form where it would be impossible to 
identify the source’.718 This, however, often made it difficult for other members to verify a 
claim made by a member based on their intelligence-based assessments.  
The problem was apparent from the early period of the Baghdad Pact. At the meeting of 
the Liaison Committee in May 1957, the Pakistani delegate frequently referred to the 
activities of the Indian Communist Party supporting subversive activities in Kashmir. The 
assessment by MI5 confirmed that there was indeed a threat from the Indian Communist 
Party in the form of propaganda attacking Pakistan’s self-proclaimed ‘neutralism’, and that 
the situation in Kashmir also presented a ‘substantial threat to member countries particularly 
Pakistan’. However, there was no supporting evidence that these subversive activities in 
Kashmir had a direct link to the Indian Communist Party.
719
 The heart of the problem lay in 
the inaccessibility of the sources (of evidence) as the Pakistani claimed. A report from the 
Head of SIME to the Head Office of MI5 recorded that:  
…here is clearly a limit to the degree to which I can over-ride the DIB [Director of the 
Intelligence Bureau: Pakistani Security Service] when, complying with the roles of the Liaison 
Committee, they produce their own National Assessment. Equally, there is a limit to which I 
could challenge their evidence, although it was clear that some of their statements were 
somewhat dubious and others highly exaggerated, but when outrightly challenged, SADULLA 
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[Director of the Intelligence Bureau] always claimed to have evidence on record to support his 
arguments.
720
 
The Pakistanis’ claim that ‘Indian subversion against Pakistan was, in fact, Communist 
inspired’ was considered by the Foreign Office as a technique to widen the mandate of the 
Liaison Committee, as they had used the same technique earlier in the SEATO Committee.
721
  
Indeed, these kinds of local and regional problems were not only present in the Pakistani 
case. All the regional members, the Iraqis, Turkish and Iranians, were preoccupied with 
countering their own national subversive elements. As a result, the coverage of the Liaison 
Committee was widened from ‘Communist’ to ‘Communist-inspired’ threats from 1957 
onwards.
722
 In 1962, it also included ‘non-Communist’ threats at the firm request of the 
regional governments.
723
 The difficulty was then to have an agreed assessment on the nature 
of subversive activities in the region. The preoccupations of the regional members with their 
local or regional problems continued throughout the period. A report on the meeting of the 
Liaison Committee in 1964 recorded that ‘the main subjects that had been expected to cause 
difficulty were the respective preoccupations of Turkey with Cyprus, of Iran with the UAR 
[Egypt], and of Pakistan with India and Afghanistan’.724  
The Separationist Movement: The Question of the Kurds 
In addition to the spread of Communist movements in the Pact area, the independence 
separatist movement of the Kurds, the largest minority in the region, spread across Turkey, 
Iraq and Iran, was a major concern to these three states. While the subject of the Kurds was 
often raised by the regional members of the Baghdad Pact for discussion in connection with 
anti-Communist measures, the dynamics of the Pact’s policy prevented serious discussion of 
the issue. While the dynamics of the Pact will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five, a 
comment by Wilbur Crane Eveland, a personal adviser to Allen Dulles, the Director of CIA, 
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on Middle Eastern affairs, illustrates the different perceptions of the various governments, 
which were directed by their own policies:  
…Iraqi Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa al Barzani was then in Russia seeking Soviet support for 
an independent republic to unite his tribesmen with the Kurds in Iran and Turkey. To the Iraqi, 
Iranian, and Turkish governments, the possibility of Moscow’s encouraging Kurdish and other 
tribal separationist movements represented a far greater danger than did the growth of local 
communist parties or the threat of an invasion of the Middle East by the Soviet Union. To the 
West, the area’s oil was of primary importance; bolstering strong central governments to 
control the tribes was considered the best way to regain access to the oil fields.
725
  
For instance, when the Turkish representative sought for the Kurdish problem to be put on the 
agenda at the Committee meeting in January 1963, insisting that the Kurds were linked with 
Communists or were at least Communist-inspired, the Foreign Office responded that the 
Turkish claim was ‘nonsense’.726  
There were indeed not only political but logical reasons for the regional governments 
to claim a link between the Communists and the Kurds, and that the Kurds were working 
alongside the Soviet Union. Firstly, the intelligence collected by local security services 
proved that the Soviet Union was using minority groups, such as the Armenians and the 
Kurds, as a means to contact local Communist Parties. This connection became apparent 
from the interrogation of Iraqi Communists by the Iraqi CID in 1949, after which MI5 was 
informed.
727
 This Soviet method was also noted by the Lebanese Sûreté Générale.
728
 In 
addition, as noted earlier, the intelligence shared at the Liaison Committee provided by the 
Turkish representative clearly indicated that the Soviet Intelligence Services incited the 
Kurds to subversion against the Turkish central government. Thus, the distinction between 
Communist and non-Communist threats was in fact not often as clear-cut as the Foreign 
Office assumed.   
Secondly, besides non-Communists who adopted a revolutionary policy to overthrow 
the central governments to change the status quo, there were also committed Kurdish 
Communists in the region. The long-standing Syrian Communist leader Khaled Bakhdash 
(1936-95) was a Kurd, and was closely observed by the Lebanese Sûreté Générale.
729
 Despite 
their dismissive attitudes towards the Communist-Kurdish-connection, the Foreign Office 
                                                 
725
 Eveland, Ropes of Sand, p.53. 
726
 TNA: PRO FO371/170252: minute, ‘CENTO Liaison Committee (Washington, January 21-25)’, by 
deGourcy Ireland, 14 Jan 1963. 
727
 See Chapter Three. 
728
 Cf. TNA: PRO KV4/470: the Liddell Diaries, 29 Dec 1948; Document of 16/9/34 in Asseily et al. (eds.), A 
Face in the Crowd, pp.84-85. 
729
 Youmna Asseily et al., A Face in the Crowd, pp. 74-76, 78, 80, 89-92, 94-95, 104. 
 156 
 
 
also followed Bakhdash’s activities from 1952 as the leader of the Syrian Communist Party, 
and was aware of the Communist-Kurdish connection elsewhere.
730
 In addition, as the 
quotation from Wilbur Eveland indicates, the regional governments were aware that the 
Soviet Union actively supported the Kurds’ efforts to achieve independence through 
propaganda, chiefly led by the Iraqi Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani, who was exiled 
from Iraq and Iran after the Second World War and lived in the Soviet Union until 1958.  
Some accounts of clandestine activities of the Soviet Union have begun to appear in 
recent years. They now tell us that the Soviet Union strategically supported post-colonial 
liberation movements in the 1950s onwards to win the Cold War.
731
 In addition, the targets of 
the Soviet Union in their global grand strategy were chiefly against Britain and France, both 
of which were heavily committed to maintain their position against insurgents in their 
Colonies/territories. The KGB Chairman, Aleksandr Shelepin (1958-61), was a chief 
instigator of this global grand strategy.
732
 Vladislav Zubok has shown in the case of the 
Middle East that supporting radical Arab nationalists was the Soviet foreign policy to 
undermine Western influence in the Middle East.
733
 More importantly, Mulla Mustafa 
Barzani (often called Mulla Mustafa by his colleagues) whose activities had been at the 
centre of concerns by Iraqi, Iranian, Turkish and even Syrian governments, was indeed a 
long-running KGB agent (code-named RAIS) from the end of the Second World War.
734
 
According to Zubok, in July 1961, by which time Barzani had returned to Baghdad from his 
exile in Moscow after the Iraqi Revolution, Shelpin suggested to the Soviet Premier Nikita 
Khrushchev that ‘old KGB connections’ with Barzani, now the chairman of the Kurdish 
Democratic Party, be used to ‘activate the movement of the Kurdish population of Iraq, Iran 
and Turkey for creation of an independent Kurdish’ state.735  
The Foreign Office was in fact fully aware of the concerns of the regional 
governments about the Soviet support for the Kurds at least from 1949 as the IRD monitored 
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Kurdish broadcasts from inside the Soviet territories which were directed primarily against 
the Iranian, Iraqi and Turkish governments.
736
 In addition, after Barzani was expelled from 
Iraq in 1949, the Iraqi government sought cooperation with the British, Turkish and Iranian 
governments on intelligence sharing on Barzani’s move, and the Foreign Office then made 
available to the Iraqis ‘any information’ which might affect security in Iraqi Kurdistan 
provided this did ‘not compromise top secret sources of information’. 737  Moreover, the 
British Embassy in Baghdad suggested that the Foreign Office take action against this 
development as, after a field trip to Kurdish areas, Sir Henry Mack noticed that the Kurds 
were generally ‘radio-conscious’, and were ‘better informed about what was happening in 
Korea than about affairs in the next village and could only attribute this to their habit of 
radio-listening’. 738  The IRD also recognised this as a vulnerable point for Communist 
exploitation, and suggested broadcasting anti-Communist programmes in Kurdish through 
their own Sharq Al-Adna station.
739
 By late 1950 the Foreign Office was aware that the 
Soviet Union was skilfully exploiting the Kurdish question as an anti-imperial weapon to 
damage the pro-British governments by giving their moral and material support to the Kurds 
for their independence.
740
 Nevertheless, identifying it as a very delicate issue, the Foreign 
Office dropped the suggestions by Sir Henry Mack and the IRD and decided not to get 
actively involved.
741
 This was mainly owing to the long-standing British policy in the region 
– to support the Iraqi, Iranian, and Turkish governments, all of which had actively been 
assimilating the Kurds in their countries to different degrees respectively.
742
  
In the second half of the 1950s, when the stability in the region began to deteriorate, 
these three governments were more concerned about Mulla Barzani and his influence on the 
Kurds in their countries. During the Suez Crisis, the Iraqi Minister of the Interior, Said 
Qazzaz, was seriously alarmed by Nikita Khrushchev’s speech (a probable bluff) over the 
Suez Crisis. The British Military Attaché in Baghdad noted that ‘if the Iraqis were not 
showing themselves very active in support of the Egyptians - the Russians might send back 
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Mulla Mustafa with some of his partisans and parachute them into Iraq’.743 In the wake of the 
Iraqi Revolution, when a rumour was spread in the Foreign Office that the Iraqi Kurds were 
fighting the revolutionary government in Baghdad, the Turkish and Iranian governments 
sought to ‘expropriate’ Iraqi Kurdistan in order to keep the Kurds in their countries.744 The 
problem of the broadcasts to the Kurds in the Pact area from the Soviet Union was that while 
the radio programmes were broadcast in the Kormanjo (northern Kurdish) dialect, and were 
thus ‘unintelligible’ to many Iranian and Iraqi Kurds, they highlighted the contrast of ‘the 
oppression of Kurds by the Governments of Iran, Turkey and Iraq with the pleasure of being 
a Kurd in the Soviet Union’.745  
Once Mulla Barzani returned from the Soviet Union to Baghdad after the Iraqi 
Revolution, there was an influx of refugees of anti-Barzani Kurdish tribes to both Turkey and 
Iran. The Turkish and Iranian governments agreed bilaterally to set up a ‘Turco-Iranian 
bureau’ to work on the matter and to share any intelligence on Barzani’s activities in 
Baghdad.
746
 In addition, the change in the Iraqi government was proving to be the emerging 
threat in the region not only for political reasons but also owing to subversive activities, 
which were spreading into the neighbouring countries such as Turkey and Iran. In 1960 MI5 
submitted its own threat assessments to its counterparts at the Liaison Committee stating that 
once Iraq had left the Baghdad Pact in 1958, the direct threat to the Pact area from radical 
Arab Nationalism ‘receded’. Instead, ‘new threats’ came from the Iraqi Communists, whose 
activities were tolerated by the new Iraqi government, including ‘subversive Kurdish 
broadcasts from Radio Baghdad’ directed at the Kurds in Iran and Turkey.747 The Turkish 
representative at the Liaison Committee reported in 1960 on the activities of the ICP in Iraq 
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and the Kurds in the region; the latter were allegedly being supported by the Kurdish Youth 
Association based in Switzerland.
748
 
Nevertheless, throughout the period between 1949 and 1963, the Foreign Office 
maintained the same attitudes towards the Kurds. The British representatives in the region 
were encouraged not to bring unnecessary attention to the Iraqi, Iranian, and Turkish 
governments unless there was any specific request from the regional governments on the 
grounds that they were ‘extremely sensitive about the Kurdish minority’.749 As a consequence 
of this policy, intelligence collection on the Kurds was not prioritised, and the Foreign Office 
even apparently turned down a Kurdish volunteer who approached the British Embassy in 
Paris in 1950, wishing to enrol himself as an agent for MI6 and offering to travel to Soviet 
Azerbaijan to find out ‘what Mustapha was up to’. 750  When the War Office requested 
information on Barzani in 1957, for instance, the Foreign Office held no information on him 
at all.
751
 Any intelligence on him and his activities came mostly from liaison with the Iraqi, 
Iranian, and Turkish governments, and from the United States through the Liaison 
Committee.
752
 
The Importance of Mutual Trust in the Liaison 
The Liaison Committee was one example of high-level security cooperation amongst 
the members in the Pact area. While Britain and the United States normally sent senior 
officials (of MI5 and the CIA respectively) to the committee meetings, the regional countries 
were represented by the heads of the intelligence and security services. In addition, unlike the 
first-half of the 1950s, in which the British-Middle Eastern intelligence liaison had 
exclusively been based on an ad hoc arrangement, the Liaison Committee was an 
institutionalised multilateral intelligence liaison. An intriguing question is, however, to what 
extent these intelligence and security services shared their secrets with their counterparts – 
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more precisely, whether Britain was willing to share its own intelligence with its Middle 
Eastern counterparts.  
Archival research indicates that, unlike the other members, who were willing to 
cooperate on subversive activities in the region, Britain was in fact the most reluctant to give 
full assessments on the issue to the member states especially in the early years of the 
Baghdad Pact. H.P. Goodwyn of MI5 once noted to the Permanent Under-Secretary’s 
Department (PUSD) of the Foreign Office that: 
…hitherto we have not provided any comprehensive paper on subversion in the Baghdad Pact 
area. Rather we have confined ourselves to snippets of information on individual matters. 
H/SIME [Head of SIME, Philip Kirby-Green] has pointed out that on the last occasion the US 
Observer contributed something a good deal more elaborate than anything we have produced 
and he, H/SIME, has observed that it is for consideration whether we (as a matter of fact “we” 
involves mainly your friends [MI6]) should produce a paper something like it ourselves.
753
 
The reasons for Britain’s reluctance to make its own contribution to the intelligence sharing 
at the Liaison Committee came from the lax protective security of the Pact. As noted earlier, 
the protection of intelligence sources was a prerequisite for any intelligence liaison. Thus, 
any intelligence shared with the member states was intelligence-based assessments, carefully 
concealing the identities of intelligence sources, rather than raw or single-source intelligence.  
As noted earlier, the protective security of the Baghdad Pact was considered non-
existent during the Baghdad Pact’s early period. Britain was mostly concerned that sensitive 
information might leak to unintended recipients through intelligence sharing with the Pact 
members. John Bruce Lockhart of MI6 noted about multilateral intelligence cooperation that 
‘if you have nine nations together swopping secrets and you include details about sources, the 
security risk of revealing those sources is multiplied by nine, or even nine-plus’. 754  A 
declassified record released under the FOIA reveals that during the early period of the Pact, 
Britain considered using a securer bilateral intelligence liaison with individual members on 
certain topics instead of intelligence-sharing with all its counterparts in the multilateral form 
of the Liaison Committee.
755
 This bilateral intelligence exchange, sometimes one-way traffic, 
was mostly conducted through other channels than the Liaison Committee. One of the 
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channels for bilateral liaison was conducted through the Counter-Subversion Office, a 
permanent working body at the headquarters of the Pact for counter-propaganda purposes; the 
members were mostly seconded from the security services.
756
 Using this channel, a report on 
Communist activities in Syria was passed to the Turkish representative by the British 
counterpart, at least in early 1957, as the Turks were ‘thirst’ for finding out more about ‘the 
Syrian situation’.757 On a different occasion, the Turks supplied intelligence to the British 
demonstrating that ‘Communism in Turkey is directed by exiles in Paris’.758 
It is noteworthy that MI5’s concerns about its lack of contribution to the Liaison 
Committee meetings may have come from the nature of its relationship with its regional 
counterparts. Since it was largely dependent on mutual trust, gaining credibility from the 
member states as a liaison partner was a cause of concern for MI5 as the British delegate. A 
difficulty was that, as discussed in Chapter Three, MI6 officers were also operating as a 
covert network, mostly without the knowledge of the local authorities, in the region.
759
 The 
exposure of MI6’s covert activities would risk the mutual trust of MI5’s liaison with the local 
authorities. Thus, the extent to which intelligence could be shared with the Pact members was 
indeed a very delicate concern – the identities of the agents controlled by MI6, and also its 
activities, had to be carefully concealed before sharing any intelligence with the counterparts. 
Of course MI6 was not MI5’s only intelligence source. The Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) was, and still is, the largest and most fruitful 
intelligence organisation in the British intelligence community. A retired British diplomat  
noted that signals intelligence, known as SIGINT, provided by GCHQ, was ‘important’, 
‘highly competent’ and ‘highly accessible’.760 Richard Aldrich’s book, GCHQ, reveals that 
Britain maintained listening stations at RAF Habbaniya, Iraq, until 1958, and at the Army 
headquarters in Cyprus throughout the period.
761
 Other studies show that RAF Canberra 
aircraft modified for SIGINT interception/collection were flying from RAF Habbaniya and 
actively collecting wireless communications close to the Soviet border. Paul Lashmar has 
noted that ‘recordings made from missions were handed over to GCHQ or, in Cyprus, to 
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GCHQ’s local station’.762 Despite the reduction in manpower and the retreat of regional 
headquarters overseas to Britain in the mid-1950s, including SIME, a JIC report recorded that 
‘no transfer of Sigint effort from the ME [Middle East] to the UK could be made without 
reducing the efficiency of the service to Middle East consumers’.763  
Indeed, SIME was also involved in SIGINT in the region. In his memoirs, Sir Alistair 
Horne, writes that the headquarters of SIME, attached to the headquarters of the British Army 
in the region, housed its own signals interception unit. He noted that:  
The heavily protected SIME villa was like a tabernacle within the temple of GHQ; and within 
SIME, where none dared tread or even ask what went on, was a small holy of holies, manned 
by strange signals personnel and topped by a tangle of aerials. That was in fact the very heart of 
British intelligence, where all the intercept work of SIGINT (signals intelligence) went on – of 
which none of us normal mortals had an inkling until three decades later, when the story of 
Ultra and Enigma came to be revealed.
764
 
In addition, a former RAF officer recollects that he flew from Habbaniya with a group of 
‘technicians’, who had university degrees in Russian, listening in on ‘Russian wireless 
traffic’, and that the recorded and interpreted materials were sent to the British Embassy in 
Baghdad.
765
 The DSO in Baghdad was indeed serving in the guise of the Assistant Air 
Attaché to the British Embassy in Baghdad.  
 Further evidence suggests that Britain’s efforts were targeted at not only the Soviet 
Union, but also Middle Eastern states. In his memoirs, Peter Wright, a former MI5 officer, 
noted that his efforts to bug the Egyptian Embassy in London, with technical support from 
the Post Office, enabled GCHQ to decrypt the Egyptians’ Hagelin code machine.766 This 
combined MI5 and GCHQ operation, he claimed, ‘enabled us to read the Egyptian cipher in 
the London Embassy throughout the Suez Crisis’.767 Of course his revelation must be treated 
with some caution.
768
 Documentary evidence, nevertheless, supports his claim that Britain 
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was able to read Egyptian communications during the crisis – the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn 
Lloyd, congratulated Sir Eric Jones, the Director of GCHQ, on his organisation’s success in 
breaking the Egyptian cipher during the Suez Crisis.
769
 In addition, while a detailed account 
is lacking for the 1950s, especially, the American counterpart of GCHQ, the National 
Security Agency (NSA), which worked intimately with GCHQ, also targeted Middle Eastern 
states.
770
 Moreover, declassified materials during the Second World War show that the 
GC&CS, the predecessor to GCHQ, competently decrypted the diplomatic communications 
of most Middle Eastern states, including the Pact members, such as Turkey, Iraq and Iran.
771
 
This fact indicates that GCHQ may possibly have continuously, or even intermittently, been 
reading the communications of the Pact members in the post-war period. In this context, 
intelligence sharing on a certain topic with its Middle Eastern counterparts might also have 
revealed Britain’s intelligence gathering capabilities and compromised its sources. Therefore, 
British contributions to the liaison had to be carefully tailored.   
There remains the question of the extent to which Britain was able to contribute 
fruitful intelligence assessments on subversive activities in the region to its counterparts. The 
available evidence suggests that MI6 had limited sources of intelligence on subversive 
activities in the region and so was unable to make much contribution to MI5’s assessments. 
Firstly, MI6 was responsible for counter-espionage in the region, not counter-subversion as 
agreed with SIME in 1951. Secondly, as demonstrated earlier, British Intelligence as a whole 
was largely dependent on the local authorities for information on Communist activities in the 
region.
772
 Thirdly, in his biography of Sir Dick White, Tom Bower claimed that MI6 had only 
very ‘few Arabists’ to understand the nature of the Middle East throughout the 1950s. 
Moreover, instead of collecting intelligence, MI6 was occupied with conducting clandestine 
political operations in the region, including an assassination plot against Nasser.
773
 In order to 
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overcome this intelligence deficiency in the region, John Bruce Lockhart, the Deputy Chief 
of MI6, held a three-day conference in the summer of 1960, to which all MI6 heads of station 
in the region were ‘summoned’ to discuss ‘how to penetrate the Nasserite movement 
[subversive activities in the region]’.774 
 The issue is also true for SIGINT: it is questionable how useful SIGINT was for 
identifying subversive threats in the region. As briefly mentioned in the Introduction, the JIC 
meeting in 1958 recorded that ‘subversive threats’ to ‘British interests throughout the world’ 
held the highest priority for intelligence collection – the same rank as a strategic nuclear 
attack by the Soviet Union against Great Britain.
775
 During the Second World War, Sir Dick 
White noted that SIGINT was indeed ‘the biggest source of intelligence’ for detecting Axis 
agents engaged in espionage and subversive activities in the region.
776
 In addition, David 
Easter has claimed that GCHQ was able to trace the connections between Nasser and 
subversive activities in the late 1950s, which were directed against pro-British governments 
in the region, such as Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq.
777
  
Indeed, the subversive activities of radical Arab Nationalism, associated with Nasser, 
were certainly a concern for the British during the period. However, it is important to note 
that, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five, Nasser’s subversive activities were not 
considered as serious a threat as Communist activities until the early 1960s – they were 
certainly a subversive threat to Iraq but not to the Pact as a whole, the target of which was 
exclusively set as Communist activities during the period between 1956 and 1962. In 
addition, when the security services studied Communist activities in the region and radical 
Arab nationalist movements associated with Nasser in 1960, the members of the Liaison 
Committee clearly distinguished between the two threats.
778
 As will be shown in Chapter 
Five, nevertheless, as a result of the strong insistence from the regional members, non-
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Communist threats, including Nasserite subversive activities, were finally included in the 
category of ‘subversive’ threats to the Pact in 1962.779 This was mainly due to the fact that 
non-Communist threats were viewed regionally as equally as subversive as Communist 
threats in the region from the regional point of view, and also that non-Communist threats 
threatened the existence of the pro-Western member states, which was ‘directly in the 
interests of Communism’.780 It is thus doubtful whether Britain’s SIGINT could make much 
of a contribution to the picture and intentions of underground Communist movements in the 
Pact area especially during the period between 1956 and 1963.  
This point also raises the question of the value of SIGINT as a useful source on 
Communist activities in the region. It is known that in the immediate post-war period, 
SIGINT was a critical source for exposing a web of Soviet espionage networks (with 
American Communists) in the United States and elsewhere (codenamed VENONA).
781
 
However, no documentary evidence suggests that VENONA had any impact on the Middle 
Eastern context.
782
 Moreover, given the abrupt end of VENONA as an on-going valuable 
intelligence source in the early 1950s, the value of SIGINT on the connections between 
Moscow and Communists in the Middle East, especially in the late 1950s and early 1960s, is 
questionable.
783
 Moreover, there was no evidence to suggest that Communists in the region 
were using wireless communication, a medium which could potentially be intercepted by 
GCHQ, at least, during the period. Evidence suggests that owing to the nature of the Middle 
East, where Communist activities were prohibited by local authorities, the contact between 
Russians and Communists in the region were rare. Even if the contact had been made by 
landline or post, for instance, the first organisations to intercept the communication by either 
wire-tapping or censorship would have been those of the local authorities – the police but not 
GCHQ. Furthermore, as noted in Chapter Two, the techniques and methods for contacting 
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local Communists employed by the Russians were exposed by the interrogation of the Iraqi 
Communist Party (ICP) members by the Iraqi CID.
784
 
In this context, it is questionable whether Britain had much intelligence on subversive 
activities in the region beyond the capacity of MI5 during the period, especially, in the first 
years of the Baghdad Pact. Britain may have been then largely dependent on the intelligence 
assessments submitted by the members of the Liaison Committee. Nevertheless, documentary 
evidence suggests that after the withdrawal of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact, Britain had 
several sources of information on the internal affairs of Iraq, including the activities of the 
ICP.
785
 In the biography of Sir Dick White, Tom Bower noted that, ‘despite the antagonism 
of the Kassem [Qasim] regime’, Britain’s old relationship with the Iraqis, including the 
Police, the armed forces, and businessmen, allowed MI6 to ‘penetrate government 
agencies’.786  
Conclusion 
This chapter has detailed the establishment of multilateral anti-Communist 
cooperation under the Baghdad Pact and the activities concerning the Liaison Committee of 
the Pact. As noted in Chapter One, there was the shift in the balance in London concerning 
anti-Communist measures in the mid-1950s. This chapter has demonstrated that from 1956 
onwards the Baghdad Pact became an instrument of Britain’s anti-Communist policy in 
instituting and coordinating its activities in the region. Richard Jasse once claimed that the 
Baghdad Pact was a form of colonialism – meaning that it was essentially run by British 
imperial interests in keeping Britain’s own influence in the region.787 To some degree, Jasse’s 
claim is right – Harold Macmillan’s offer to the regional members to train them in the 
techniques and methods of Britain’s anti-Communist measures was indeed to prevent the 
spread of Communist activities in the region, which was equally meant to serve British 
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interests in maintaining influence over the pro-British governments in the region. It is 
noteworthy that despite Macmillan’s suggestion, intelligence exchange under the Baghdad 
Pact was, nevertheless, strained. This was mainly owing to the security of the Pact – Britain 
considered that sharing classified intelligence with the regional members was unsafe. A by-
product of this lax security was the establishment of SAVAK in 1957. The security concern 
was not only about the Iranians, however. Throughout the period between 1956 and 1963, 
Britain sought to improve the state of the security of the Pact members. The extent to which 
the state of CENTO security improved after 1963 is a matter of speculation. However, given 
the state of conditions up to 1963, and the problems associated with them, it seems most 
unlikely that the state of security improved substantially soon after 1963.  
This chapter has also shown that the anti-Communist threat was not monolithic, nor 
clear-cut. Britain (and the United States) were mostly concerned on the one hand about the 
spread of Communist activities in the region – though of course Britain’s policy shifted its 
focus onto Nasser for a while, but it appears that this did not much affect MI5’s commitment 
to intelligence exchange on the Communist threat as the primary concern for the Liaison 
Committee. The regional members’ concerns on the other hand were wider – they were not 
exclusively about Communist activities, but also other threats such as the Kurdish separatist 
movement, which were also seen as ‘Communist-inspired’ threats by the regional members. 
As demonstrated in this chapter, disentangling Communist from non-Communist threats was 
in fact very difficult as the demarcation line between Communist and non-Communist 
activities was often blurred - because Communist Parties were illegal in the Pact area, their 
subversive activities were often conducted in tandem with non-Communist groups against the 
local governments. In addition, the difference in the perceptions between Britain (and the 
United States) on the one hand and Middle Eastern states on the other demonstrates the 
dynamics of the Pact, a topic which will be further discussed in Chapter Five. The limitations 
of Britain’s influence will be further discussed in different contexts in both Chapters Five and 
Six.      
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Chapter Five 
Counter-Subversion by Propaganda:  
The Conflicting Interests of the Baghdad Pact 
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Our main concern at the start of the meeting was that the Asian members [i.e. the regional 
members] would tend to interpret counter-subversion as simply an excuse to discuss and 
develop operations by their own police and security services…[comprising] Generals and 
Colonels, who took rather a physical view of counter-subversion, and no one even remotely 
connected with information work as we know it. 
- Sir Leonard Figg
788
 
Introduction 
Panagiotis Dimitrakis, a military historian, argues that, unlike NATO, CENTO was a 
‘failed alliance’ since it did not survive beyond the Cold War. He asserts, above all, that 
‘there was no real threat to be deterred in the first place’.789 The absence of the threat of a 
Soviet invasion, nevertheless, does not necessarily mean that there was no threat at all in the 
Middle East. Owing to the nature of the Middle East, where political intrigues, assassinations 
and coups d’état were commonplace, most Middle Eastern governments were not concerned 
about the threat of a Soviet invasion but instead internal subversion. In addition, the 
perceptions of Middle Eastern leaders were fostered by their views on the development of 
regional affairs, which Daniel Pipes called the ‘conspiracy mentality’. 790  In this context, 
looking at propaganda is crucial – the perceptions of the policymakers were formed by both 
real and imagined threats of internal subversion.  
The existing literature clearly indicates the significance of propaganda in shaping 
regional affairs. A classic study on the techniques of Soviet propaganda in the region by 
Baruch Hazan, for instance, shows that the Soviet Union had undoubtedly been the chief 
instigator for calling the local population to arms against ‘imperialists’ and ‘reactionary’ (pro-
western) governments in the region since the late 1940s.
791
 The fear of internal subversion 
was also fostered by the rise of radical Arab nationalist movements in the region from the 
mid-1950s, associated with the Egyptian leader, Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser. By the time 
the Baghdad Pact was formed in 1955, Nasser had recognised the power of propaganda and 
considered it his only weapon against ‘imperialists’, i.e. largely Britain and to a lesser extent 
the United States, and, above all, pro-imperialist Middle Eastern governments, such as 
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Iraq.
792
 Sir Sam Falle, the Oriental Counsellor at the British Embassy in Baghdad (1957-61), 
believed that the Iraqi Revolution was clearly instigated by Egypt’s propaganda through the 
Voice of the Arabs, a popular programme of Cairo Radio, and noted that ‘its virulence and 
incitement to violence were horrifying’.793 Wilbur Crane Eveland, his American counterpart, 
also wrote that the Iraqi Revolution resulted from a series of propaganda efforts emanating 
through ‘Nasser’s radio’. 794  Moreover, the power of radio was an important symbol of 
emerging nationalism in the region, and the Voice of the Arabs certainly played a role in 
fostering Algeria’s revolutionary movements.795  
This chapter will show the nature of the threats which Middle Eastern governments 
encountered; how Britain and the local authorities utilised propaganda as an anti-Communist 
measure; and above all how a schism in propaganda approaches can be seen as a microcosm 
of the problems affecting the regional cooperation as a whole. The discussion of the 
limitations in intelligence sharing in the previous chapter has indicated that the regional 
security services held different views on internal security from their British counterparts. The 
main purpose of this chapter will then demonstrate that these security services dominated in 
both internal security and propaganda in their home countries, and that these services 
frequently held views on security and intelligence that contrasted sharply with the policing 
and information-oriented approach of the British. This rift was most noticeable and most 
destructive in the Counter-Subversion Committee. This chapter will mainly focus on the 
nature of collective counter-subversion by propaganda between Britain and the regional 
members of the Baghdad Pact (Turkey, Iraq, Iran and to a lesser extent Pakistan). It will show 
that although all members considered Communist movements as the main threat and they 
took this threat very seriously, there were limitations in the collective efforts under the Pact, 
mainly stemming from its dynamics – while Britain and the United States considered the Pact 
as an alliance against the Soviet Union or International Communism, the regional members 
were more concerned about local or regional problems. The problem was reinforced by the 
fact that the Counter-Subversion Committee of the Baghdad Pact, the highest policymaking 
committee for propaganda, consisted of the heads of the security and intelligence services of 
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the regional states, which also handled counter-subversive propaganda campaigns in their 
respective countries.
796
 
The Nature of Threats in the Middle East  
As noted in Chapter Two, despite the Communist Parties in the region being outlawed 
by the late 1940s, there were some differences among the Middle Eastern governments in 
their anti-Communist stances. However, all the local security services were engaged in anti-
Communist measures, arresting Communists, and confiscating subversive publications and 
printing machines of alleged subversive activists or groups. The Private Papers of Emir Farid 
Chehab, Head of the Sûreté Générale in Lebanon, which was considered the country most 
tolerant of Communist activities in the region, illustrate how seriously the local security 
services treated the Communist threats in the region.
797
 The intelligence obtained by the 
Lebanese Sûreté Générale, for instance, came not only from its own agents but also through 
liaising with other Middle Eastern security services under the framework of the Arab League, 
and also perhaps in the form of informal arrangements. Through these arrangements, the 
Lebanese Sûreté Générale ‘kept up its surveillance and monitoring, and watched’ over 
Communist movements not only in Lebanon, but also in Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and the Arabian 
Gulf area.
798
  
There were certain limitations in anti-Communist measures by Middle Eastern 
security services especially against the spread of subversive publications. The local security 
services found it difficult to intercept and confiscate subversive (i.e. illegal) publications, 
which circulated in the country or even across the region. A British diplomat in Lebanon, for 
instance, which was considered to be a smaller country in the region, noted that an illegal 
publication, “Akhbar”, was believed to have a circulation of ‘about 10,000 copies a day’ in 
Lebanon, ‘which for Lebanon is very large’.799 These subversive publications were the main 
source for Communist activists for agitating local populations to turn against their own 
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governments. In addition, some materials were smuggled into countries from outside the 
jurisdictions of the local security services, which made the local security services unworkable 
to eradicate a root of subversive activities, and the activists were also often moving across the 
borders.
800
 Moreover, the printing presses of these illegal publications were reported to be 
located either in the Soviet Union or in the Soviet Embassy itself, against which the local 
security services were unable to take further actions.
801
 
Indeed, subversive Communist publications were not only the threat. Extraterritorial 
radio broadcasts were often more subversive and threatening to the existence of local 
authorities, especially associated with the West. Above all Nasser extensively used Cairo 
Radio and employed the power of the masses to force out British influence from the Middle 
East. He targeted not only Britain itself, but also pro-British Middle Eastern governments, 
namely the Hashemite dynasty, Iraq, Jordan, and pro-western Lebanon. Similar to 
Communist activities, Nasser also sought to generate internal subversion, ‘revolution’ in 
Nasser’s words.802 Diplomatic correspondence in July 1957 also records that King Hussein of 
Jordan was being attacked by ‘hostile Egyptian propaganda.’ A ‘clandestine radio station’ 
named ‘Radio Free Jordan’ was being established and the Egyptians were ‘trying to recruit 
Jordanians for it’.803 Similarly, another radio station situated outside Iraq, named ‘Radio Free 
Iraq’, was calling on the people of Iraq to revolt against the Iraqi government led by Nuri al-
Said.
804
  
In addition to his Cairo Radio broadcasts, Nasser further encouraged ‘revolution’ by 
providing material support for coup d’état. Egyptian Military Attachés acted as vehicles of 
revolution in the region.
805
 According to Yaacov Caroz, Nasser ‘considered subversion to be 
a legitimate means of achieving his objectives’.806 Prime Minister Anthony Eden wrote in his 
memoirs that there was evidence that Nasser was preparing ‘to mount revolutions of young 
officers’ in various countries in the region. 807  Colonel Sir Patrick Coghill, the Director-
General of Intelligence of the Arab Legion (1952 - 56), once noted that, in addition to 
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Communists, ‘the worst’ subversive activity he had to deal with in fact came from Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia.  
They [Egyptians] are entirely unscrupulous…[T]hey broadcast a stream of vitriolic abuse of 
Nuri Said in Hebrew. So much for Arab brotherly love. For months recently they have been 
trying to organise sabotage gangs to operate from Jordan into Israel, in order to compromise 
this country. Their local M.A. [Military Attaché] is the mainspring of this. For all the time I 
have been here – nearly four years – Egypt has flooded the Press and Air of the Middle East 
with bitterly hostile attacks on “Imperialists” and “Colonizers”…Saudi Arabia is working hand 
in glove with Egypt… – [through] lavish bribes on a fabulous scale which include or included 
subsidies to the Jordan royal family – Cabinet Ministers, Deputies and newspapers, one and all 
on their pay-roll. Their principal objects of dislike are the members of the Hashemite 
family…So all is directed at weakening Hashemite influence.
808
 
In this report, Coghill suggested that ‘the only right and safe line’ for Britain was to ‘build up 
Jordan and back Iraq against the destructive and dangerous influences of Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia’.809 Although it is uncertain whether his suggestion had any impact on subsequent 
decisions, declassified Overseas Planning Committee records show that ‘particular attention’ 
was paid to Syria and the Committee gave MI6 and the IRD ‘the region-wide task of 
diminishing Egyptian and Saudi influence’ and ‘breaking the Egypt/Saudi axis’.810  
Documentary evidence shows that Egyptian Military Attachés were expelled from 
countries such as Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia between 1956 and 1957 
on the grounds that the Egyptians were conducting subversive activities, such as instigating 
subversive activities and even supplying arms and explosives to politically-motivated locals 
for use against their own governments.
811
 According to a JIC report in August 1958, a 
number of pro-Nasserite ‘influential opponents’ of regimes such as Jordan and Lebanon were 
provided with ‘weapons and explosives for use in promoting disorder and, if necessary, to 
overthrow the established government by revolution’.812 As Nasser’s popularity grew, the 
reactionary pro-British regimes, including even Iran, felt increasingly threatened by internal 
subversion.
813
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Besides the Egyptian Military Attachés, Britain also viewed Egyptian teachers 
throughout the region as subversive propagandists.
814
 MI6 reported in 1958 that the number 
of Egyptian teachers throughout the region had increased from about 300 before the Egyptian 
coup of 1952 to 3,000 in 1958, and that there was ‘evidence’ obtained from various countries, 
such as Lebanon, the Persian Gulf States, and Jordan, that the Egyptian government used 
‘Egyptian teachers’ for both espionage and subversion. It concluded that this ‘large and well-
placed body of propagandists abroad’ presented ‘a grave threat to the future stability of the 
countries in which they are working, and to the Middle East as a whole’.815 The Overseas 
Planning Committee, successor to the AC (O) Committee, tasked MI6, MI5 and the IRD to 
counteract their activities in the Persian Gulf States in March 1956, noting that ‘we should do 
whatever is possible to counteract Egyptian influence, especially the influence of Egyptian 
teachers’.816 
As noted in the previous chapter, there were indeed a series of MI6’s attempts to 
overthrow Nasser in the course of the Suez Crisis in 1956.
817
 According to Heikal, George K. 
Young, the Vice-Chief of MI6, said to his American counterpart, James Eichelberger of the 
CIA, ‘“[MI6 will] do a Mossadeq” with Nasser’.818 MI6 was not of course acting alone, but 
these operations were directed by the British Government. Amongst all, it was Prime 
Minister Anthony Eden, who wanted Nasser ‘destroyed’.819 At the working level, Douglas 
Dodds-Parker, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Overseas 
Planning Committee, formed a special committee with Sir Charles Hambro, a former chief of 
the wartime Special Operations Executive (SOE), to suggest any clandestine actions against 
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Egypt and Nasser.
820
 By the mid-August 1956, Dodds-Parker was already contemplating 
Britain’s strategic position in the Middle East on the assumption of Britain’s relationship with 
a new Egyptian government after Nasser.
821
 In addition, the existing evidence also suggests 
that there was also an attempt to overthrow Nasser led by Conservative backbenchers, such as 
Julian Amery, also a former SOE officer.
822
 These attempts, nevertheless, failed, and 
Nasser’s popularity significantly grew after the Suez Crisis.823  
Communists and radical Arab nationalist propaganda was a clear threat to local 
authorities whose populations were always targeted by the UAR and Soviet Union with calls 
for revolution. As noted by Baruch Hazan, who studied the techniques and methods of Soviet 
propaganda in the region, the association of the Baghdad Pact with Britain and the United 
States ‘created a community of interests’ between Nasser’s Egypt and the Soviet Union as a 
target for propaganda.
824
 The Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri al-Said, also felt that the existence of 
the Hashemite dynasty of Iraq was threatened by propaganda from Moscow, Cairo and 
Damascus.
825
 From the mid-1950s, the problem only worsened as non-Communist forces, 
chiefly radical Arab nationalists, grew increasingly hostile to the local authorities. 
From the perspective of the regional members, regardless of their political affiliations, 
these threats were substantial, often spreading across the borders, and were considered 
Communist-inspired for their ‘revolutionary tendency’.826 Worst of all, as CENTO’s regional 
members all agreed, it was the Voice of the Arabs, a non-Communist threat, which was most 
vocal in calls for revolutions in the region.
827
 Nevertheless, countering these threats with 
propaganda under the single authority of the Baghdad Pact proved more complex as a 
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response. This was mainly due to the fact that there was no consensus at the policy level as to 
whether these non-Communist activities constituted a subversive threat. As the perceptions of 
these substantial threats differed between Britain and the United States on one hand, and the 
regional members on the other, this was a significant cause of frustration for the regional 
states who insisted that these non-Communist activities posed an existential threat to their 
regimes. 
The Dynamics of the Baghdad Pact and the Committees  
The Liaison and Counter-Subversion Committees of the Baghdad Pact were clearly 
tasked from the outset to tackle the Communist problems in the region. As the regional 
members were well-aware of the potential danger of Communist movements, throughout the 
period between 1956 and 1963 they maintained a strong anti-Communist stance and 
cooperated in anti-Communist propaganda with the members through the Counter-
Subversion Committee. The Iraqis were at the forefront of anti-Communist propaganda until 
their withdrawal from the Pact in 1958. After the Iraqi withdrawal, Sir Roger Stevens, the 
British Ambassador in Tehran (1954-58), noted that the Turks became ‘by a long way’ the 
leading force with the Iranians ‘second’ and the Pakistanis ‘a very poor third’.828  
Under the Counter-Subversion Committee, which was the highest policymaking body 
for countering subversive propaganda efforts, there was a ‘permanent executive arm’ of 
counter-subversion, the Counter-Subversion Office (CSO). The CSO, consisting of 
representatives from each member, was placed under the administrative control of the 
Secretary-General of the Baghdad Pact and housed in the headquarters of the Pact in Baghdad 
(1956-58) and Ankara (1958-79).
829
 A day-to-day contact amongst the Pact members took 
place though the CSO which essentially coordinated counter-subversive measures between 
the member states, and acted as a channel for disseminating propaganda materials from the 
members.
830
 For instance, a selection of IRD materials, especially anti-Communist 
publications, was shared through the CSO, whose members translated the materials into their 
own languages and then distributed them through their own national channels. These 
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materials included a comparative study of Soviet aid to Israel and the Arab states;
831
 stories 
exposing a life behind the Communist Bloc;
832
 and about the ideas of Communism, such as 
‘What is Communism?’. 833  For example, as a result of the CSO’s work, there was an 
‘impressive increase’ in anti-Communist material published in Turkey. During the first eight 
months of 1959, over 388 articles ‘based on IRD materials’ appeared in the Turkish press.834 
The CSO members constantly visited Britain to attend training courses organised by the 
IRD.
835
 The CSO also studied the methods and techniques of Soviet disinformation activities; 
such as how the Soviet Union forged documents and disseminated these forged documents 
through the local press in the Pact area.
836
 Although the CSO was a multilateral body of 
cooperation, it also facilitated closer bilateral relationships. D.C. Hopson of the Foreign 
Office noted that: 
...because the CSO has to work on a basis of multi-lateral agreement its sphere of activity is 
necessarily limited. But meanwhile a great deal of bilateral co-operation in activities which can 
be called “counter-subversive” is taking place on a routine, day-to-day basis between the 
Iranians and ourselves - and, in fact, between all the CENTO allies. For example, we are 
exchanging information about Communist activities, helping each other with the training of 
broadcasting staff, arranging educational, cultural and technical exchanges, etc. This distinction 
- between the CENTO allies on a bilateral basis and the relatively small but still useful 
contribution that can be made through the CSO on a multi-lateral basis - is very important.
837
 
As noted in Chapter Four, this sort of bilateral cooperation also extended to the exchange of 
‘secret intelligence’.  
Despite close cooperation on anti-Communist propaganda, as a multilateral 
organisation, CENTO was limited in its propaganda efforts. Any decisions for collective 
propaganda campaigns were taken on the basis of consensus, and they were often vetoed by a 
Pact member. Although the members worked well on conducting anti-Communist measures 
in the region, their national interests clashed when their policies differed. As a result, the 
effectiveness of counter-subversive campaigns by propaganda was hampered by the 
dynamics of the Pact, and a sense of frustration was very clear in the late 1950s and early 
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1960s. Recollecting his time in Ankara (1964-67), Charles Naas, a former member of the 
State Department’s policy-planning staff of the United States, encapsulates the dynamics of 
the Pact, writing that: 
CENTO was a disappointment to the regional members, all of them, because they hoped – or 
had hoped – to use the organization and therefore the united US-UK prestige…We [US and 
Britain] took a, very, I’d say, fairly rigid line, that the CENTO organization was intended to 
deal with a communist threat, and basically a Soviet Communist threat obviously. Whereas Iran 
would have liked us very much in public statements, the communiques, or actual activities to 
use the organization against Iraq [after Iraq had left]…The Pakistanis wanted us to use the 
organization against India in some fashion or other. The Turks would have been [sic] if we fully 
sided with them on the Cyprus question.
838
   
In this regard, as seen before, the Pact was broadly divided into two camps – the regional 
members on the one hand, and Britain and the United States on the other. The regional 
members’ frustration was often directed at Britain and the United States, yet they were also 
dependent on ‘British skill’ and ‘American material resources’ for their own counter-
subversive propaganda campaigns.
839
  
The growing frustration was particularly seen after Iraq withdrew its membership in 
1958, and Britain abandoned its anti-Nasserite policy in 1959.
840
 Amongst all, Iran was the 
most concerned with this ‘negative’ counter-subversive policy of the Pact as the Iranians still 
feared ‘subversion’ by its neighbouring states, the Soviet Union, Egypt (through Cairo and 
Damascus Radio) and Iraq, until the early 1960s.
841
 These concerns were frequently made at 
the Counter-Subversion Committee by the Iranian representatives, General Teymour Bakhtiar 
(Head of SAVAK, 1957-61) and General Hassan Pakravan (Deputy-Head of SAVAK, 1957-
61).
 842
 The senior SAVAK officers criticised that ‘the British nor the Americans intended to 
make the Committee anything more than a talking shop’.843 Nevertheless, the United States 
maintained its firm stance that the scope of the Counter-Subversion Office of the Pact should 
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be placed ‘exclusively on meeting the Communist and Communist-inspired subversive 
threats’ and nothing more.844 
The American attitudes towards the region merit brief attention here since the 
Americans’ involvement in the Pact sometimes acted as an obstruction to propaganda efforts. 
Despite maintaining the official status as an ‘observer’, the United States in fact exercised 
influence on the policy of the Pact through substantial financial and moral support to the 
regional members. The United States’ own policies towards Nasser and radical Arab 
Nationalism have been studied elsewhere: while maintaining its official neutral position 
towards the region throughout the period, it pursued its own policy to contain radical Arab 
Nationalism by supporting Saudi Arabia as a challenger to Nasser’s popularity in the region 
in the late 1950s until the end of the Eisenhower Doctrine in September 1960.
845
 However, at 
the Pact during the period between 1956 and 1963, as indicated earlier, their focus was 
exclusively on anti-Communist activities.  
Their ambivalent attitude towards the region was, nevertheless, unsurprising since their 
departmental policies were often in conflict. Their indecisive and often non-existent national 
strategy, based on a short-slighted and ill-founded policy towards the region, has also been 
criticised.
846
  For instance, Robert McClintock, the Ambassador of the United States to 
Lebanon (1958-61), who himself felt that it was ‘a mistake to be anti-Nasser’, informally 
spoke to his British counterpart, Sir Moore Crosthwaite, about a division of opinion about the 
Eisenhower doctrine to undermine Nasser’s popularity in the region.847 The indecisive US 
attitude towards the region was also a cause of confusion to the Pact members and was 
frequently criticised by the regional members – the Iranian delegate, General Teymour 
Bakhtiar (Head of SAVAK, 1957-61), complained to his British counterpart that a 
representative from the Department of State, and another from the CIA, ‘did not even agree 
with each other’ over what constituted a ‘subversive’ threat in the region.848  
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Similar to the Liaison Committee, the meetings of the Counter-Subversion Committee 
were mostly a place of political discussions, where there was no consensus amongst its 
members beyond the Communist threat in the region. For instance, as noted in Chapter Four, 
the regional members were concerned by the activities of the Kurds, and their connection 
with the Soviet Union. When the Turks insisted that Kurdish nationals were suspected of 
being Communists or at least communist-inspired, for instance, the British response was 
‘nonsense’.849 In addition, from the establishment of the Pact, Pakistan frequently raised its 
concerns about subversive activities in Kashmir and claimed that activities were supported 
and instigated by propaganda from the Indian Communist Party.
850
 Once their claim was 
rejected, the Pakistanis appealed to revise the mandate of the Liaison and Counter-Subversion 
Committees to deal with not only Communists, but also all subversion in the Pact area.
851
 
Nevertheless, Britain was reluctant to accept the Pakistani claim and the Foreign Office 
sought to avoid the ‘subversive’ label due to its concern over diplomatic relations with 
India.
852
  
The exclusion of a non-Communist or even Communist-inspired threat from the 
coherent counter-subversion policy of the Pact caused a sense of frustration among the 
regional members. As a result, despite the fact that the Liaison Committee of the Pact, most 
of whose members also set at the Counter-Subversion Committee, had already agreed that 
Nasser was clearly not a Communist puppet;
853
 the regional members, especially the Turks 
and Iranians, wished to label Nasser as ‘a tool of Communist subversion’ to conduct anti-
Nasserite propaganda campaigns under the Pact.
854
 
The dynamics of the Pact policy limited the efficacy of the cooperative propaganda 
efforts. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the regional member states restricted 
their propaganda campaigns in their own countries. As the responsibility for conducting 
propaganda operations always remained in the hands of local authorities, the regional 
member states certainly used the techniques and CSO materials for their own purposes. For 
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instance, while the British policy ordered a halt to the IRD’s all-out anti-Nasserite campaigns 
towards the end of 1959, the regional member states did not follow the same practice. In 1959 
the IRD asked its outposts in the region to assess the extent to which the anti-Nasserite 
propaganda materials, so-called ‘Transmission X’, were still being disseminated in each 
country of the Middle East.
855
 Since the IRD had halted the supply of such materials to the 
region, nearly all Arab states, including Jordan and Lebanon, stopped disseminating these 
materials in their countries.
856
 On the contrary, the members of CENTO (now Turkey, Iran 
and Pakistan), where anti-Communist and the ‘Transmission X’ materials were pooled at the 
headquarters, were, nevertheless, still disseminating these materials, while they slightly 
tailored for their purposes, broadening the focus from not only anti-Nasserite but also to anti-
Soviet Communism. The British Embassy in Ankara estimated that ‘up to 60 per cent’ had 
been placed in the local press in Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.
857
  
It is important to note, however, that, despite the dynamics of the Pact, CENTO 
functioned on the basis of a democratic principle: any decisions at either the Counter-
Subversive Committee or the CSO were made collectively through a majority of the 
signatories. This principle gradually acted in the regional members’ favour, and eventually, 
after long deliberation at a series of the committee meetings, a request from the regional 
members was accepted. At a meeting of the Counter-Subversion Committee in Lahore in 
1962, the term ‘subversion’ was finally broadened to include ‘non-communist threats’.858 As 
noted in Chapter Four, this was mainly because non-Communist threats were equally as 
important as Communist threats in the region, and that non-Communist threats were 
threatening the existence of the pro-Western member states, which was ‘directly in the 
interests of Communism’.859  
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British Propaganda Policy in the Middle East 
It is clear from the literature that Britain maintained a rigid anti-Communist stance in 
the post-war period and the IRD was at the forefront of British anti-Communist propaganda 
campaigns. In his study of IRD activities in the Middle East, James Vaughan noted that by 
the mid-1950s ‘significant evidence’ suggested the IRD was ‘extremely successful in 
establishing high-level contacts within Middle Eastern governments’ –  the Middle Eastern 
governments were willing to cooperate with the British on anti-Communist propaganda and 
accepted its materials for use in their anti-Communist policy.
860
 It is noteworthy that the 
formation of the Baghdad Pact was an additional boost for British anti-Communist 
propaganda in this regard. Once the Counter-Subversion Committee of the Baghdad Pact was 
established in 1956, it provided Britain with the opportunity of obtaining additional resources 
and channels through which anti-Communist propaganda materials could be circulated. 
The significance of the Baghdad Pact in this context cannot be underestimated. Since 
anti-Communist propaganda campaigns were in fact conducted by the regional countries, this 
was more advantageous for British interests in the region. Firstly, the region became a hotbed 
of anti-British sentiment, and British membership of the Baghdad Pact was exploited by 
Radio Cairo and Radio Moscow. While Britain maintained the initiative in anti-Communist 
propaganda campaigns by giving guidance and direction, the regional governments assumed 
the front line of anti-Communist propaganda in the Pact area. An IRD officer noted that the 
consequences of becoming known of the ‘British-made programmes’ to the local public 
would most likely have been ‘politically embarrassing’ not only to Britain but also to the 
local authorities.
861
 British involvement in anti-Communist efforts in the region ostensibly 
became invisible.  
Secondly, owing to their inexperience in anti-Communist measures and especially in 
propaganda, the regional members welcomed British experience and expertise. Britain’s role 
was thus to provide the regional members with technical support including training and 
materials for broadcasting and publications. This was mutually beneficial for Britain and the 
regional members as John A. Speares, First Secretary at the British Embassy in Baghdad, 
noted regarding the Iranian case: 
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Even if our policemen [the regional representatives of the Baghdad Pact] lack propaganda 
expertise, they have at least in this case issued some Western material under a Middle East 
dateline, and this seems important. Although the regular local propaganda services are more 
experienced they may also be more sophisticated and therefore less open to our 
influence...these police channels even if they are inexpert and incomplete are at least open to 
us...General Kia [the Iranian representative, Head of Military Intelligence] has, incidentally, 
already indicated willingness to accept a training and advisory survey of information 
services.
862
 
This training role served British interests in the region well. As discussed in Chapter One, the 
principal objective of British policy towards the region was to maintain security over oil 
resources, and the Baghdad Pact was ‘the main instrument’ to achieve this. By providing the 
regional members, especially Iran and Iraq, with support for anti-Communist measures, 
Britain hoped to gain the ‘goodwill’ of its regional partners,863 and thus ensure that they 
would remain in the sphere of Western influence.    
The existing literature also establishes that British propaganda efforts were directed 
against not only Communists but also Nasser. The British anti-Nasserite propaganda policy 
started in the early 1950s, but it was during the 1956 Suez Crisis that Britain adopted outright 
anti-Nasserite propaganda campaigns through an inter-departmental committee comprising 
both the IRD and the military against the strongest anti-British voice, Cairo Radio.
864
 In 
addition, by the eve of the Suez Crisis, the IRD was employed as an instrument of 
psychological warfare against Nasser.
865
 Jack Rennie, head of the IRD, was given a specific 
brief to lead IRD’s Middle Eastern operations in an anti-Nasserite and anti-Arab nationalism 
direction while Norman Reddaway, Rennie’s deputy, was left in charge of the day-to-day 
anti-Communist work.
866
 
 Documentary evidence records that these anti-Nasser propaganda operations were 
secretly conducted and named using the bracket term of ‘Transmission X’ to conceal their 
intent and activities.
867
 Britain’s anti-Nasserite propaganda campaigns sought to ‘rebut’ Cairo 
Radio’s anti-British propaganda in the Middle East, and ‘to discredit Nasser and to expose 
                                                 
862
 TNA: PRO FO371/127860: VB1691/5: letter by J.A. Speares, Baghdad, to P.G.D. Adams, Beirut, 9 Jan 
1957. 
863
 TNA: PRO FO371/121261: V1073/294G: COS (56) 270: report by Chiefs of Staff Committee, ‘United 
Kingdom Commitments under the Baghdad Pact’, 13 Jul 1956. 
864
 Michael Thornhill, Road to Suez: The Battle of the Canal Zone (Phoenix Mill: Sutton Publishing, 2006), 
pp.48, 58-63, 191-3; Gary Rawnsley, ‘Overt and Covert: The Voice of Britain and Black Radio Broadcasting in 
the Suez Criris, 1956’, INS vol.11, no.3 (1996), pp.497-522. 
865
 James Vaughan, ‘‘Cloak Without Dagger’: How the Information Research Department Fought Britain’s Cold 
War in the Middle East, 1948-56’, Cold War History, vol.4, no.3 (2004), pp.56-84.  
866
 Vaughan, Failure of American and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle East, p.207. 
867
 TNA: PRO FO1110/1370: PR10116/4/G: memorandum ‘Transmission X’, 15 Feb 1961. 
 184 
 
 
Egyptian expansionism’ by using ‘unattributable propaganda’. 868  The themes for this 
propaganda included Nasser’s future economic plan, which was portrayed as being ill-
prepared for building the Aswan Dam; ‘the dangers of Egypt’s pan-Arab imperialist 
ambitions’; and ‘Nasser’s link with the Russians’.869 However, the activities associated with 
the ‘Transmission X’ were short-lived. Once the Hashemite dynasty of Iraq was swept away 
in the Revolution of 1958 and after British-Egyptian relations began to improve towards the 
end of 1958, the Foreign Office decided to redirect the IRD back to its original anti-
Communist task of countering ‘Communist-bloc propaganda’.870  
The change in direction came from a change in British policy towards Egypt. Records 
released under the FOIA show that soon after the Iraqi Revolution, Britain re-examined its 
national interests in the region, and decided to adopt a policy of ‘disengagement’: in other 
words, ‘not taking sides in inter-Arab disputes’.871 This meant that the British anti-Nasserite 
policy in the region also softened. In order to maintain good relations with the Baghdad Pact 
members, who would be unlikely to welcome Britain’s ‘disengagement’ policy, the British 
government decided that the Americans, who had had so far ‘no wish to support or protect 
British interests’ in the region, ‘should be induced to join the new organisation’.872 While 
British policy was being repositioned, the process of restoring British-Egyptian relations after 
the Suez Crisis also began in the first half of 1957, and an exchange of Ambassadors finally 
happened in February 1961.
873
 The negotiations included delicate issues such as the release of 
the MI6 officers, James Swinburn and James Zarb, who had been captured during the Suez 
Crisis of 1956.
874
  
Even before Britain’s anti-Nasserite propaganda policy was reset after the Iraqi 
Revolution, its propaganda strategy overseas had been reviewed by 1957. Records 
declassified under the FOIA show that the Macmillan Government stepped up its 
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broadcasting and publication propaganda campaigns in the region from 1957. Compensating 
for cut in defence spending, propaganda was recognised as being of prime importance, and 
the focus of British propaganda efforts shifted away from Europe, where ‘BBC broadcasts are 
doing little good’.875 This decision was made on the basis of a committee chaired by the 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Charles Hill, which reviewed the performance of 
Britain’s information services overseas throughout the world in 1957.876 Before this review, 
Britain spent the most money on non-Communist Europe (26.1 per cent – a fourth of the total 
expenditure), with the Middle East in second place at 14.1 per cent.
877
 After the review, the 
Middle East, where Harold Macmillan had felt that ‘our propaganda’ was ‘not strong 
enough’, was given the highest importance, followed by the Far East, Europe and the United 
States.
878
  
The Macmillan government also oversaw a change in the general approach to 
propaganda in the Middle East – before outright anti-Nasserite propaganda campaigns were 
abandoned in 1959 – with cultural propaganda efforts put forth to forward British interests in 
the region.
879
 In February 1957 a working party was formed under the chairmanship of 
William Alfred Wolverson, the Director of the Radio Services Department, General Post-
Office Headquarters (1955-60), to consider the possibility of ‘a light programme of 
entertainment and news directed to Arab countries of the Middle East’. This soft approach to 
propaganda in the region was intended to attract ‘the uneducated masses’ in the region ‘away 
from Radio Cairo’.880 For this purpose, Sharq Al-Adna, a Foreign Office owned Arabic-
broadcasting station in Cyprus, which had unsuccessfully conducted anti-Nasser propaganda 
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campaigns over the Suez Crisis, was handed over to the BBC.
881
 Under its new ownership, 
Sharq Al-Adna started broadcasting ‘bazaar’ music throughout the region using a second 
medium wave transmitter of 100 kilo-watts.
882
 According to Douglas Boyd, the new Sharq 
Al-Adna ‘became the most consistently popular and credible Arabic-language radio 
service[s] in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s transmitting in Arabic’.883 
The Propaganda War 
At the centre of the propaganda war in the region, the most influential broadcasting 
station was Cairo Radio.
884
 According to official figures recorded by the IRD in 1961, the 
Voice of the Arabs, one of the most popular programmes, extolling Nasser’s concept of Arab 
Nationalism, was on the air for a hundred-and-fifty-six hours per week, and was being 
broadcast throughout the Middle East and North Africa in twenty-three languages.
885
 Cairo 
Radio steadily increased its capacity from 1953 and became the most powerful broadcasting 
station in the region with twelve medium wave transmitters (including two 300 kilo-watts and 
one 100 kilo-watts) and eleven short-wave transmitters (among them, two 140 kilo-watts and 
two 100 kilo-watts). By comparison, Baghdad Radio, established under the Baghdad Pact, 
had only four 100 kilo-watt transmitters.
886
 According to Mohamed Heikal, Nasser’s closest 
confidant, Nasser understood the power of radio as an instrument in his foreign policy and 
believed that it was the only way to reach his people and mobilise the Arab masses beyond 
the borders of Egypt. This was particularly true in the cases of Lebanon and Jordan, where 
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Egyptian newspapers were banned and the Egyptian embassies were under surveillance by 
local security services.
887
  
As noted earlier, Britain operated outright anti-Nasserite propaganda campaigns in the 
course of the Suez Crisis of 1956, which continued until 1959. The propaganda war against 
Nasser became more intense as the United States joined towards the end of the 1950s. A 
declassified CIA report records that Nasser claimed through Cairo Radio that ‘some of the 
nine clandestine radio stations’ under the control of the Counter-Subversion Committee of the 
Baghdad Pact were attacking him.
888
 Although the source of information on ‘the nine 
clandestine radio stations’ is unclear, according to Heikal, Nasser understood that telling the 
truth to the masses was the only way to make the masses become the ‘weapon of the Arab 
Revolution’.889  
There was also a regional dimension to this propaganda war. Amongst all the regional 
players, Nuri al-Said, a long-standing Iraqi Prime Minister, who wished to see Iraq lead the 
Arab countries by unifying with Syria, was also willing to confront Nasser in a propaganda 
war.
890
 ‘Attaching so much importance to radio propaganda’, Nuri al-Said welcomed British 
help in developing Iraqi propaganda capabilities against Moscow Radio and Cairo Radio, and 
Baghdad Radio was established in 1956 under the Baghdad Pact.
891
 Britain provided the 
materials and financial support for the Iraqi broadcasting operation.
892
 However, while the 
Foreign Office backed Baghdad Radio to counter the increasingly popular but hostile 
broadcasting of Cairo Radio, Britain also sought to distance itself from the operational 
matters of Baghdad Radio. Michael Hadow, Head of the Levant Department of the Foreign 
Office, noted that ‘we would not wish it to become branded in Arab eyes as an instrument of 
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the Pact rather than an Iraqi national station’.893 While there was no reason for not advising 
on the conduct of any operational matters, Michael Hadow limited its commitment to 
advising only on ‘future planning’ at request from the Iraqi government, rather than on ‘the 
programming side’. In this way, Hadow also envisaged that the Iraqis would be helped by 
more experienced regional members, such as the Pakistanis, who had also been involved in 
similar operations under the SEATO.
894
  
However, in reality Britain was also involved in developing the broadcasting 
programmes of Baghdad Radio, in line with the policy of the Pact as ‘a Moslem alliance to 
challenge the pan-Arab doctrines sponsored by Egypt’s Voice of the Arab broadcasts’.895 
These anti-Communist propaganda efforts by Baghdad Radio were largely targeted at ‘all key 
moulders’ of ‘public opinion’, especially in the spheres of ‘politics, commerce and labour, 
science, literature and education’, by exposing ‘Communist aims, tactics and pretensions’ 
through broadcasting and publicity media.
896
 More specifically, particular attention was given 
to ‘youth, students, intellectuals and leading academic figures’.897  
Iraqi control over the Baghdad broadcasting was a cause of concern for some British 
diplomats as the Iraqis had their own ambitions for regional leadership. Baghdad Radio 
promoted Iraq as the leader in the region, not only in Iraq, but also throughout the region, 
against Nasser’s pan-Arab Nationalism, with themes which included ‘internal progress in 
Iraq’ and ‘Iraq’s role in international affairs’. 898  In addition, the Iraqi government 
appointment of Yunis Bakri, the ‘Arab “Lord Haw-Haw”’, a ‘mercenary prepared to abuse 
anyone if paid enough’, to lead the Iraqi Information Services was seen by the British as 
evidence that the Iraqis were ready to wage a ‘radio war’ against Cairo, which some British 
diplomats thought would only create political instability in the region. Gordon Waterfield, 
Head of the BBC Eastern Services, working closely with the IRD, noted that there would be 
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‘confusion in the Middle East air with one radio station fighting another’, and ‘British policy, 
as I understand it, is not to try to divide the Arab world, but to try to create understanding and 
cooperation among the Arab countries’.899  
Nevertheless, Britain’s regional partners could not compete with Nasser’s influential 
and powerful anti-imperial rhetoric. A growing anti-British sentiment and the rise of Arab 
Nationalism throughout the region, all of which moved in Nasser’s favour, especially after 
the Suez Crisis, also acted to the anti-Nasserite governments’ disadvantage. James Vaughan 
has observed that the development of regional affairs and crises in the mid- and late 1950s 
were a consequence of Nasser’s propaganda war: the dismissal of Glubb Pasha; Jordan’s 
abstention from joining the Baghdad Pact; the Jordanian and Lebanese Crises of 1958; and 
even the Iraqi Revolution.
900
  
Dominance of Security Services 
 One of the difficulties faced by IRD officers cooperating with the Pact members was 
how to establish common ground on which to conduct their anti-Communist propaganda 
efforts. The representatives of the regional members at both the Counter-Subversion 
Committee and the CSO were predominantly members of the security services: the Director 
of the Iraqi CID; Head of the Iranian Military Intelligence (G-2), later replaced by Head of 
SAVAK; the Director-General of the Turkish National Security Service; and a senior official 
of the Ministry of Interior of Pakistan. On the other hand, Britain was represented by an IRD 
officer. The United States, which remained an ‘observer’, not a member, until 1959, was 
represented by either USIS (United States Information Service) or CIA officers. As a result, 
the discussions at the Counter-Subversion Committee were mostly dominated by security 
concerns, which were in particular expressed by the regional representatives who had strong 
security-mind-sets. At the outset of the Counter-Subversion Committee, L.C.W. Figg of the 
IRD recorded his concerns that:  
Our main concern at the start of the meeting was that the Asian members [i.e. the regional 
members] would tend to interpret counter-subversion as simply an excuse to discuss and 
develop operations by their own police and security services…[comprising] Generals and 
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Colonels, who took rather a physical view of counter-subversion, and no one even remotely 
connected with information work as we know it.
901
 
This domination by the regional security services often led to situations in which the British 
representative from the IRD was the subject of complaints by the regional counterparts for 
being too soft about counter-subversion efforts. This was often seen as evidence that Britain 
was less committed to collective efforts by them.  
This was in particular the case from the summer of 1956 onwards, when unrest and 
instability in Syria was a cause of central concern for all the regional members, who became 
more frustrated with the ineffectiveness of the Pact. General Behcet Turkmen, the Turkish 
representative (Director-General of the Turkish National Security Service), who chaired the 
Counter-Subversion Committee, demanded ‘more drastic weapons’ – setting up ‘a sort of 
SOE’ for conducting more aggressive operations in Syria for the Pact to stabilise the 
situation. General Haj-Ali Kia, the Iranian representative (Head of Iranian Military 
Intelligence), sought to give more authority to the Liaison Committee, which he chaired, to 
conduct clandestine operations against Syria on behalf of the Counter-Subversion Committee. 
The Pakistani and Iraqi representatives respectively endorsed proposals for creating Pact 
intelligence service and also underlined ‘the need for action in Syria’.902 Nevertheless, the 
British representative vetoed the proposal on the ground that it would lead to ‘inefficiency 
and confusion’, and were supported by the Americans, who at the time sought to maintain 
their neutral stance towards the region.
903
 This sort of proposal was a recurrent theme in the 
discussions between the Pact members, and Britain constantly ‘blocked’ such proposals.904  
This formed the context of Operation Straggle: based on the assertion that Iraq was 
‘the central point of British support and area stability’, George K. Young, the Vice-Chief of 
MI6, explained to his American counterparts, the operation envisaged that Syria and King 
Saud, in that order, would be overthrown, and then Nasser would be eliminated.
905
 Evidence 
suggests that the blue print for overthrowing the Syrian government was laid out by the 
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British, perhaps George Young.
906
  The master plan was, nevertheless, entirely initiated and 
conducted by the regional players, and it was above all the Iraqis, Nuri al-Said and Abdul 
Ilah, the Crown Prince, who contemplated engineering a coup d’état in Syria – replacing the 
Communist Syrian government with the former Syrian leader, Colonel Adeeb al-Shishakli, 
and also invading Syria with Iraqi troops to force Syria into a ‘union with Iraq’.907 This was 
codenamed ‘Operation X’ by the Iraqis.908 The Turkish government endorsed the Iraqi plan 
and ‘was ready to help’.909 In this, the role of Britain, and also the United States, was then to 
provide financial and material support for the Iraqis, and to ‘restrain’ any Israeli actions 
against the Iraqi move.
910
 However, as the Iraqi Revolution occurred, there could be no coup 
d’état as Nuri al-Said and Abdul Ilah had envisaged. This episode indicates that the regional 
players were willing to initiate drastic actions when an opportunity came, rather than being 
pressured by their Western partners.  
There was also a conceptual difference between the Pact members concerning counter-
subversion. The term counter-subversion was understood by the British, as information 
experts, as largely a passive activity – exposing and refuting subversive propaganda 
campaigns by the enemy. However, for the regional members, it ought to be ‘more far-
reaching and “forward”’, including offensive counter-subversive measures.911 The difference 
came from their backgrounds and professions – from the viewpoint of security officers, 
counter-subversion often meant the elimination of existential threats, ‘the habit’ to deal with 
subversive elements ‘by locking them up’.912 There was also the nature of the threats in the 
region. The subversive threats were internal and external – indigenous Communist activists in 
their countries and those who instigated them from outside.  
The extent to which the regional security services successfully contained the spread of 
Communist movements in their countries is noteworthy. A document released under the 
FOIA – a threat assessment prepared in July 1958 on the indigenous Communist Parties in 
the Pact area and categorised as ‘Top Secret’ by MI5 – indicates the extent to which the 
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regional security services effectively contained Communist activities in their countries. 
Despite the anxieties of the regional members, MI5 assessed that the Communist threat had 
been ‘well contained’ by the security services of the regional members. The leadership of the 
party had been forced into exile ‘either in Europe or in such Middle Eastern countries’ which 
were not actively hostile to Communism.
913
 SAVAK continued to ‘harry and disrupt’ the 
Tudeh ‘rump’, which was ‘split with dissension’, and did not ‘appear to obtain any effective 
direction from its exiled leaders’. Likewise, the Iraqi Communist Party had been ‘subject to 
increasing pressure’ from the Iraqi CID, and appeared to ‘find difficulty in maintaining its 
organisation’. As to the Turks and Pakistanis, it was confidently reported by MI5 that ‘the 
problem does not exist in organised form in either Turkey or Pakistan’. Indeed, although 
these Communist threats were contained by the regional security services for the time being, 
MI5 also noted that it ‘must not be allowed to breed complacenc[y]’ as ‘the nationalist 
movements’ could be ‘expected to be targets for Soviet penetration’.914 Although the threat 
assessment report by MI5 was circulated to the Middle Eastern counterparts, the documentary 
evidence does not show whether the regional members felt less threatened by Communist 
activities thanks to on the basis of the MI5’s assessment.  
The strong presence of the security services on the Pact committees also reflected the 
dominance of the security services in the internal affairs of these member countries. As these 
services regarded counter-subversion as their own domain, it followed that counter-
subversion by propaganda must also be controlled by the same services. General Teymour 
Bakhtiar, Head of SAVAK (1957-61), for instance, noted that it was not an information 
expert, but only an intelligence or security expert, who ‘could understand the problems of 
subversion thoroughly’.915 He also attempted to create the Counter-Subversion Committee as 
a ‘psychological warfare headquarters’. 916  This sort of strong security-minded thinking 
troubled the British representative, who believed that propaganda operations should be left 
out of the hands of intelligence and security officers. Ironically, the name of the committee, 
Counter-Subversion, encouraged the regional security services to participate in propaganda, 
as Gordon Waterfield of the BBC, closely working with an IRD officer in Ankara, noted:  
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The use of the term counter-subversion in relation to radio encourages the Security Services, so 
active in Turkey, Persia and Iraq, to think that they should have control of the radio and the 
press...kept out representatives from the Turkish Directorate-General of Press and 
Publications...None of them have any understanding of what can or cannot be done with 
broadcasting...The increasing power of security officials in the organisation is an unfortunate 
trend since it encourages those forces of reaction which we, the British and the Americans, wish 
to discourage, and which has made it difficult to encourage popularity of the Baghdad Pact, 
both within the Pact countries and outside.
917
 
The domination of the security services in the internal affairs meant that, despite British 
efforts to the contrary, the information experts of these regional countries were excluded from 
anti-Communist propaganda measures.  
As a result of the domination of the security services in these Pact countries, 
information and broadcasting experts of the regional member states were ‘frightened off’ or 
appeared ‘not interested’ in getting involved in anti-Communist propaganda measures.918 The 
British representative made several attempts to make contact outside the security circle, for 
instance, the Head of the Turkish Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who 
was regarded as ‘well qualified on press relations and publicity matters, both in Turkey and 
abroad, particularly in the Arab States’. However, there was no success owing to the 
domination of the security officials in the internal affairs, who were also confident of their 
own abilities to handle all such matters.
919
 Philip Adams, the Regional Information Officer in 
Beirut, noted to John Rennie, Head of the IRD, that: 
The views of delegates expressed at this restricted meeting have of course been known to us in 
general terms all along. They stem from the fact that the Asian [the regional member] countries 
have very little in the way of organised information services and from their more physical view 
than ours of what is meant by counter-subversion. I am afraid that this difference of approach is 
bound to continue so long as the Asian [regional] member governments are represented on the 
Counter-Subversion Committee by the heads or members of their security services.
920
 
From the outset, the fear of the British representative was that the presence of the security 
services on the Counter-Subversion Committee would make it unlikely to produce effective 
plans for joint publicity in the sense that the British desired.
921
 Even as their propaganda 
skills and experience grew, there remained persistent frustration among the regional 
representatives who wished to develop the CSO into a ‘“psychological warfare” centre’ 
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operating against ‘subversion from the USSR, the UAR, Afghanistan and even India’.922 The 
representation of the security services at the Committee continued between 1956 and 1963. 
Limitations in Influencing Local Anti-Communist Propaganda 
Measures 
Britain found the Iranian government particularly vulnerable to subversive broadcasting 
by Radio Moscow, and Iran was believed to be the main target of Soviet propaganda in the 
late 1950s. In August 1957, Reginald Burrows, an IRD officer, observed that:    
...To date, the Iranian information services have been ineffectual both in countering Communist 
propaganda and in publicising Iranian achievements...the USSR is devoting more time to 
broadcasting, in various languages, to Iran than to any other country in the world.
923
 
As the Iranians were ill-equipped to counter these threats, they were undoubtedly willing to 
receive British support. Moreover, Iranian propaganda efforts largely depended on the British 
and the CSO from the outset.
924
 As noted in Chapter One, British policy towards the post-war 
Middle East was principally to secure access to oil, especially from the mid-1950s. The 
Baghdad Pact, including two major oil producing countries, Iraq and Iran, was seen as an 
instrument for achieving this objective. After the loss of their strategic ally in the Iraqi 
Revolution, Britain became more proactive in intervening in anti-Communist propaganda 
measures local authorities might take. The Iranian case illustrates not only the extent to which 
the regional members conducted their own domestic propaganda campaigns, but also the 
limitations of British engagement with the Iranians on counter-subversion by propaganda.  
The Iranians primarily focused on two types of propaganda campaigns, agreed at the 
CSO and directed by the Counter-Subversion Committee. The first type sought to discredit 
the reputations of the Soviet Union and the Tudeh Party, exposing life under the Communist 
regime and also envisaging what life in Iran would be like under Communist rule. The second 
type praised Iranian ‘social well-being’ and economic development with support from 
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CENTO.
925
 One of the methods of propagating these campaigns was broadcasting. The Shah 
of Iran recorded in his autobiography that there were numerous transmitters in operation 
throughout Iran mainly intended for internal radio broadcasting.
926
 Archival evidence shows 
that these broadcasting programmes were designed to discredit the reputation of the Soviet 
Union and the Tudeh Party amongst the population, and they included a factual account of 
‘Russian activities during the wartime occupation of Iran’.927 In addition to the broadcasting, 
publications, such as Boris Pasternak’s novel Dr. Zhivago, were supplied by the IRD and 
translated through the CSO into Persian for the purpose of dissemination throughout Iran.
928
 
As noted in Chapter Four, after its establishment in October 1956, SAVAK gradually 
expanded the focus of its security duty from military to civilian departments from 1957 
onwards.
929
 SAVAK assumed responsibility for conducting a range of political, economic 
and cultural anti-communist campaigns in Iran throughout the period between 1957 and 
1963. One theme, on which the Iranians placed much importance, was the use of Islam, 
religious faith  against Communism. An Iranian delegation, Professor Furuzanfar, who had 
taught at the Religious College of the University of Tehran and then worked for the Iranian 
government, reported on the progress of the on-going programme to the Counter-Subversion 
Committee in June 1956: 
After our adherence to the Baghdad Pact…We decided…to establish a school where Marxist 
ideologies would be fought by means of religious faith...while educating men of religion we are 
at the same time trying to train young men faithful to the nation...Actually 320 students are 
receiving training in these courses. It is hoped that their number will increase to 1,000 by the 
end of this year...in the near future we shall be able to have our religious representatives and 
orators in all parts of our country.
930
 
The main objective of the Iranian government for the use of Islam was indeed political. It was 
designed to train the ‘efficient religious orators’, through whom ‘political, economic and 
cultural programmes’ were relayed to the population ‘in compliance with the directives of the 
central government’. Professor Furuzanfar emphasised that this was the only way to ‘avoid 
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the infiltration of harmful elements into the people and obstruct their way in their subversive 
activities’.931 While the degree to which similar operations were conducted in their countries 
was different, the use of Islam and praise for the monarchy (as well as the government) 
became common practices as anti-Communist propaganda campaigns in the Pact countries. 
This theme was also propagated through Baghdad Radio as the Iraqis were ‘very keen to keep 
up this positive aspect of the work’.932  
Despite Iranian counter-subversive efforts, the threats of internal subversion – riots, 
disturbances and propaganda against the Iranian government and the Shah – were endemic. 
They were to a large degree instigated by both Radio Moscow and Radio Cairo. Denis J. 
Speares, an IRD officer, residing as First Secretary of the British Embassy in Tehran (1958-
60), after speaking with the Deputy Head of SAVAK, General Pakravan (1957-61), noted: 
A particular difficulty was that the Russians did not even have to attract people to their own 
cause in order to carry out their subversive aims; any unstable situation in the Middle East 
tended to react to their advantage, so that all they needed to do was to stir up trouble whenever 
an opportunity occurred (he [General Pakravan] particularly stressed the Kurdish problem as an 
example of a situation which could easily be exploited by the Russians).
933
 
The frustration of SAVAK officers, who saw internal subversion being directed by external 
threats such as the Soviet Union or Egypt, often turned against the British and Americans. 
Consequently, as noted earlier, the Iranians frequently demanded the Pact set up a committee 
of counter-intelligence experts to act firmly against these external threats.
934
 
 In addition, from the Iranians’ point of view, the British-led focus on anti-Communist 
measures was too narrow. Their frustrations were exacerbated by subversion from the UAR. 
This concern was frequently raised by General Pakravan to the British.
935
 A senior IRD 
officer, Norman Reddaway, observed about the Iranian attitudes towards the counter-
subversion efforts of the Pact that: 
The Iranians…feel that the CSO, while useful as a source of training, information and useful 
minor operations, hardly touches on their major problems. The Iranians worry about the many 
challenges to the Regime. Disaffected students, non-co-operative peasants, unenthusiastic 
officials, critics of the Shah – these are the main preoccupations of the Iranians. They struggle 
on, recognising that the CSO can be marginally helpful by providing information about foreign 
subverters of students, hostile radios and front organisations and by getting for them the odd 
piece of favourable publicity, but they feel that the CSO’s help is marginal and that the solution 
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to their problems lies elsewhere – they have no idea where. The Iranians are saddened but 
hardly surprised when the Americans and ourselves are coy about requests to analyse and do 
something about Nasser’s anti-Shah propaganda.
936
 
Aside from external threats, dealing with the member states on domestic counter-subversion 
was a delicate issue as they exclusively regarded it as their domain. Like other member states, 
while Iran was willing to learn the methods and techniques from the British, it was averse to 
being instructed by outsiders on how it should approach its own problems. Peter Joy, an IRD 
officer in Ankara liaising with the regional counterparts, observed in 1960 that, on the issue 
of domestic anti-Communist counter-subversion, the regional member states saw only ‘purely 
local and internal problems’ and ‘they would each prefer to deal with in their own way with 
the minimum of outside “interference”’.937  
As the same issue has been earlier, one of the difficulties in dealing with the 
domination of the security services in the internal affairs from a British point of view was that 
although the Iranian government had the Department of Publications and Radio, SAVAK had 
substantial practical control of the national press and broadcasting as anti-Communist 
propaganda measures were considered a matter of national security.
938
 As a result, SAVAK 
totally precluded any consultation with the Department of Publications and Radio on this 
matter. Concerning SAVAK’s propaganda efforts, Denis J. Speares observed in 1960 that:  
Our opinion is that there is at present no shortage of either material or funds available to the 
Iranians. The real difficulty is the relative inexperience of SAVAK in [the] information field (a 
view which has been unofficially endorsed by officials in the Department of Publications and 
Radio) and the lack of conviction in at least parts of SAVAK of the value of real propaganda 
and information work, as opposed to the simple dragooning of the national press into echoing 
current governmental thinking.
939
 
As raised in the aforementioned threat assessment by MI5, SAVAK had been successfully 
containing the domestic Communist front, the Tudeh Party, since its establishment in 
1956/57, but domestic unrest and disturbances were still common in the country. These 
subversive activities were not necessarily Communist-oriented, but they were against the 
Shah himself and their slogan was the same as that of the Tudeh Party.  
The IRD had recognised issues with Iranian’s anti-Communist measures by mid-
1959. Peter Joy of the IRD visited Tehran in August 1959 and observed two main problems 
associated with the way in which SAVAK conducted anti-Communist measures. The first 
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was that the Iranians’ use of anti-Communist material, which was combined with 
‘exaggerated eulogies of the Shah and the regime’, was causing the Iranian general public to 
identify ‘anti-Communist comment solely with the regime and thus to discount it in 
advance’.940 As a result, the value of anti-Communist measures, which were intended to 
influence and foster the antipathy of the general public towards Communism, became 
meaningless. The second was the compartmentalisation of SAVAK into external and internal 
functions.
941
 While external liaison with foreign intelligence, especially with the Pact 
members and the CSO, was done by the external department, anti-Communist measures 
including information control and propaganda were conducted by the internal department.
942
 
A turf war between these departments made the matter even worse.
943
 As a result, counter-
subversion was above all chiefly managed by the internal department, which countered 
subversive elements against the Shah and was applied to any opposition movements against 
him.   
SAVAK was ‘a bottle-neck’ of distributing and using anti-Communist materials, so 
the IRD decided to bypass SAVAK and to distribute its own material to the Department of 
Publications and Radio through its own IRD officer in Tehran, Donald J. Makinson (1960-
63).
944
 Until August 1960, ‘two thirds’ of IRD materials were supplied to the Department of 
Publications and Radio without informing SAVAK.
945
 However, once this ‘breach’ of 
bypassing SAVAK was discovered, it caused strains in relationships of the British and the 
Iranians on the one hand, and SAVAK and the Department of Publications and Radio on the 
other.
946
 After the ‘breach’, Donald J. Makinson had to devote most of his time in Tehran to 
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repairing whose relationship with SAVAK and to mediate with the Department of 
Publications and Radio.
947
  
Britain was also severely limited in the extent to which it could help the Iranians in 
anti-Communist measures. Iran had been a chief target of subversive propaganda since the 
mid-1950s, firstly by Radio Moscow and joined later by Radio Cairo, and Britain recognised 
the vulnerability of the Iranian government to this subversive broadcasting. Britain operated 
jamming technology as a counter-measure against similar broadcasts in the Colonies, but it is 
unknown whether Britain provided the Iranians with similar technical support.
948
  Archival 
evidence suggests that, while the topic of jamming had been raised in Iran, the IRD made its 
position clear to Donald J. Makinson in 1962 that he should avoid any discussion of jamming 
with the Iranians.
949
 The reasons for the IRD’s anti-jamming stance were that firstly jamming 
could never technically be ‘100% effective’; and secondly, the costs incurred by jamming 
were ‘enormously expensive’.950  Most of all, the IRD’s policy held that the practice of 
jamming was also ‘an admission of weakness’ and implied that the hostile radio being 
jammed was ‘successful in its subversive aims’. Above all, it recorded that ‘it goes against 
the principle of freedom of information, for which we stand’.951 
Conclusion  
This chapter has focused primarily on anti-Communist propaganda campaigns under 
the Pact and highlighted the nature of the cooperation and the differences between the Pact 
members. Looking at the nature of the threats in the Middle East, where political intrigues, 
propaganda, and transnational underground activities destabilised local governments, there is 
a parallel with the contemporary situation in the region. Conflict in the region is and has been 
multifaceted – not only traditional combat between states in dispute, but also internal, inter-
state and regional tensions. A notable example is Lebanon, where a number of external 
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players, Israel, Syria, and Iran, have actively been involved in vying for control of domestic 
politics.
952
 ‘The conspiracy mentality’ of Middle Eastern leaders, as Daniel Pipes termed it, 
grew out of their experiences of dealing with these threats, and in turn fostered their views on 
the development of regional affairs.
953
 Panagiotis Dimitrakis, who neglects to examine these 
aspects, arguing that CENTO was a ‘failed alliance’ on the ground of being no Soviet 
military invasion of the region, misses the significance of these regional affairs. This chapter 
has demonstrated that it was internal subversion with which the Pact members, including 
Britain and the United States, were most concerned in the region. This was the context in 
which the Iraqi, Iranian, Turkish and Pakistani governments saw the Baghdad Pact (CENTO) 
as a solution to their problems.   
This chapter has demonstrated that the cooperation in anti-Communist propaganda 
under the Pact was often perverse – the schism in propaganda approaches can be seen as a 
microcosm of the problems affecting the regional cooperation as a whole. The difficulty for 
the British cooperating with the regional members was the dominance of the security services 
in their home countries, and that the regional security services frequently held different views 
on security and intelligence that contrasted sharply with the policing and information-
oriented approach of the British. This rift was most noticeable and most destructive in the 
Counter-Subversion Committee. All members considered Communist movements as the main 
threat and they took this threat very seriously. However, Britain (and the United States) seem 
to have been most cautious in propaganda operations than their CENTO partners, owing to 
the different national interests of the Pact members. In addition, inter-allied tensions in the 
field of propaganda restricted propaganda cooperation, just as they restricted intelligence 
sharing. The western powers sometimes had narrower targets than the regional members 
would have liked. As a result, Britain’s efforts to maximise the effectiveness of the anti-
Communist propaganda measures of the Pact members suffered since ultimate control was 
left in the hands of the local governments with their own propaganda and security objectives. 
In this regard, Britain’s anti-Communist propaganda must inevitably be seen as failure. 
Moreover, Britain’s unsuccessful intervention in the Iranian case only reinforces this 
conclusion. The limitations of Britain’s influence will be further discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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I tried to give them a rough idea of what the Security Service was like and what it should do. I 
began by telling them that it should be wholly non-political and merely concerned with the 
security of the State, regardless of the Government in power; otherwise it could have no 
stability and no continuity. This did not, of course, mean that it was not entitled to investigate 
the activities of political parties which advocated the overthrow of the State by unconstitutional 
means. I realised from the expressions on their faces how unpractical they felt my suggestion 
was! 
- Captain Guy Liddell
954
 
…scientific interrogation in the world’s intelligence and security organizations has a limit, and 
wherever, because of a sensitive political situation, this method becomes somewhat ineffective, 
torture is resorted to in order to get speedy results or to create terror and fear. In normal 
circumstances, the aim of the interrogation is to extract information and so naturally the more 
scientific and thorough the methods the better! But in sensitive political situations where 
security is seen to be threatened, the interrogators’ aim is not only at getting information, they 
also aim at breaking the suspect and creating panic in society. 
- General Hussein Fardust
955
 
Introduction  
British Intelligence has been in the spotlight over the last few years in the context of 
the ‘War on Terror’ and its alleged complicity in human rights abuse.956 Recent studies on 
British counter-insurgency have also suggested that British measures against colonial 
problems were more violent than previously understood.
957
 The recent discovery of 
‘sensitive’ Colonial Office documents, the so-called Hanslope archives, highlight a 
particularly dark side of British decolonisation.
958
 In the case of Kenya, for instance, where 
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the Colonial Office confronted the Mau Mau insurgency, the chief security forces at the front 
line of the counter-insurgency campaigns were the Special Branch and the British Army, both 
of which were implicated in the conduct of torture and human rights abuses against the 
Kenyans.
959
 Concerning the role of British Intelligence, Calder Walton has claimed that an 
MI5 representative in Kenya was not directly involved in such misconduct, but played a 
‘guiding role over Special Branch interrogation practices at the time’.960 As identified in the 
previous chapters, Britain was also involved in anti-Communist training of its Middle Eastern 
counterparts. An intriguing question is to what extent Britain was complicit in anti-
Communist measures conducted by Middle Eastern governments, which often lacked 
democratic principles in the western sense and often engaged in human rights abuses 
especially when dealing with subversive activities.  
This chapter will discuss how far Britain was involved in the conduct of anti-
Communist measures by Middle Eastern governments. Since the details of training courses 
chiefly associated with MI5 were little known, it will firstly explore what was meant by 
“training” and what areas these courses covered, and it will also discuss the different 
approaches towards the training of colonial and Middle Eastern security services. It will then 
examine the usefulness and limitations of intelligence liaison between British Intelligence 
and its Middle Eastern counterparts, and intelligence activities for influencing the policy of 
Middle Eastern governments. It will finally look at Britain’s attitudes towards the security 
measures conducted by Middle Eastern governments, often in violation of human rights.  
Setting of Anti-Communist Training 
It is known that in order to maintain the internal security of the British Empire, MI5 
regularly organised a series of training courses for colonial security officers either in Britain 
or in the Colonies in the post-war period.
961
 These training courses were designed for senior 
police officers, such as the heads of Special Branch or equivalent ranks, of all colonial, and 
protectorate, territories. As recommended by the Templer report in April 1955, training for 
colonial security forces expanded and the number of these training courses grew, seeing MI5 
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helping ‘to train an average of 250 colonial police and security officials per year’.962 From 
June 1956, these training courses were conducted at either the headquarters of MI5 at 
Leconfield House in London or a Regional Training College located in the Colonies. A series 
of lectures were given by senior British officials, including the Director-General of MI5 
himself, Sir Roger Hollis, and colonial security officers attending the training courses were 
also greeted by a speech from the Colonial Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd.
963
 Such training 
was indeed not only provided to colonial security forces, but also to MI5’s Middle Eastern 
counterparts. The British police and security advisers were introduced to Middle Eastern 
governments and Middle Eastern police officers received training in Britain as part of 
Britain’s anti-Communist policy.964 
There were caveats, however. Firstly, it is wrong to assume that these training courses 
were merely a sort of training for police officers in maintaining law and order.
965
 These 
training courses were mainly designed specifically to be part of anti-Communist measures, 
and MI5 was the chief organiser of these security training courses from the outset.
966
 Thus, 
the aforementioned training courses for colonial police officers in anti-Communist measures, 
as identified by Calder Walton, were based on the foundation laid by the AC (O) Committee 
in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
967
 Secondly, there were indeed different functions and 
responsibilities for internal security between Britain, the Colonies and Middle Eastern states. 
MI5 had been principally responsible for the internal security of Britain since 1931, whereas 
the Special Branches, as part of the colonial police forces, were empowered to function in the 
Colonies as counterparts to MI5.
968
 In the Middle East, either the police or the army, or both, 
were responsible for internal security in their countries.
969
 Despite these differences in 
functions and responsibilities, the training courses provided by the British were particularly 
concerned with counter-intelligence and counter-subversion. The purpose of providing such 
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training either in Britain or local countries was, in Templer’s words, for the ‘stepping-up of 
intelligence activity’ against the spread of Communist movements overseas.970 
MI5’s training course, also known as anti-Communist training, appears mainly to 
have consisted of two different curricula – one was a series of lectures conducted by senior 
MI5 officers, and the other was a number of Special Branch training sessions run by Scotland 
Yard. These curricula developed as ad hoc arrangements in 1950 and became gradually 
institutionalised in the early 1950s. The first group to attend such training was in fact an 
Iranian delegation – this opportunity arising from the meeting on anti-Communist measures 
between Haldane-Porter of MI5 in Tehran and General Razmara.
971
 Importantly, providing 
anti-Communist training to Middle Eastern countries was also given priority by the AC (O) 
Committee, where the maintenance of internal security in the region was considered most 
important to Britain’s defence policy, even over other regions such as Europe.972 At the 
agreement reached between General Razmara and Handane-Porter of MI5, four Iranian 
officers (two from the Iranian Police and two from the Iranian G-2), all of whom had also 
been vetted by MI5 prior to their visit, came over to Britain to study ‘methods of dealing with 
subversive activity’ in October 1950.973  The AC (O) Committee welcomed the Iranians’ 
interest in anti-Communist measures and, as the Iranians specifically requested anti-
Communist training, the AC (O) Committee also requested MI5 to meet the Iranians’ 
requests.
974
After a careful consideration of these requests by Guy Liddell, the Deputy-
Director General of MI5, in consultation with Jack Easton, the Vice-Chief of MI6, the course 
was arranged accordingly – the reason for this careful consideration will be discussed 
below.
975
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In the anti-Communist training course, three lectures were given to the Iranians by 
senior MI5 officers.
976
 In addition, in order to meet the Iranians’ specific requests, a four-
week-long practical training session was arranged to be run by Scotland Yard at the 
Metropolitan Police Training School, Hendon. The Iranians stayed in Britain nearly a year as 
further ad hoc training followed at a War Office Field Security course and one of the higher 
police training courses at Hendon.
977
 The available evidence suggests that senior Middle 
Eastern security chiefs, such as Emir Farid Chehab and Bahjat Attiyah, also attended such 
anti-Communist training courses in Britain.
978
 Similar arrangements were also made for the 
Lebanese, who were selected in July 1950 by J.M. Kyles, the British Security Adviser in 
Lebanon, and for the Jordanian security officers, who were sent at the request of Glubb Pasha 
in 1951.
979
 These training courses were also made available to the Iraqis sent by Duncan 
MacIntosh, the British Police Adviser to the Minister of the Interior, in the mid-1950s.
980
 
Following these ad hoc arrangements, anti-Communist training courses were also 
extended to colonial police officers and became institutionalised in the mid-1950s. Learning 
from the lessons of the Malayan Emergency, the AC (O) Committee noted the importance of 
training colonial police forces in dealing with Communists in the colonial territories in July 
1950.
981
 Chaired by Sir Charles Jeffries, Deputy Under-Secretary of the Colonial Office, a 
conference was held in April 1951 at the Police College, Ryton-on-Dunsmore, where the 
Commissioners of Police from sixteen Colonies gathered together to review the state of 
colonial police forces throughout the British Empire.
982
 At the conference, the importance of 
proper training was addressed, and the Commissioners of Colonial Police were encouraged to 
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send their colonial police officers to training courses at the Police College, Ryton-on-
Dunsmore, and the Metropolitan Police Training School, Hendon.
983
  
In the mid-1950s, after the recommendation made by General Templer, several 
Regional Training Colleges, also known as Special Branch Training Units, were established 
in different regions of the Colonies for the purpose of anti-Communist training.
984
 A report 
submitted to the JIC in November 1957 shows that by that time a majority of anti-Communist 
training courses were conducted at these Regional Training Colleges.
985
 It is noteworthy that, 
as mentioned in Chapter Two, there was also a regional training course in Libya especially 
designed for Middle Eastern security forces from the mid-1950s. The training course was run 
in Arabic by a British officer, Arthur Giles, former Commissioner of Police in Cyrenaica 
(1949) and in Tripolitania (1952), who had served in the Egyptian Police (1919-38) and 
Colonial Police (1938-49).
986
 A mixture of Middle Eastern security officers from different 
countries attended the training course. As all instructions were in Arabic, there was ‘no 
language problem’, noted Colonel Sir Patrick Coghill, the head of the CID in Jordan.987 In 
addition, until 1958, training facilities were provided in Iraq for Middle Eastern security 
officers, and also Iraqi police officers acted as Commandant of the Police Training School in 
Mukalla, Aden.
988
 
The significance of these training courses was that they were distinctively anti-
Communist in character. The series of lectures given by MI5 officers included, for instance, 
one given by Dick White at the Police College in 1951 on ‘the methods of Soviet subversion 
throughout the world’, and ‘the objects and capabilities’ of the Communist Party of Great 
Britain (CPGB).
989
 In addition, one of the lectures given by Haldane Porter in 1955 to 
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colonial police officers was entitled ‘Why Communists are subversive’.990 In addition, the 
training sessions associated with Special Branch activities were also purposefully arranged. 
The Home Office, a non-AC (O) Committee member, once commented on a blueprint of a 
Special Branch training course designed for the Syrian security officers that ‘they [Special 
Branch] indulged in anti-Communist activity’.991  
Differences in Training of Colonial and Middle Eastern Security 
Services 
A distinct characteristic of Middle Eastern states was that they were politically non-
democratic in the western sense, with domestic politics dominated by a strong security force, 
which has often been labelled as a secret political police.
992
 Owing to the diversity of the 
region, where each state had a different set of security standards and practices, not all Middle 
East security services can necessarily be called a secret police.
993
 Nevertheless, Middle 
Eastern security services in most cases deserve such a reputation. In Britain the general 
principles of MI5 were defined by the Maxwell-Fyfe Directive in 1952, which served as 
MI5’s charter until 1989 when it was superseded by the Security Service Act. Under the 
Directive, MI5 was essentially to act in the interest of ‘the Defence of the Realm as a 
whole’.994 It was ‘essential’ that MI5 ‘should be kept absolutely free from any political bias 
or influence’ and ‘no enquiry is to be carried out on behalf of any Government 
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Department’.995 In this, the constitutional principle was that the operations of MI5 were 
entirely the responsibility of the Director-General of MI5, who was responsible to the Home 
Secretary, but MI5 was not, however, a part of the Home Office. In addition, the government 
could not direct whom MI5 would investigate. A former Director-General of MI5, Eliza 
Manningham-Buller, noted that this was ‘an important safeguard against the politicisation of 
the Service’s work’.996  
The use and abuse of the police force as an instrument of political parties in power was 
also a discussion topic at a training course of the Police College for senior colonial police 
officers in the context of the British decolonisation, in which Colonies became independent 
and the police forces fell under the control of a new local (indigenous) government.
997
 
Indeed, the anti-Communist training course was used to assert the principle of being 
apolitical to foreign police officers. However, how seriously this principle was taught is 
questionable. Guy Liddell reflected in his diaries on his lecture to the Iranian officers that: 
I tried to give them a rough idea of what the Security Service was like and what it should do. I 
began by telling them that it should be wholly non-political and merely concerned with the 
security of the State, regardless of the Government in power; otherwise it could have no 
stability and no continuity. This did not, of course, mean that it was not entitled to investigate 
the activities of political parties which advocated the overthrow of the State by unconstitutional 
means. I realised from the expressions on their faces how unpractical they felt my suggestion 
was!
998
 
A crucial difference between the Colonies and foreign countries was, however, that while a 
new colonial constitution could be introduced to safeguard the position of the police forces 
before its independence, this was not possible in foreign countries, in which the introduction 
and the implementation of such a constitution was entirely in the hands of foreign 
governments. Being asked to organise anti-Communist training courses at the Police College 
for foreign police officers, Sir Frank Newsam, Permanent Under-Secretary of the Home 
Office, wrote to Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the Chairman of the AC (O) Committee, that ‘I cannot 
help doubting whether a foreign police officer, however well indoctrinated in British police 
methods he might become after a course at the College, will be able to apply them in the very 
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different circumstances of his own country’.999 Sir Frank Newsam was not a member of the 
AC (O) Committee, and his voice was ignored.  
It is noteworthy that despite being the central figure in organising such anti-Communist 
training courses, MI5 was also critical of the idea of providing training in anti-Communist 
measures especially for Middle Eastern security officers. Guy Liddell wrote in his diaries in 
February 1951 after his meeting at MI5 Head Office about the line MI5 should take with the 
AC (O) Committee concerning the training of foreign police officers that:  
We wished to point out, first of all, that we were bound to look at the problem to some extent 
from the point of view of defence priorities. This caused us to feel that in the matter of building 
up foreign security organisations we should do more profitable work with the Western 
European countries, who thought, at least to some extent, on the same lines as ourselves.
 1000
  
Guy Liddell also wrote on the same day in his diaries about his conversation with Brigadier 
Johnstone, Deputy Director of Military Intelligence, over lunch after the JIC meeting that: 
I told him [Johnstone] that I was rather worried by the attitude of the Chiefs of Staff, the Cold 
War Committee [the AC (O) Committee], and, to some extent, the Ds of I [Directors of 
Intelligence], on the question of Communism...The views held by the Chiefs of Staff were not 
our views and the views of other departments on the working level. It seemed to me, therefore, 
somewhat dangerous that they should be so misguided at the top.
1001
 
Nevertheless, amongst all foreign police forces, the AC (O) Committee prioritised the 
training of Middle Eastern security officers as the defence of the Middle East was given 
paramount importance by the British Government in the early 1950s. MI5’s views were also 
ignored by the AC (O) Committee.  
In addition to disciplinary differences, there was a problem in communication. When 
Guy Liddell gave the lecture to the Iranian officers in November 1950, he had to speak ‘very 
slowly’ and repeat it ‘at least three times’ as ‘none of them understood much English’.1002 As 
discussed in Chapter Two, this was the main reason why Guy Liddell suggested at the AC 
(O) Committee the dispatch of British police officers who would speak in the local language 
to conduct such training to local Middle Eastern security services. Otherwise, Britain might 
have ‘little chance of improving national security services’ in the Middle East.1003 
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More importantly, there was also a fundamental issue of providing training to foreign 
police forces, which was a major cause of concern for British Intelligence as a whole and 
inevitably limited what MI5 could offer to foreign police officers. A major difference 
between colonial and foreign police forces was that, above all, colonial police forces worked 
towards the internal security of the British Empire. However, as far as training of foreign 
police forces was concerned, as Guy Liddell noted in his diaries that: 
[I]n so far as attempting to teach [REDACTED] in London how to set up an efficient Security 
Service in their own country was concerned, it was to a large extent a waste of time; in fact MI5 
did not stand to benefit at all directly; the only percentage lay with SIS who might acquire a 
certain amount of goodwill which would enable them to operate from bases in 
[REDACTED]…The only people we could teach profitably here were those from Western 
European countries whose conditions were in some measure comparable to our own; we regard 
them as a first priority.
1004
 
In addition, while providing training to foreign police forces was considered one of the pillars 
of Britain’s anti-Communist policy at the AC (O) Committee, this was a double-edged sword 
in practice. Providing training for foreign police forces also meant that Britain would enhance 
the counter-intelligence capabilities of foreign countries, which could potentially act against 
them. Guy Liddell noted that:   
I made it clear at the [AC (O) Committee] meeting that the training by MI5 in a general way 
could not last more than about four days, and in some cases not more than two days. It was 
necessary to take a realistic view of what the word “training” meant. You could explain the 
general principles on which a security organisation worked, and in some branches you could 
give a certain amount of detail, but in other cases it was not possible to do so without running 
the risk of our own methods being used against us.
1005
 
This was indeed the deciding point on what kinds of training could be provided for foreign 
police forces – if a friendly country turned against Britain, the training would above all affect 
MI6’s operations on foreign soil.1006 This was mainly the reason for Guy Liddell’s reluctance 
to develop the anti-Communist capabilities of Middle Eastern security forces.  
There may have been some exceptions to these limits on training, but they were 
individual cases. One of them was a senior Iranian army officer, General Hussein Fardust, a 
life-long friend of the Shah of Iran, who oversaw the development and the activities of the 
Iranian Intelligence Community from the late 1950s until 1979.
1007
 At the order of the Shah 
himself, General Fardust claims to have visited Britain three times during the period between 
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the late 1950s and early 1960s to receive training for establishing an intelligence organisation 
to coordinate and supervise the activities of all intelligence and security services, including 
SAVAK.
1008
 He was alone in the first and second visits and was escorted throughout his stay 
in Britain by MI6.
1009
 In the four-month training programme of his first visit in 1959, he 
wrote that he mainly learned the system and the functions of the JIC.
1010
 In the four-month 
training programme of his second visit in 1961, he received more practical training such as 
MI6 recruitment methods, counter-intelligence, and ‘psychological war’ aiming at 
‘weakening the enemy’ and also ‘influencing public opinion’ through propaganda. 1011 
Regardless of the credibility of his claims above, an important point here is that General 
Fardust felt that he had only been given what he needed to know, and noted that ‘the British 
were always playing safe in their statements and did not talk in detail’.1012 More importantly, 
as will be discussed further below, in addition to enhancing the Iranian Intelligence 
Community, the training provided to him was also aimed at influencing the domestic policies 
of the Shah. 
One of the main claims made by Calder Walton has been that Britain’s post-war 
imperial interests throughout the British Empire were largely maintained on the basis of the 
contributions of its intelligence and security services. Importantly, particular credit has been 
given to the successful ‘formula’ adopted by MI5 for dealing with colonial problems: 
exporting its own model of separating intelligence from law enforcement work in local 
security forces.
1013
 According to Walton, MI5 also educated colonial security officers through 
the training courses that there was a ‘fundamental difference between policing and 
intelligence work’, and that ‘the two required completely different outlooks for officers’. 
Walton asserts that this was a ‘central tenet’ of the training courses. 1014  Following the 
introduction of Templer’s recommendations for enhancing colonial security, three MI5 
officers, seconded to the Colonial Office under the title of the Security Intelligence Adviser 
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(SIA), visited the Colonies.
1015
 According to a Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) report in 
1957, in the period between 1954 and 1957, the SIAs paid 57 visits to 27 colonial territories, 
where 21 Colonial Special Branches were formed with guidance from the SIAs to Colonial 
Governors.
1016
 
As shown in Chapter Two, this ‘formula’ was indeed introduced to the ‘informal’ 
British Empire of the Middle East by British security/police advisers in Lebanon, Iran and 
Jordan. In the words of Thomas Plate and Andrea Darvi, the intelligence function is ‘the 
brain’, and law enforcement is ‘the body’.1017 In the case of the Middle East, however, given 
the strong presence of the security forces, and the use and abuse of them, which will be 
discussed later, the success of separating ‘the brain’ from ‘the body’ is questionable. In 
addition, although Britain’s influence in particular intelligence and security aspects has been 
identified, it is difficult to claim Britain made a positive contribution toward the development 
of local security forces in the field of anti-Communist measures.  
The Usefulness of Intelligence Liaison and British Influence 
An intelligence liaison with local authorities was essential if British foreign policy 
sought to maintain its good relationship with them. In addition, an intelligence liaison was 
also the means of obtaining invaluable information from local authorities. Sir Patrick Dean, 
then Chairman of both the AC (O) Committee and the JIC, once noted to the Foreign 
Secretary Harold Macmillan, when explaining the functions and responsibilities of both MI6 
and MI5 overseas, that an intelligence liaison with local authorities was ‘one of the functions 
of the Security Service to obtain secret intelligence by its own means’.1018  
This was particularly true in the case of the Middle East, where clandestine 
Communist movements were exclusively dealt with by the local security services. Until the 
mid-1950s, before which security intelligence was in the domain of SIME, MI5 
representatives maintained a close liaison with their counterparts in each country. SIME 
regularly sent their analyses on Communist activities to British Embassies in the region, and 
also contributed to the Joint Intelligence Committee in the Middle East (JIC/ME) assessment 
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on Communist activities.
1019
 Good relations were particularly important as the sources of 
these assessments were mostly local security force insiders.
1020
 As noted in Chapter Three, 
when anti-British riots broke out in Egypt in early 1952, over the issue of the British military 
presence in the Suez Canal zone, British officials at the British Embassy in Cairo assumed 
that either the Soviet Union or International Communists must have been behind the anti-
British riots. However, this view of the British Embassy staff was soon refuted by an SIME 
analysis. This analysis was a direct result of their close contact with their Egyptian 
counterpart, and was sourced to ‘a senior official in the Special Section of the Ministry of the 
Interior’.1021  
There was, however, a downside to the over-reliance on intelligence liaisons with 
local authorities. Evidence seems to suggest that while Britain maintained a good liaison with 
local authorities, there was no advance warning about the series of the regional crises 
erupting at the time, such as the Egyptian coup in 1952 and the Iraqi coup in 1958.
1022
 As a 
result of these crises, Britain lost its anti-Communist allies and also its influence in the region 
ultimately diminished, inevitably changing the direction of British policy towards the 
region.
1023
 Concerned that no warning was provided by MI6 about the Iraqi Revolution in 
1958, Jonathan Bloch and Patrick Fitzgerald claimed in their book that ‘MI6 had committed a 
classic intelligence error by recruiting agents among its allies rather than anti-British 
elements. General Daghestani [Dashistani], for example, was arrested not because he was an 
MI6 agent – which he was – but because he was a leading figure in the government’.1024  
They make a fair point – there was indeed a tendency for British Intelligence to focus on 
intelligence liaisons with local authorities as a source of intelligence in the region during the 
period. More precisely, while MI6 was closely working with General Daghestani on special 
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political action, the aforementioned ‘Operation X’, to overthrow the Syrian regime; MI5’s 
liaison with the Iraqi CID inhabited MI6’s traditional espionage role. Nevertheless, this point 
has to be taken further. The lack of advance warning should not solely be blamed on British 
Intelligence, but ultimately the blame should be laid on the policy of the British Government 
which directed all intelligence activities at the time. Above all, since British foreign policy 
sought to sustain its relationships with local authorities, the intelligence requirement was to 
maintain a liaison relationship with them. 
It is important to note that intelligence liaisons were made on the basis of mutual trust. 
Even in the institutionalised form of an intelligence liaison, such as the so-called ‘Five Eyes’, 
the intelligence cooperation of the Anglosphere nations (Britain, the United States, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand) based on the UKUSA Agreement in 1946, trust-building was 
crucial to cooperation between the parties. In order to establish such a relationship, the liaison 
had to be mutually advantageous and also there would be no espionage activities without the 
knowledge of the host country.
1025
 In other words, cooperating nations were not to spy on the 
host country. If such activities were exposed, trust in the intelligence liaison would be 
undermined.
1026
 In addition, according to Anthony Cavendish, for the purposes of 
maintaining a good liaison relationship, Sir Maurice Oldfield, as ‘C’, ‘promised the Shah of 
Iran that while he was Chief, SIS [MI6] would not conduct any internal espionage against 
Iran’.1027  
Moreover, this was the main reason for the closure of SIME’s Counter-Intelligence 
Branch, JID – Sir Dick White became concerned about MI6’s clandestine political activities, 
which would potentially undermine the credibility of local representatives of MI5 in the host 
countries.
1028
 The authorised history of MI5 also shows MI5’s general attitudes towards the 
so-called special political action (SPA), stating that its use in a host country would undermine 
the trust that had been built upon the good liaison between MI5 and local security 
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services.
1029
 Therefore, Britain was in fact facing an inherent problem of maintaining good 
liaisons with its Middle Eastern counterparts: its intelligence necessarily came from the very 
same local authorities, and not from other local sources. This was the reason that no advance 
warning was provided by local authorities, which were also caught by surprise.   
A retired British diplomat has observed that intelligence services have activities which 
constitute two different but interwoven roles. The first is to collect intelligence from their 
agents, and the second is to exercise influence through their agents.
1030
 Similarly, a former 
intelligence officer has also commented on the role of MI6 in influencing a foreign 
government that MI6, which sometimes had better access to a higher level of a foreign 
government than a British Ambassador, exercised its influence on a foreign government 
through its own agents under the direction of the Foreign Office.
1031
 This indicates in theory 
that a highly-placed agent in a foreign government is able to exercise influence on the 
policymaking of the foreign government on behalf of Britain itself. In the context of the 
Middle East, Anthony Cavandish has also claimed that MI6 officers had more influence on 
the Shah of Iran than anyone else, including British Ambassadors and the Americans.   
The Shah asked that [Edward] de Haan [of MI6 (1954-57)] and subsequent Station Chiefs, such 
as Alexis Forter [of MI6 (1958-61)], report to him regularly, and the more competent of the 
MI6 representatives in Tehran soon had more influence with the Shah than the British 
Ambassadors, which proved an irritant to most Ambassadors [who lost their direct contact with 
the Shah]...The Shah was surrounded by sycophants and there were really only two people who 
could speak freely to him. One was the longstanding British SIS officer in Tehran and the other 
was Assadollah Alam, a former Prime Minister.
1032
 
Other sources also support the claim that the Shah had a good personal relationship with MI6 
officers.
1033
 Richard Deacon has also made a similar claim that after the coup in 1953 Britain 
still had closer relations with the Shah ‘on an intelligence level’ than the American 
counterparts, and that Maurice Oldfield, then Head of Station in Washington (1960-64), even 
‘helped’ the Shah to ‘accept American aid’ when the Shah visited the United States on the 
subject of military assistance in March 1962.
1034
 
MI6 also had its own agent right next to the Shah himself, Sir Shapoor Reporter, a 
personal friend of the Shah, who was recruited by Monty Woodhouse when Woodhouse was 
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the MI6 Head of Station in Tehran in the early 1950s, before the 1953 coup.
1035
 According to 
General Hussein Fardust, Reporter was ‘Britain’s top spy’, who was ‘clearly superior to the 
Chief of the MI6 station in Iran’ in being able to exercise British influence in the decision-
making process of the Shah and other high-ranking Iranian officials.
1036
 Archival evidence 
also confirms the scope of his influence on behalf of Britain as an MI6 agent – the Ministry 
of Defence noted him as a “close and trusted confidant of the Shah”.1037 Evidence suggests 
that Reporter’s role seems to have been confined to sealing arms deals between Britain and 
Iran, rather than counter-subversive matters, and that, rather than being interested in 
preserving British interests in Iran, his motivation was mercenary. The Shah himself lost his 
confidence in Reporter in the late 1970s after he found out that Reporter merely acted on a 
profit basis rather than as his close friend.
1038
  
Britain indeed had far more numerous influential pro-British figures in the Iraqi 
government throughout the period until 1958. Above all, the head of state, King Faisal II of 
Iraq, and the Crown Prince, King Faisal’s uncle, Abd al-Ilah, who exercised substantial 
control over the administration of the Hashemite Kingdom of Iran, were pro-British.
1039
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addition, the post-war Iraqi government was mostly dominated by Nuri al-Said, who also 
appointed his close colleagues in his cabinet, such as Said Qazzaz, the Minister of Interior. 
British Intelligence also maintained close connections with its Iraqi counterparts, such as 
Bahjat Attiyah, the Director of the CID, later the Director-General of Security, and General 
Ghazi Daghistani, Deputy Chief of Staff, who was the chief operator in a plot to overthrow 
the Syrian government in the 1950s, ‘Operation X’, also known as Operation Straggle in the 
West.
1040
 After the 1958 Revolution, a total of 108 senior civilian and military officers, 
including Qazzaz, Attiyah, Daghistani, Fadhel Jamali, a former Prime Minister, and Yunis 
Bakri, the Iraqi broadcaster, (who also appeared in Chapter Five), were interned at Abu 
Ghraib and tried by Military Tribunal.
1041
  
These pro-British Iraqis were charged with corruption and ‘conspiracy against the 
state’, meaning that they were acting on behalf of the interests of foreign powers, i.e. Britain, 
and also conspiring in a plot to overthrow the Syrian government.
1042
 Amongst them, Said 
Qazzaz and Bahjat Attiyah were the first civilians to be hanged.
1043
 The death sentence of 
General Daghistani, who admitted Iraq’s plot of ‘Operation X’, and its connection with MI6, 
was later commuted.
1044
 A retired member of the British intelligence community recalled that 
‘we had agents hanged in the main square in the late fifties’.1045 Indeed, it is arguable whether 
these pro-British figures were actually Britain’s agents as they were mostly serving the 
Hashemite dynasty of Iraq under their own government. From Britain’s point of view, 
however, they were invaluable assets through whom British interests could be preserved as 
they pursued their own domestic policies.  
 
The Limits of British Influence 
                                                 
1040
 Cf. Rathmell, Secret War in the Middle East, p.119; Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 1965); King (eds.), Inside the Arab Nationalist Struggle, p.66.  
1041
 TNA: PRO FO371/134202: YQ1015/197: report by J.M. Hunter, Baghdad, to FO, annex D, ‘list of 108 
persons to be tried by Military Tribunal’, 12 Aug 1958.  
1042
 Cf. Birdwood, Nuri As-Said, p.271n. 
1043
 Waldemar Gallman, US Ambassador in Iraq, recalled that ‘I watched his [Qazzaz’s] trial on television. He 
stood erect and strong for hours under a barrage of charges, accusations, and tauntings [sic]. He made no 
apologies. He did not ask for mercy. He maintained throughout the trial what he had done, he had done from 
conviction, to save his country and his people from communism, and if he had it to do over again he would do 
the same. As he and everyone who watched the proceedings anticipated, he was sentenced to death and hanged’. 
Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri, p.96. 
1044
 The Iraq Times, 26 Aug 1958. He was released from prison and moved to Britain. See Eveland, Ropes of 
Sand, p.291, n.*.  
1045
 Quote from email exchange, 18 Sep 2011. 
 220 
 
 
Regardless of the benefits of an intelligence liaison for obtaining information or 
exercising influence, there is a question to what extent Britain was able to enjoy its influence 
over the policy of Middle Eastern governments through the liaison. Evidence suggests that 
the value of the liaison as a means of influence was, however, questionable. There was the 
fact that Britain’s influence was based on the policy of maintaining pro-British governments 
in a region which was becoming increasingly anti-British. As Andrew Rathmell noted in his 
study of post-war Syria, because the Middle East had experienced a long colonial history for 
centuries, there was a tendency for ‘political opponents commonly [to] accuse each other of 
being agents of a foreign power’.1046 This was in fact apparent even before the Suez Crisis. 
While King Hussein of Jordan had a long established relationship with Britain, he also often 
had to dissociate himself from the British, whose role in Jordan was ‘the object of deep 
popular suspicion’ in the eyes of the Jordanians.1047 Subsequently, King Hussein of Jordan 
dismissed General Sir John Bagot Glubb from the command of the Arab Legion in March 
1956, until which point Britain had enjoyed considerable influence over the defence and 
security policies of Jordan.
1048
  
The existence of the intelligence liaison between Britain and the Middle Eastern 
governments was kept absolutely secret. From Britain’s point of view, it was mostly for 
security reasons. Such liaisons would be vulnerable to penetration or might become the 
subject of a propaganda attack by the Soviet Union.
1049
 For the Middle Eastern governments, 
it was for exclusively political reasons. Middle East policymakers with links to the West were 
vulnerable to being attacked by political opponents and risked forfeiting their political lives, 
or even their lives, as in Iraq. As a result of anti-British sentiment throughout the region after 
the Second World War, intelligence liaisons between Britain and the Middle Eastern states 
thus had to be built on the basis of absolute secrecy, or sometimes at personal discretion, in 
non-institutionalised forms.
1050
 They remained on unstable foundations until the formation of 
the Baghdad Pact.  
Despite the fact that Britain was constantly being asked for its advice on anti-
Communist measures, Britain’s image was far from positive even amongst Middle Eastern 
policymakers. This was especially the case in Iran. As a result of Britain’s earlier collusion 
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with the Americans to overthrow Mohammad Mossadeq in 1953, Britain was often seen as a 
conspiratorial force in international affairs. During the Suez Crisis, the Shah became ‘deeply 
suspicious’ of the British collusion with Israel against Nasser’s Egypt, but Sir Roger Stevens, 
the British Ambassador in Tehran, who had indeed no prior knowledge of his own country’s 
‘collusion’, repeatedly assured the Shah that ‘there had been no prior collusion with the 
Israelis’.1051 In addition, when the Iraqi Revolution occurred, General Teymour Bakhtiar, the 
Head of SAVAK, publicly announced that ‘the British had engineered the Iraqi coup d’état’ 
and the new Iraqi government was ‘the newly chosen instrument of the British’.1052 
In addition, Britain itself seriously undermined its relationship with its allies – the 
Suez Crisis, in which Britain colluded with France, and above all, Israel, the enemy of the 
Arabs, to attack Nasser’s Egypt. Although Middle Eastern governments maintained their 
existing intelligence liaisons with the British, the political costs were much greater in the long 
term – pro-British Middle Eastern governments found it more difficult to handle their 
domestic politics in the face of anti-British sentiment throughout the region.
1053
 Amongst all, 
Britain’s closest ally, Iraq, which was at the centre of British foreign policy at the time, 
became more vulnerable to a barrage of hostile propaganda attacks both by Nasser and 
International (Soviet-sponsored) Communists. The US Ambassador in Baghdad, Waldemar 
Gallman, observed that, despite all the efforts Nuri al-Said put into enhancing the reputation 
of the Baghdad Pact against Nasser’s Arab Nationalism, the Suez debacle ‘came close to 
being Nuri’s undoing’. Nuri ‘felt that the British had let the Arab world down badly’, and that 
‘Iraq was being forced into a position of opposition to the British’.1054 Not only was Iraqi 
policy towards Britain under attack, but so too was the credibility of the Baghdad Pact 
questioned by the Iraqi opposition and attacked by Cairo Radio. Fadhel Jamali, a former Iraqi 
Prime Minister, recollected that Iraq ‘was being undermined from within’, contributing to the 
Iraqi Revolution.
1055
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All of these limitations raise the question of whether Britain enjoyed any influence at 
all over the policy of Middle Eastern governments. Indeed, the intangible extent of influence 
is incredibly difficult to assess, and the degree of influence depended on the sensitivity of the 
issue and the convergence of mutual interests of both parties, which was constantly shifting 
with domestic and overseas events. However, evidence seems to suggest that there was a 
certain limit to British influence over the policy of Middle Eastern governments. Middle 
Eastern governments were above all foreign governments – all decisions were in their hands 
to act on at their own discretion. When Iran faced a situation that subversive activities, riots, 
students’ demonstrations were commonplace in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Britain’s plan 
was seemingly to try to influence the Iranian government policy through General Fardust, one 
of the Shah’s closest confidents. In his first four-month stay for training in Britain in 1959, 
the training courses especially designed for him consisted of three sessions, two of which 
mostly involving political education. While one was concerned with intelligence matters 
taught in English through a translator, the remaining two sessions were taught in Persian: one 
was all about Communism by a ‘Communist professional teacher’, including its social and 
economic system; and the other was about Iran’s economy by a ‘British Iranologist’, who 
was ‘very critical of Iran’s economic conditions’ and believed that the Shah ‘had to make 
some fundamental reforms otherwise his government could not remain in power for long’.1056  
Once General Fardust returned from Britain after the training, he suggested some 
economic reforms to the Shah as instructed by the British Iranologist. However, the Shah 
rejected his suggestion outright and replied that ‘he [the British Iranologist] has nothing to do 
with our policies’, and ‘it is none of his business’.1057 According to General Fardust, the 
instruction given by the British expert on Iran’s economic affairs ‘ran exactly against’ Shah’s 
‘White Revolution’, a series of measures for reshaping the political, social and economic life 
of Iran, which was implemented in 1963, a few years later.
1058
 The initiation of the White 
Revolution was acutely opposed by some of Iran’s clergy, including Ayatollah Khomeini, 
and has been said to be the beginning of the fall of the Shah in the course of a long battle 
between the Shah and Khomeini.
1059
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Iran was not the only ally to act against British wishes, but Iraq also acted against 
Britain’s policy and desires. Despite receiving no advance warnings, Britain was indeed 
aware of the danger of a coup by the Iraqi Army prior to the 1958 Revolution. William 
Magan wrote in his autobiography that, even during his tenure as Head of SIME, he had been 
acutely aware of the disaffection in the Iraqi Army, and he duly passed his concerns on to 
Bahjat Attiyah, then Director of the Iraqi CID.
1060
 A JIC assessment made after the coup 
attests to Magan’s recollection that his concerns had been already reported to London, 
presumably either by Duncan MacIntosh or the representative of MI5 in Baghdad.
1061
 The 
problem was that despite repeated warnings by its own chief of the Secret Police, Bahjat 
Attiyah, Iraqi ministers were completely blinkered by their anti-Communist concerns.
1062
  
In addition, it is noteworthy that in his memoirs Sir Sam Falle, the Oriental Counsellor 
at the British Embassy in Baghdad (1957-61), dismissed the idea of Iraq as a ‘British lackey’ 
and noted that: 
Nuri was very much his own man and nobody’s stooge. The British Ambassador, Sir Michael 
Wright, was in Nuri’s pocket, not the other way round. Wright had an immense and quite 
understandable respect for Nuri…When I used to give Wright my political observations, he 
would counter with: “But Nuri says…” Occasionally and most reluctantly, at my most urgent 
prompting, Wright used to mention mildly to Nuri that there was a need for social and 
economic reforms and that it was important to curb the power of the tribal shaikhs. 
Unfortunately, Nuri took absolutely no notice; it might have been better if we had been able to 
exercise some influence.
1063
    
As noted, the degree of influence depended on the sensitivity of the issue and the 
convergence of mutual interests of both parties. However, the Shah’s attitudes towards 
Britain’s suggestion of Iran’s domestic reforms, and Sir Sam Falle’s point about Nuri’s 
determination to pursue his own policies, demonstrate the limitations faced by British 
intelligence when attempting to exercise influence over the policy of the Middle Eastern 
governments. 
Adherence to the Rules of Law: Use and Abuse of Secret Police 
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The practices associated with the secret police were not all illegal. Rather, most 
Middle Eastern states had passed laws defining Communist and subversive activities as 
illegal and authorising the practices of the security services in countering these threats. The 
conduct of counter-subversive measures in dealing with Communists, radical Arab 
nationalists, and separatists were thus mostly lawful under domestic penal codes or defence 
regulations. Under these conditions, the suspects were often interned without trial, and some 
cases resulted in capital punishment. However, the rule of law differed in each country and 
some countries adopted extreme measures. In the case of Iraq, for instance, the introduction 
of the ‘Association Law’ under the government of Nuri al-Said in 1955 gave the Minister of 
the Interior extensive power over political groups and their gatherings. Waldemar Gallman, a 
former US Ambassador to Iraq, observed that under the Iraqi Association Law, ‘any party 
would be completely dependent on the Minister’s benevolence for its existence’.1064 
In addition to the differences in political systems, there were of course cultural 
underpinnings which made the practices of Middle Eastern security services more akin with 
those of a secret police. For instance, Bahjat Attiyah, the long-standing head of the Iraqi CID, 
once explained to Guy Liddell about the adverse conditions for recruiting local agents in Iraq, 
on which Liddell noted that they were ‘very different’ from Britain. In Iraq, Attiyah said, ‘the 
Police get no voluntary assistance whatever from the population’, for whom, ‘the idea of 
doing something because it is in the national interest never enters their heads’. According to 
the Liddell Diaries: 
[Attiyah] gave me an example of a murder committed in a café, when he and some friend were 
sitting in an adjoining house. He went round himself immediately and interrogated the 
proprietor, who pleaded that he had seen nothing. Even two men who had been sitting on the 
same bench as the murdered man pleaded the one that he was reading a newspaper at the time, 
and the other that he was thinking of something else and had only heard the report of the 
revolver! The only method of coping with a situation of this kind, Colonel Bahjat said, was to 
take some fifty people who were present in the café and put them all in jail. After some hours of 
confinement, people began to admit that they had seen something and eventually fifteen 
witnesses, corroborating each other’s stories, were procured. This story, he said, would indicate 
how difficult it was to get informants; the only method is by using a personal or family 
connection and exploiting some situation where money is the primary factor. The average 
citizen in Iraq does not see any reason why he should court trouble by becoming an agent, and 
he further takes the view that it is contrary to the tenets of the Koran to act as a spy on his 
fellow men.
1065
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Whether religion was another factor in preventing Muslims from becoming spies or 
informants for their own country is beyond the scope of this research.
1066
 However, Attiyah’s 
story at least demonstrates the different conditions, not only in Iraq, in which Middle Eastern 
security services had to operate and the reason that some of the secret police behaviour was 
seen as a necessary instrument for maintaining the nation’s precarious internal security.1067 
In the Middle East, there were no comparable principles to the Maxwell-Fyfe 
Directive in Britain defining the roles and responsibilities of the security services. They often 
served the interests of particular political groups or elites, who used and abused the power of 
these security services. Political opponents were sometimes arrested by the security services 
on account of being security threats against the government. When a group of Turkish 
military officers (both serving and retired) were arrested by the Turkish authorities in January 
1958 on the grounds of a ‘serious plot’ against the government, Sir James Bowker, the British 
Ambassador in Ankara (1954-58), who believed the affair to be ‘simply another by-product 
of the general bitterness engendered by the elections’, commented that the Turkish Prime 
Minister Adnan Menderes was ‘determined to teach the army a sharp lesson about the 
desirability of keeping out of politics, or at least out of opposition politics’.1068 Indeed, the 
Menderes Government was overthrown in 1960 and Adnan Menderes himself was hanged by 
the military government.  
There are other examples of the power of the security services being abused for the 
personal interests of particular elites. For instance, it appears that Princess Ashraf, the Shah’s 
sister, ordered SAVAK to ‘eavesdrop’ on her boyfriend’s ‘telephone conversations and 
closely watch his activities’ for her own personal reasons.1069 Moreover, the security services 
were also bedevilled by corruption. According to General Hussein Fardust, during his reign at 
SAVAK, General Teymour Bakhtiar accumulated ‘a fortune’ by confiscating properties from 
‘wealthy’ bazaar tradesmen with fabricated files accusing them of ‘being a Communist’ and 
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throwing them into jail.
1070
 In the case of Jordan, for instance, corruption was not limited to 
the security services themselves, but also the ministers who directed them.
1071
  
Moreover, the security services were controlled by the head of state in some 
monarchical states. For instance, Jack O’Connell, the former CIA station chief in Jordan 
(1963-71), recalled in his autobiography that when he asked King Hussein of Jordan if he 
could see the head of the Jordanian Intelligence Service, King Hussein himself said to 
O’Connell, ‘I’m the head of the Intelligence Service’. 1072  Similarly, Richard Helms, the 
former Director of the CIA (1966-73), recollected on his dealing with the Shah of Iran that 
the Shah himself was ‘the chief Iranian intelligence officer’ de facto.1073 As a result, the 
power of security forces did not reside in the organisation itself but was ultimately in the 
hands of the head of state.
1074
 As a result, a danger was that the power of security forces was 
likely to be politicised to support the policies of the monarch’s own government.1075  In 
addition, nominal post-holders of the security services who became too powerful were often 
fired by the head of state. A notable case is General Teymour Bakhtiar, the first Head of 
SAVAK (1957-61), who was dismissed by the Shah in 1961 on the grounds of backing a plot 
against the Shah and was exiled to Europe the following year.
1076
  
The unregulated extraordinary state power displayed in these cases often promoted the 
misconduct of counter-subversive measures and violation of fundamental human rights. After 
the fall of Mohammad Moseddeq in 1953, the Iranian government became even more 
unsympathetic to the Tudeh Party and conducted a security purge of Tudeh sympathisers 
                                                 
1070
 Ibid., p.223. 
1071
 TNA: PRO KV4/473: the Liddell Diaries, 8 Oct 1951, in which Guy Liddell noted that ‘one of their main 
troubles is that the [Jordanian] Police have not got the co-operation of the public, and another thing, of course, is 
that most of their Ministers are probably corrupt’. 
1072
 O’Connell, King’s Counsel, p.4. 
1073
 OHOFIS: Richard Helms, interviewed by William Burr, Washington, D.C., 10 and 24 Jul 1985, script no.1, 
p.12, accessible on-line at http://fis-iran.org/en (accessed 20 Aug 2013). 
1074
 According to a classified CIA report, the Shah himself took a ‘deep and personal interest in the day to day 
operations’ of the various intelligence and security organisations and made ‘all major, and many minor, 
decisions in this field’. Quoted from Asnad, vol.60, p.5, report by ‘United States Military Information Control 
Committee: Security in the Government of Iran’, by Donald S. Harris, the Secretary, 7 Feb 1966. See also an 
oral testimony by the CIA station chief in Tehran in the late 1950s and early 1960s. OHOFIS: Colonel Gratian 
Yatsevitch, interviewed by William Burr, Washington, D.C., 5 Nov 1988 and 12 Jan 1989, script no.1, p.33, 
accessible on-line at http://fis-iran.org/en (accessed 20 Aug 2013). 
1075
 See Chapter Five. 
1076
 He was later attacked by a SAVAK officer and killed in his exile in Iraq in August 1970. Cf. Ladjevardi 
(ed), Memoirs of Fatemeh Pakravan, p.21, n.16; Dareini (ed), Rise and Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty, p.227; 
OHOFIS: Oney, interviewed by Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Maryland, 22 and 29 May 1991, script no.2, p.5, 
accessible on-line at http://fis-iran.org/en (accessed 20 Aug 2013).  
 227 
 
 
within the administration and security apparatus, mainly the Army and Police.
1077
 The 
security purge was not well-executed: suspects were often inappropriately treated and even 
executed without firm incriminating evidence. Observing the situation, David Stewart of 
MI5, former Deputy Head of SIME specialising in Middle Eastern affairs, identified 
underlying potential problems in the long run of these security measures, and reported that: 
All the officers were young and a high proportion drawn from the technical, i.e. better educated, 
branches of the Armed Forces. The Persian Foreign Minister has admitted privately that many 
were honest and efficient and that most were probably idealists driven into communism by the 
rottenness of Persia. This is the general impression both inside and outside Persia, and the 
executions have consequently aroused strong feelings, particularly since they have been 
conducted inefficiently. In short the incident has been a particularly successful exercise in 
repression, but emphasises once again the vital importance of constructive action by the Persian 
regime to remedy a situation in which so many honest, efficient and idealistic young men can 
find no alternative to communism.
1078
 
This statement is indicative that these actions were taken as “anti-Communist measures”, 
which were originally designed to prevent, or suppress, subversive activities. However, these 
inefficiently conducted and executed measures cultivated anti-governmental sentiments 
amongst the population.  
The eruption of deep discontent amongst the people against their own government can 
also be seen in the context of the Iraqi Revolution. As noted earlier, Iraq, Britain’s most 
reliable ally in the region, especially under the premiership of Nuri al-Said, was considered to 
have the strongest anti-Communist government in the region, introducing repressive security 
regulations, such as the Association Law. Under the law, Said Qazzaz, the Iraqi Minister of 
the Interior, Nuri al-Said’s right hand man for internal security, was exclusively empowered 
to conduct robust anti-Communist measures. After the Iraqi Revolution, Qazzaz and also 
Bahjat Attiyah were the first civilians to be executed by the revolutionary government on the 
grounds of ‘multiple murders and physical torture of anti-government demonstrators and 
political detainees’.1079 Sir Sam Falle, Oriental Counsellor at the British Embassy in Baghdad 
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(1957-61), who observed the developments in Iraq before and after the Revolution during his 
stay in Baghdad, recollected on the fate of Said Qazzaz that ‘his crime was that he was an 
effective anti-communist’.1080 Indeed, Nuri al-Said, who had just escaped from his house on 
the morning of the day of the Revolution, was discovered the next day disguised as an Arab 
woman, and killed in the street. His body was dragged through the streets by the mob.
1081
 
An intriguing question is, however, to what extent Britain contributed to the excessive 
use and abuse of interrogation techniques, such as torture. As torture was illegal in British 
national law, the security service abstained from its use. Eliza Manningham-Buller, former 
Director-General of MI5 (2002-07), proudly noted MI5’s strict adherence to the rule of law 
during the Second World War.
1082
 Cases of abuse of power, such as the ill-treatment of 
prisoners, were indeed brought to a Court Martial, as can be seen from the case of Bad 
Nenndorf, a post-war interrogation centre in Germany. The Commandant, Colonel Robin 
‘Tin-eye’ Stephens, faced Court Martial for claims of ill-treatment and brutality by his 
subordinates, but was later acquitted and employed by MI5.
1083
 Owing to a lack of 
documentary evidence, the existing literature can only lead to an assumption that the training 
in interrogation techniques given to Middle Eastern security services at a course run by 
Scotland Yard was likely conducted on the basis of the adherence to the rule of law and was 
thus unlikely to have suggested torture or ill-treatment.
1084
    
This assumption is also supported from the other side of the Atlantic. As noted earlier, 
the CIA was deeply involved in training SAVAK officers and even interfering in their 
operational matters. However, Earnest Oney, a former CIA officer, whose mission was to 
train SAVAK officers in Iran in the late 1950s (1957-59) and early 1960s (1962 and 1964), 
has refuted any allegation that the Americans were involved in training the officers in the 
Third Department of SAVAK, responsible for the internal security of Iran, and particularly 
denies training in the use of torture.
1085
 Documentary evidence now seems to support his 
                                                                                                                                                        
people from communism, and if he had it to do over again he would do the same. As he and everyone who 
watched the proceedings anticipated, he was sentenced to death and hanged.’  
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claim. The declassified CIA interrogation manual, codenamed KUBARK – CIA’s counter-
intelligence interrogation manual – 1086 drafted in July 1963, states that ‘intense pain is quite 
likely to produce false confessions, concocted as a means of escaping from distress’, and that 
interrogation must be ‘conducted for the sake of information and not for police purposes’.1087 
Moreover, according to a former SAVAK officer, who noted that the organisation was 
largely trained by the Americans, British and Israelis, SAVAK officers were ‘trained by those 
countries not for torture’, ‘but to learn how to spy, to do research – that sort of thing’.1088  
According to General Fardust, who admitted that ‘the brutal method of torture’ was 
commonplace in SAVAK, one of the reasons why SAVAK resorted to such interrogation 
techniques was that: 
…scientific interrogation in the world’s intelligence and security organizations has a limit, and 
wherever, because of a sensitive political situation, this method becomes somewhat ineffective, 
torture is resorted to in order to get speedy results or to create terror and fear. In normal 
circumstances, the aim of the interrogation is to extract information and so naturally the more 
scientific and thorough the methods the better! But in sensitive political situations where 
security is seen to be threatened, the interrogators’ aim is not only at getting information, they 
also aim at breaking the suspect and creating panic in society.
1089
 
This indicates that the circumstances in the Middle East were a contributing factor in 
facilitating excessive security measures conducted by the security services. Ernest Oney also 
recalled that SAVAK received ‘dozens of reports of plotting against the Shah’ over the years, 
which was an ‘endemic’ condition in Iran.1090 Additionally, Sir Sam Falle notes that ‘the 
Shah’s tyranny came from fear’.1091 Similarly, MI5 itself was also concerned that Nuri al-
Said ‘might at any moment be assassinated’.1092 
                                                                                                                                                        
police and intelligence officers, interrogators outside of Europe and the Americas, one of the hardest things is to 
persuade them that you cannot beat useful information out of people…Good interrogation, you don’t do it by 
pulling out fingernails. You don’t do it by beating people. You know, you beat anybody long enough, he would 
confess to anything that you’re looking for, and in intelligence interrogation you’re not looking for confessions 
that you can try somebody for in court. You’re looking for information that will lead you through a network and 
ultimately to whoever is running the operation. You don’t get useful information by torturing people.’, quoted 
from ibid., script, no.3, p.4. 
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Britain’s Reaction to the Abuse of Human Rights 
Finally, an intriguing question is how Britain saw these counter-measures as conducted 
by the local security services, often violating fundamental human rights, and to what extent 
Britain endorsed them. A case in the late 1940s illustrates the extent to which Britain was 
able to exercise its influence on the policy of the Iraqi government concerning human rights 
abuses. In late 1948 and early 1949 the Iraqi CID raided houses of Iraqi Communists and 
arrested hundreds of revolutionaries, which also led to a retrial of the three foremost leaders 
of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), who were later convicted of ‘having led the party from 
the prison’.1093 In February 1949 the three leaders, plus another individual, were hanged in 
different squares in Baghdad, and their bodies were ‘left hanging for several hours so that the 
common people going to their work would receive the warning’.1094 Sir Henry Mack, who 
had not been informed by the Iraqi government about the executions of the Communist 
leaders, reported to the Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin that: 
Information received from secret sources indicates that the trial was not conducted in 
accordance with British ideas of judicial impartiality, but it must be admitted that the Iraqi 
Government needed to make an example and there is no doubt that these men were intent on 
undermining the Iraqi States. All of them had long records of subversive activity...[and 
evidence for their connection with the Soviet Union] shows that their aims were revolutionary 
and Government in Iraq is not so firmly established that it can afford to be lenient when such 
men fall into their hands.
1095
 
Once the news reached Britain that 160 other alleged Communists were still being held in 
custody and more executions were likely to be carried out, a number of protests were made to 
Ernest Bevin to take action against them. The Foreign Office decided to intervene to stop 
further executions by the Iraqis who were ‘violating fundamental human rights’.1096 It was 
also feared at the Foreign Office that acting too ruthlessly against the Communists would 
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only intensify Communist activities and be exploited by propaganda accusing the Iraqi 
government of human rights abuses.
1097
  
Observing the executions of the Iraqi Communist leaders by the Iraqi authority, Arkady 
Suvorov, the secretary of the Soviet Legation, noted that:  
Does Nuri as-Said [al-Said] or the ruling class…think that the hanging of these men or of others 
will put an end to the Communist movement in Iraq? They are only being foolish…They may 
now shatter the party and incarcerate thousands of its members…but this will not avail them for 
long. The rotten state of things will of necessity rouse the people and not only the Communists 
to protests and eventually to revolution.
1098
  
Despite a strong anti-Communist stance by the Iraqi authorities, the Communist activities in 
Iraq persisted and further intensified throughout the 1950s. In his study on the Communist 
movement in Iraq, Hanna Batatu judged that the execution of the Iraqi Communist leaders in 
1949 was a turning point for the Communist struggle against the Iraqi government. Noting 
that Suvorov’s remark was ‘correct’, Batatu also wrote that ‘to what he said we should add 
that Fahd [one of the executed Communist leaders whose body was exposed in public] dead 
proved more potent than Fahd living’, and that ‘Communism became now surrounded with 
the halo of martyrdom’.1099 Sir Henry Mack duly but gently reproved the Iraqi Prime Minister 
Nuri al-Said for his action, which had ‘gone quite far enough’. Nuri al-Said, however, 
responded that this practice had been adopted since 1921 in accordance with the law, and told 
Sir Henry Mack that ‘with a third world war possible it was essential to ensure that these 
anarchists would not be able to repeat what they had done in the past’. 1100  Despite the 
intervention by Sir Henry Mack, the Iraqi government nonetheless carried out further 
executions, and another ICP leader was hanged in May 1949, though the dead body was not 
exposed in public this time.
1101
  
Another case is in Iran in the second half of the 1950s, in which British officials 
became aware of the Iranians’ excessive anti-Communist measures, involving the torture of 
political prisoners. Britain contemplated an intervention, but in the end simply looked on at 
the unwelcome developments. The stepping-up of the Iranian measures against the Tudeh 
Party after the 1953 coup has been noted earlier; the person in charge of this operation was 
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General Teymour Bakhtiar, Military Governor of Tehran, who supervised the purge of the 
Tudeh elements within the Iranian government – mainly in both the Police and the Army in 
the mid-1950s. The allegation was widely propagated by the members, or sympathisers, of 
the Tudeh Party that the Iranian government flogged political prisoners with a whip at ‘the 
renowned “bath-house” (hammam)’, and that General Bakhtiar was also personally involved 
in the torture of prisoners.
1102
 The British Embassy in Tehran was mostly kept out from the 
matter by the Iranian government, but the only explanation given by General Bakhtiar 
himself was that he had been received an order from the Shah that he ‘should use whatever 
methods he considered necessary to gain information’.1103  
As the Tudeh elements, and International Communists, gained ground by exploiting the 
situation with subversive propaganda, the diplomats at the British Embassy in Tehran judged 
that the allegation was accurate on the basis of patchy evidence and discussed whether they 
should intervene in the situation by suggesting the Shah dismiss General Bakhtiar from his 
post. The argument for intervention was that ‘our reputation will suffer unless we do 
something about it’.1104 However, an MI6 officer, Edward de Haan, who headed the Tehran 
Station (1954-57), intervened in the discussion and noted that: 
Whatever one may say against General Bakhtiar’s methods, he is an extremely able individual 
who is likely to have many years of service under the Shah. He is, as you know, highly 
regarded by the Shah…[who] has no intention of keeping him in the post of Military Governor 
for very much longer…If General Bakhtiar believed that he had been dismissed from his post 
because of British objections to his methods of treatment of prisoners, we might alienate him 
forever. This would be a serious blow when he reaches higher posts, as he almost certainly will. 
The price would not be worth improving our stock in other quarters of Tehran.
1105
   
Indeed, General Bakhtiar relinquished his post as Military Governor of Tehran and assumed a 
new post, the first head of the Iranian national intelligence and security organisation 
(SAVAK). Given his subsequent career as the Head of SAVAK (1957-61), who was also 
entitled to assume the post of Deputy Prime Minister, it was most likely that no intervention 
was made regarding his treatment of prisoners. Even if the intervention was made, there was 
no visible consequence.
1106
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 Britain’s non-interventionist attitude was more apparent towards the treatment of the 
Kurds by the central governments of Iran, Turkey, and to a lesser extent Iraq, throughout the 
period between 1949 and 1963 since the policy of the British government towards the region 
was to maintain good relationships with these governments. As the regional governments 
were ‘sensitive’ on the question of the Kurds, the Foreign Office insisted the representatives 
of the British government not raise any issues concerning the Kurds in the region and the way 
in which they were treated by the central governments. Indeed, the Kurdish minorities were 
treated differently between Iraq, Iran and Turkey; while the rights of the Iraqi Kurds had been 
recognised by the Iraqi government since the 1920s. Nevertheless, the question of the Kurds 
was a politically sensitive topic to the three governments.
1107
  
Despite British awareness of this politically sensitive issue in the decades since the 
end of the First World War, the treatment of the Kurds by the regional governments had 
never caught much attention outside the region until the heroic return of Mulla Mustafa 
Barzani from his exile in the Soviet Union to Iraq in October 1958. As noted in Chapter Five, 
the Iranian and Turkish governments kept a close eye on him and developments in Iraq 
through intelligence sharing between them. Once Barzani announced his proposal for the 
unification of his Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Iraq and the Kurdistan Democratic 
Party of Iran (KDPI) under a single secretary-general, SAVAK readily rounded up ‘250 
suspected KDPI activists’ without trial, and the KDPI ‘almost ceased to exist’.1108  
In addition, the Turkish government also conducted precautionary security measures 
against the Kurds. Shortly after the civilian Menderes government was overthrown by the 
Turkish army officers in May 1960, a group of Kurds began demanding Kurdish autonomy. 
The new military government moved fast and arrested 248 Kurds who were ‘believed to have 
supported agitation for a free Kurdish State’.1109 Once news about the treatment of the Kurds 
by the Iranian and Turkish governments reached Britain, John Profumo, then Minister of 
State for Foreign Affairs, was asked by William Owen, a Labour MP, at the House of 
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Commons in May 1960 about Britain’s view on ‘the recent disturbances in Turkey and Iran’ 
and if Britain was consulted with by these authorities as a CENTO member.
1110
 John 
Profumo replied that Britain was not consulted by them and restated Britain’s non-
intervention policy towards the minority movements that ‘the internal affairs of each country 
are a matter for that country alone’. 1111 
Conclusion 
As shown in preceding chapters, the training of Middle Eastern security services in 
anti-Communist measures was a recurrent theme of Britain’s anti-Communist policy in the 
region. Based on the findings from earlier chapters, this chapter has discussed the meanings 
and the value of this training. It is noteworthy that Calder Walton suggests in his book, 
Empire of Secrets, that Britain successfully exported its ‘intelligence culture’ by training 
colonial security forces throughout the British Empire.
1112
 This chapter has shown that the 
training colonial security forces in fact originated from British anti-Communist policy to train 
and facilitate the effectiveness of anti-Communist measures by local security services in the 
late 1940s and the early 1950s. Akin to the security training implemented throughout the 
Colonies, policymakers in London, such as those of the AC (O) Committee, also hoped that 
through British training strong Middle Eastern security services would safeguard British 
interests in the region – above all, pursuing Britain’s national interests – chief defence policy 
and then oil – was prioritised. However, as Sir Frank Newsam and Guy Liddell rightly 
doubted, the value of this training was largely questionable.  
This chapter has also discussed that the implications and the consequences of 
Britain’s anti-Communist measures in the region. Strengthening the political police certainly 
forestalled the Communist advance in these countries and sustained the existence of the local 
governments, but once internal subversion by the Communists, the Soviet Union or Egypt 
intensified, the local authorities felt increasingly threatened. The inevitable consequence was 
that Middle Eastern security services became part of the problem rather than the solution. As 
the local security services were the only means to maintain the governments in power, 
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Middle Eastern governments often adopted more vigorous and ruthless counter-measures, 
including torture of prisoners. Despite these efforts by the Middle Eastern authorities, internal 
subversion persisted, and the repression fostered anti-governmental feelings amongst the 
population. As a result, Middle Eastern governments faced internal subversion, not by 
International Communists, but by their own people. To maintain good relations with the local 
authorities, Britain looked the other way as the local authorities conducted excessive counter-
subversive, and ultimately kept intervention at a minimum. Consequently, British influence 
over the policy of Middle Eastern governments was also limited.  
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Those who consider it [Britain’s engagement in the post-war Middle East] to have been a 
period of failure, are the sentimentalists who do not understand why things should not have 
gone on as they were before. A more correct judgement is that though we made mistakes like 
everyone else involved, we have so far come through an unusually difficult and complex period 
without more damage to our real interests in the Middle East.  
- Lord Trevelyan
1113
 
 
It is just possible, I suppose, that the West knows how a country like Persia ought to be 
governed in the best interests of the people, but that it knows how it could be so governed has 
always seemed to me very unlikely.  
- Lit-Col. Geoffrey Wheeler
1114
 
Common Intelligence Culture? – Britain’s ‘Informal’ Empire in the 
Middle East 
Britain’s engagement in the post-war Middle East was firmly connected to its imperial 
past. As Sir Alan Munro, a former British diplomat, later admitted, his dealings with the 
Middle Eastern and African affairs were based on ‘the legacies of imperial history’.1115 Sir 
Anthony Parsons, another Middle Eastern specialist at the Foreign Office, recalls that though 
the Middle East was not part of the post-war British Empire, Britain, still known as ‘the lion’ 
across the Arab world, retained a ‘predominant’ influence over the region.1116 Indeed, while 
Middle Eastern countries, such as Egypt, Iraq, Iran, and Jordan, in the post-war period were 
not under the colonial administration of the British Empire, their relationships with Britain 
had certainly developed since the First World War.
1117
 Britain had closer connections with 
Middle Eastern governments than any other power except France which maintained its 
influence in the Levant (Syria and Lebanon) until the Second World War.
1118
 This thesis has 
shown that common interests in anti-Communist policy encouraged an even closer 
relationship between Britain and Middle Eastern authorities (Chapters One and Two). In the 
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post-war period, Britain was seen as the most reliable and experienced ally by several Middle 
Eastern authorities, including even Lebanon, where British officials were very much in 
demand for their advice on anti-Communist measures. This was the context in which Britain 
maintained closer relationships with Middle Eastern states and in which British Intelligence 
established close connections with its Middle Eastern counterparts (Chapter Two).  
As noted in the Introduction, Sir Stephen Lander noted that international intelligence 
cooperation, not only intelligence sharing but also other forms of liaison, such as intelligence 
and security training, happened ‘where there [was] a pressing shared need that [went] beyond 
the capacity or capability of one country to address’.1119 As has been shown throughout the 
thesis, British intelligence liaison with its Middle Eastern counterparts was essentially driven 
by Britain’s post-war anti-Communist policy – Middle Eastern governments and their 
security services were considered ill-prepared for or incapable of conducting security 
measures in the case of a war against the Soviet Union; and also strengthening Middle 
Eastern security services was thought essential to safeguard British anti-Communist and 
economic interests in the region (Chapter One). Intelligence and security liaison between 
Britain and Middle Eastern countries was based on their common interests in anti-Communist 
measures in the region (Chapters Two and Three). Nevertheless, there were also conflicting 
interests in the region. The schism in propaganda approaches can be seen as a microcosm of 
the problems affecting regional cooperation as a whole. Britain saw the threats more narrowly 
than its Middle Eastern counterparts (Chapters Four and Five).  
 The authorised history of MI5 has noted that MI5 officers were expected to spend ‘a 
quarter to a third of their careers on overseas posting in the Empire and Commonwealth’ in 
the post-war period.
1120
 The secret linkage of MI5’s network with the colonial authorities was 
pronounced by Philip Murphy as exporting a ‘Commonwealth intelligence culture’. 1121 
Calder Walton recently claimed that Britain rather successfully implemented its own policy 
through intelligence liaison with local authorities of the British Empire, through which 
particular techniques and methods were transported with the movement of MI5 from one 
Colony to another.
1122
 This thesis has also identified similar dynamics in Britain’s ‘informal 
empire’ in the Middle East (Chapters Two and Three). For instance, all Heads of SIME, 
William Magan (1947-51), Robin ‘Tin-eye’ Stephens (1951-53), William Oughton (1953-
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55), Philip Kirby-Green (1955-58), either had colonial backgrounds or later moved to serve 
in the colonial territories. The DSO in Baghdad, such as Jack Morton (1947-48), Philip Ray 
(1948-51), and Roger Lees (1951-53), all had Indian Police backgrounds.
1123
 Security and 
police advisers, such as J.M. Kyles, the Security Adviser in Lebanon (1950-51), and Duncan 
MacIntosh, the Police/Security Adviser both in Iraq (1955-58) and Jordan (1958-62), also had 
extensive experience in the Colonies.  
Nevertheless, in the case of the Middle East, despite a close connection with the local 
authorities, including the training in anti-Communist measures provided by Britain, there was 
no common intelligence culture between British Intelligence and its Middle Eastern 
counterparts. The intelligence and security culture of these Middle Eastern regimes derived to 
a considerable extent from the political culture of the regimes they served. In some cases, 
such as Iran, for instance, there was strong adherence to the military culture from which the 
intelligence personnel sprang. From their point of view, MI5’s constitutional principle, 
stipulated by the Maxwell-Fyfe Directive in 1952 as being apolitical in the defence of the 
realm, was perhaps incomprehensive (Chapter Six). As shown in this thesis, Middle Eastern 
security services dominated in both internal security and propaganda in their home countries, 
and, despite frequent interactions with their British counterparts, these services frequently 
held views on security and intelligence that contrasted sharply with the policing and 
information-oriented approach of the British. This rift was most noticeable and most 
destructive in the Counter-Subversion Committee and excessive security measures, including 
torture of political prisoners (Chapters Five and Six). This thesis has found that, despite the 
fostering of cooperative anti-Communist measures by organisations like the AC (O) 
Committee and on the initiative of individual leaders like Harold Macmillan (who offered to 
share British methods and techniques of anti-Communist measures with the signatories to the 
Baghdad Pact), there was no evidence of a common intelligence culture between Britain and 
Middle Eastern countries. The reality was above all that British intelligence liaison with its 
Middle Eastern counterparts was based on a narrow interest of anti-Communist measures in 
the region; and when there were conflicting interests, it became even more restricted. 
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The year 1958 has been the subject of scholarly attention as the year in which a series 
of crises in the Middle East, especially the Iraqi Revolution, formed a turning point for 
British Middle Eastern policy. Some imperial historians have claimed that this was a pivotal 
moment in the decline of Britain’s ‘informal’ Empire in the region.1124 An intriguing question 
is when the British-Middle Eastern intelligence/security liaison ended and to what extent it 
continued beyond it. The year 1958 was certainly a setback for British intelligence/security 
liaison. As a result of the Iraqi Revolution, Duncan MacIntosh’s career as Security/Police 
Adviser in Baghdad came to an abrupt end (Chapter Two). Indeed, a total of 108 pro-British 
influential Iraqis, including the key liaison contacts, such as Said Qazzaz, Bahjat Attiyah, and 
General Ghazi Dashistani, were arrested and accused of being ‘criminal traitors’ by the 
revolutionary government (Chapter Six).
1125
 In addition, the Lebanese Crisis in the same year 
led to the resignation of Farid Chehab from his post as the Head of the Sûreté Générale.
1126
 
Colonel Sir Patrick Coghill, meanwhile, noted in his diaries that 1958 marked the end of the 
informal regional intelligence/security cooperation between Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran and 
Turkey on subversive activities in the region.
1127
  
It is clear, however, that a degree of continuity in intelligence liaison remained after 
1958 and was even sustained beyond the period of this study. A notable example is the 
Liaison and Counter-Subversion Committees under CENTO (Chapters Four and Five), which 
continued until the dissolution of CENTO in 1979.
1128
 Duncan MacIntosh moved to Jordan as 
Police Adviser from 1958 to 1962, and until 1979 the Shah of Iran maintained a close 
connection with MI6 officers, including Sir Maurice Oldfield, as well as MI6 agents, Sir 
Shapoor Reporter and General Hussein Fardust (Chapter Six). There is also evidence to 
suggest that MI6 continued to benefit from on-going British intelligence relationships with 
contacts in the Iraqi Police, armed forces, and businessmen after the 1958 Revolution 
(Chapter Four). A retired member of the British Intelligence Community recalls that even the 
                                                 
1124
 Cf. Louis et al. (eds.), A Revolutionary Year; Ferrea et al. (eds.), Iraqi Revolution of 1958. 
1125
 Cf. AP, Beirut, The Tuscaloosa News, 21 Sep 1959, available on-line at 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1817&dat=19590921&id=OokfAAAAIBAJ&sjid=85kEAAAAIBAJ&
pg=7016,2738827 (accessed, 15 Sep 2013). 
1126
 Asseily et al., A Face in the Crowd, p.147. Also see Eveland, Ropes of Sand, p.321. After 1958, when 
General Fouad Chehab, a former Commander of the Army, became the Lebanese President, the Army, instead 
of the Sûreté Générale, assumed the main responsibility for internal security in Lebanon. 
1127
 IWM: Private Papers of Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Patrick Coghill: memoir/diary, entitled ‘Before I Forget…’, 
vol.2. 
1128
 Cf. TNA: PRO FO371/175633: EB1692/1G: a report ‘UK submission to CENTO Liaison Committee: 
assessment of the threat of communist subversion in the CENTO area’, 1 Jan 1964; PRO FO371/180719: 
EB1692/2: report ‘13th Session of CENTO liaison Committee’, undated. 
 241 
 
 
Egyptians in the 1970s/80s, who had been uncooperative during the period of Nasser’s rule 
from 1952 to 1970, were ‘good allies’ with Britain Intelligence especially against Libya.1129 
The continuation of British intelligence liaison with its Middle Eastern counterparts 
did not, however, entirely substitute for the relationships that had constituted the systems of 
‘informal’ Empire in the region. Above all, given the limits of Britain’s influence over the 
policy of Middle Eastern governments, it is questionable whether the notion of a British 
‘informal’ Empire accurately reflects the limited reality of Britain’s ability to exert its 
influence across the region. This thesis has demonstrated that British intelligence liaison with 
its Middle Eastern counterparts only operated on the basis of common interests. In this 
regard, Britain’s ‘informal’ Empire in the post-war Middle East was only sustained on the 
common but thin ground of anti-Communism. 
Failure of Intelligence Liaison and Britain’s Counter-Subversion in 
the ‘Informal’ Empire in the Middle East 
The quotation of Lord Trevelyan indicates that, despite some mistakes in the short-
run, Britain’s engagement in the region was successful in the long-run. Were Britain’s efforts 
towards intelligence liaison and fulfilling its anti-Communist policy in the post-war Middle 
East then successful? There are caveats. It is difficult to judge the degree to which they 
succeeded or failed as there were many factors contributing to the general failure of the 
Communist Parties to make significant headway in the region. In contrast to Britain’s 
Colonies where Britain could implement policy directly, in the Middle East anti-Communist 
measures were implemented by local authorities, meaning that Britain’s influence was 
inevitably more limited. In addition, since several Middle Eastern governments were already 
anti-Communist in inclination, it is possible that anti-Communist measures may have been 
implemented without significant British encouragement or assistance.  
There are also important questions relating to the extent to which British 
policymakers understood the role of intelligence, and how far the implications of anti-
Communist measures in the region were considered. Calder Walton, for instance, gives credit 
to both the role of intelligence and its use by the British Government in the Colonies on the 
grounds that intelligence was vital for perpetuating Britain’s influence overseas, which 
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‘allowed London to punch far above its weight in the years after 1957, for the rest of the Cold 
War’.1130 This thesis is more critical, especially of the British decision/policymakers at the 
time. It has shown how the role of intelligence was understood by British policymakers 
especially in the context of counter-subversion.  
Harold Macmillan also had a particular view of the role of intelligence in the conduct 
of the Cold War (Chapter One), and his initiative to share the methods and techniques of anti-
Communist measures with the members of the Baghdad Pact had at least some influence on 
counter-subversive measures conducted by local authorities (Chapters Four and Five). As 
strong security services were considered essential for preventing the spread of Communist 
activities and maintaining British influence in the region, British Intelligence, MI5 in 
particular, was tasked with strengthening the repressive capability of Middle Eastern 
governments (Chapters One and Five). However, as the thesis has demonstrated, there were 
unintended consequences relating to the development of security forces in the Middle East. 
More precisely, it is arguable that certain Middle Eastern governments actually undermined 
their own security as the repressive nature of their regimes alienated and bred resentment 
among their own populations (Chapter Five). 
In this regard, Britain’s anti-Communist policy in the region was arguably flawed in 
the first place. It was particularly the case in the Middle East, where Communist activities 
were illegal and operating often in tandem with other underground groups. As a result, the 
demarcation line between Communist and non-Communist subversive activities was often 
blurred (Chapter Four). In addition, most Middle Eastern governments were already anti-
Communist and maintained strong security services which had the reputation of a secret 
police, infringing human rights. Indeed, it was often Middle Eastern governments that took 
the initiative in requesting British advice on anti-Communist measures, which the British 
decision/policymakers then proceeded to provide as a means of pursuing their own interests. 
The paradox was that while the maintenance of Britain’s interests in the region was of the 
foremost importance, in the long-term, the policy served mainly to prop up increasingly 
unpopular, authoritarian regimes against a rising tide of anti-British sentiment. The failure 
was not specific to British Cold War policy in the Middle East, however. The United States, 
Britain’s closest ally against the Soviet Union, also used similar methods and techniques to 
sustain its own short-term interests, but failed in the long-term, for instance, in Guatemala 
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and Vietnam.
1131
 From a rather different perspective, similar arguments have been made 
about Soviet Union with regard to Eastern Europe in the post-war period.
1132
  
The role of intelligence is to guide the policymaking process. Until the release of 
MI5’s own archives, it was extremely difficult for historians to assess how the role of MI5 
was understood and its intelligence was used by policymakers. In this regard, despite certain 
passages being redacted in the declassification process, the Liddell Diaries, which Liddell 
himself would have never imagined would be exposed to public eyes, contain unusually 
detailed frank and often critical views on MI5’s relationship with other departments and its 
intelligence customers. They make clear that there were those within MI5 who remained 
sceptical about the prospect of strengthening the repressive capability of Middle Eastern 
governments (Chapter Six). These sceptical voices were overridden by Britain’s strategic, 
anti-Communist, and oil interests in the region. This thesis thus reinforces the interpretation 
of the authorised history of MI5, The Defence of the Realm, that it was not MI5, but the 
decision/policymakers who were mostly occupied with the spread of ‘the Communist 
menace’ and ignored advice from MI5.1133 
Quid Pro Quo – the Requisite for Intelligence Liaison 
The central theme of this thesis has been the subject of intelligence and security 
liaison. Henry Kissinger once observed that ‘there is no such thing as “friendly intelligence 
agencies”’, and that ‘there are only the intelligence agencies of friendly powers’. 1134 
Kissinger’s observation implies that intelligence services do spy on friendly nations. 
However, spying on a friendly nation is a delicate issue as it can undermine diplomatic 
relations once it is found out. There is certainly a historical precedent, such as the case of 
Jonathan Pollard, a US Navy intelligence employee who spied for the Israeli Intelligence 
Service in the 1980s, when the United States and Israel maintained a close relationship.
1135
 
The issue of spying on a friendly nation is also entailed in the subject of intelligence liaison.  
As noted in the Introduction, the subject of intelligence liaison is a developing area. 
There are a few scholars who have started to engage in the subject in the context of the ‘War 
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on Terror’. Academic discussion is centred on intelligence sharing. According to Stephane 
Lefebvre, for effective intelligence sharing, ‘confidence and trust’ and ‘the perceived benefits 
to both sides in the liaison’ are ‘essential ingredients’. In the context of the ‘War on Terror’, 
he suggests Western intelligence and security services obtain trust from their Middle Eastern 
and Central Asian counterparts for intelligence sharing.
1136
 Derek Reveron similarly argues 
that the United States must obtain ‘high levels of trust on the part of all countries involved’ to 
operate its intelligence services on foreign soil and to obtain intelligence through its liaison 
with local authorities.
1137
 Chris Clough argues further that ‘mutual trust is the most important 
factor’ in driving intelligence liaison.1138 Their points are essentially that trust is a necessary 
condition for intelligence liaison, and that if countries did not trust each other, they would not 
share intelligence. On the contrary, James Walsh argues that it is not trust but a hierarchy that 
dictates intelligence cooperation; countries ‘may share intelligence even when they do not 
have much trust in each other’, and they do so ‘by substituting a hierarchical relationship for 
trust’.1139 According to Walsh, the ‘dominant state’ can force a ‘subordinate partner’ to share 
intelligence, and establish ‘oversight mechanisms’ to determine the security of intelligence, 
and also ‘punish defection without the subordinate state’s having the right to retaliate’.1140  
This thesis has identified that there were at least three essential requirements for 
intelligence liaison in the Middle East during the early Cold War – all three are prerequisite 
for effective intelligence liaison. The first and foremost was common interests between the 
parties, encouraging liaison and the significance of conflicting interests in restricting it. The 
connection between British intelligence liaisons with its Middle Eastern counterparts was 
anti-Communist measures in the region. There was little effective intelligence liaison outside 
anti-Communist measures. Concerning intelligence sharing more specifically, Colonel 
Jenkins, the DSO Cairo, was, for instance, able to obtain intelligence from his Egyptian 
counterparts on ‘Communist, Russian and Jewish matters’, but not topics which might ‘harm 
Egyptian interests’ (Chapter Three). Similarly, conflicting interests also affected the 
application of anti-Communist measures in the region, such as dealing with the Kurdish 
problem (Chapter Four).  
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The second was the security of systems. Even if common interests existed, when there 
was a defect in the security of a liaison partner, there was no effective intelligence liaison. 
This was the case of intelligence sharing in particular. As this thesis has demonstrated, the 
establishment of SAVAK was a good example of this (Chapter Four). Prior to effective 
intelligence sharing, MI5 sought to build up the security of the Iranian intelligence system, 
which included the recommendation for establishing a national security organisation, i.e. 
SAVAK; training of Iranian officers in protective security; and setting up an efficient system 
at its Registry. Until the state of Iranian protective security was improved to a minimal 
standard, Britain sought to avoid sharing intelligence in the form of multilateral intelligence 
liaison, but instead shared intelligence with its counterparts on a bilateral basis. In the latter 
way, a risk of secret intelligence leaking out to unintended recipients could be minimised.  
This thesis thus reinforces the argument of a recent study on Britain’s attitudes 
towards the insecurity of the French system and Britain’s reluctance to share its own 
intelligence with France under NATO in the early Cold War.
1141
 Similarly, this research also 
identified that in 1955, when Sir Charles Duke, the British Ambassador in Jordan (1954-56), 
was approached by his French counterpart to share intelligence on Communist activities in 
the region, the British Embassy in Jordan was ‘not very keen on too close contact with the 
French on this or any other subject’ on the ground of the lack of protective security of France 
at the time. Instead, the British decided to arrange for ‘periodical talks’ with their French 
counterpart ‘of a general character’.1142 Indeed, the security of systems is vital for effective 
intelligence sharing. A retired intelligence officer notes that the security of communications 
is a precondition for intelligence liaison, which is ‘the norms of behaviour’.1143  
Based on her theoretical assumption that the international system is ‘essentially one of 
self-help and anarchy’, Jennifer Sims presupposes that intelligence liaison occurs only on the 
basis of the costs and benefits of its cooperation. She then suggests that an intelligence 
service ‘must penetrate its liaison partner to determine if losses are likely to exceed gains in 
the relationship, to independently vet the partner’s sources, and to ensure that the partner is 
not penetrated by a hostile third party’.1144 Indeed, she also recognises the importance of 
information security for intelligence liaison, but her suggestion is associated with the 
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mentality of an extreme counter-intelligence officer, such as James Angleton, the long-time 
head of counterintelligence at the CIA, whose philosophy of counter-intelligence has been 
seen as most destructive not only within the Agency but also with its allies.
1145
 However, her 
suggestion risks the third essential requirement for intelligence liaison, which is trust in the 
liaison. 
The findings of this thesis therefore reinforce the argument of earlier researchers, such 
as Lefebvre, Clough, and Reveron, concerning the importance of trust in the liaison. This 
thesis has shown that mutual trust was an important element for effective intelligence liaison 
not only at state level but also at the individual level. At the state level, Britain, not the 
Americans nor the French, was seen by Middle Eastern governments as the most reliable ally 
for their fight against Communist movements in their countries. At the individual level, the 
close connections of Colonel Jenkins with his Egyptian counterparts are an example; once his 
liaison partner changed, Jenkins had to ‘win the good will’ of the new partner before any 
secret intelligence was shared (Chapter Three). The ‘Anti-Communist Triangle’ between 
Colonel Coghill, Farid Chehab, and Bahjat Attiyah was also institutionalised on the basis of 
personal relationships (Chapters Two and Four). The relationship between Coghill and 
Chehab, including a sort of intelligence exchange, even continued after Coghill’s dismissal 
from the post in 1956.
1146
 Maurice Oldfield also maintained a personal friendship with Farid 
Chehab.
1147
 William Magan stated in his autobiography that Bahjat Attiyah had remained his 
‘close friend’.1148 In addition, the importance of mutual trust in the liaison can also be seen 
from MI5’s general attitudes towards MI6’s espionage activities and its concern about covert 
action in host countries which would potentially undermine MI5’s good liaison relationships 
with local authorities (Chapters Three and Four). While this thesis has also identified that 
Britain did spy on its host country (Chapter Three), it was not through counter-intelligence 
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operations to determine the security of a liaison partner, as Jennifer Sims presupposes. 
However, espionage activities without the knowledge of local authorities could undermine a 
liaison relationship once exposed.    
James Walsh presupposes a hierarchy of intelligence liaison – the power of a 
dominant state over a subordinate state. There was indeed a senior-and-junior relationship 
which existed in the British-Middle Eastern intelligence liaison, but not a hierarchical 
relationship as Walsh presupposes. Britain was seen as senior and more experienced by its 
liaison partners in the field of anti-Communist measures, protective security, and intelligence 
sharing (Chapters Two and Four). However, this thesis has not found any evidence to suggest 
that Britain forced its junior partner to either provide intelligence to it or ‘punish defection 
without the subordinate state’s having the right to retaliate’.1149 Indeed, Britain provided its 
Middle Eastern counterparts with the system of protective security. However, this was for the 
security of systems for intelligence sharing (Chapter Four). Therefore, effective intelligence 
liaison requires common interests, the security of systems, and mutual trust in the liaison.
1150
   
Besides the prerequisites for effective intelligence liaison, this thesis has also 
identified issues surrounding intelligence liaison. Firstly, intelligence liaison requires a 
sensible balance. Intelligence liaison was cost-effective and above all it yielded intelligence 
that would have been otherwise unobtainable (Chapters Two and Four). However, the limit of 
intelligence liaison in turn was to provide intelligence that is only available from a liaison 
partner. This thesis has shown that British Intelligence, MI5 in particular, was tasked with 
liaising closely with local authorities (Chapter One). Its close liaison with local authorities 
meant that Britain would be more dependent on official channels for collecting intelligence. 
The irony was that there was no advance warning about the Egyptian coup in 1952 and the 
Iraqi Revolution in 1958. As mutual trust in the liaison was an essential requirement for 
effective intelligence liaison, there was tacit understanding between liaison partners that they 
would not spy on each other (Chapter Six). Thus, there is a necessity to maintain a delicate 
balance between spying and liaison.  
Secondly, and finally, there remains further scope for academic discussion of 
intelligence liaison. This thesis has identified that the British Government used intelligence 
liaison as a means to influence the anti-Communist policies of Middle Eastern government 
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(Chapters Two and Six). A retired senior intelligence officer notes the role of intelligence 
liaison is ‘maintaining influence’ over a liaison partner.1151 It is interesting to note that the 
role of intelligence in this regard is identified in the academic literature as a part of special 
political action (better known as ‘covert action’ in the academic literature), more specifically 
being referred to as so-called ‘agents of influence’, whose task is to ‘influence directly 
government policy rather than to collect information’.1152 As this thesis has shown, while the 
presence of a liaison officer was declared to the host government as the means of 
communication, it was used by the British Government to gain political leverage or political 
influence through the liaison channel. The reason for maintaining such a secret connection 
between Britain and Middle Eastern governments was mainly the concealment from the 
population or opposition parties, who were hostile to the British, as was common in the post-
war Middle East (Chapter Two). Thus, intelligence liaison as a means of secret diplomacy 
was indeed useful in such a hostile environment. Indeed, British Intelligence already had 
plenty of experience of intelligence liaison as a form of secret diplomacy.
1153
 Therefore, in 
this context, the subjects of intelligence liaison and special political action certainly 
overlap.
1154
  
In addition to intelligence liaison which fulfils the functions both of intelligence 
collection and influence, a highly-placed agent in a foreign government could also function 
similarly to intelligence liaison, such as Sir Shapoor Reporter in Iran (Chapter Six), in terms 
of functions of both intelligence collection and influence. Looking at intelligence liaison or a 
highly-placed agent in a foreign government as the means of exercising influence on the 
policy of a foreign government also raises the question of the distinction between diplomacy 
(conducted by a diplomatic service, the Foreign Office, for instance) and secret diplomacy 
(by an intelligence service, MI6 as an example). These aspects are significantly understudied 
in the literature, and need to be explored further.  
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Len Scott and Peter Jackson remarked nearly a decade ago that the subject of 
intelligence liaison was ‘a final ‘missing dimension” in the field.1155 It is still a developing 
subject.
1156
 This thesis has shown that a historical study of the subject can certainly contribute 
to fill the gap in our knowledge. Historians tend to jump on to the declassified records at the 
TNA. However, Richard Aldrich once reminded us of a consequence of an indiscriminate 
scrutiny of an intelligence history, noting that ‘historians who feast only on the processed 
food available in the PRO’s efficient history supermarket may begin to display a flabby 
posture’.1157 This thesis has also demonstrated that a historical enquiry into state secrets needs 
to be conducted diligently and that such multi-archival research can yield fruitful results to 
fill the gap.  
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APPENDIX I 
SECURITY INTELLIGENCE MIDDLE EAST CHATER
1158
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1. Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME) is an inter-service organisation and a part of 
the Security Service (MI5) 
2. Head/SIME is responsible to the Director-General of the Security Service, and for 
local policy and executive action to the Middle East Defence Committee jointly and 
individually. 
3. SIME is responsible for the collection, collation and dissemination to the interested 
and appropriate Service and Civil Authorities of Security Intelligence affecting British 
interests in the Middle East. It is also responsible for such executive action as may be 
approved by the Service and/or Civil Authority concerned. 
4. SIME will, with the approval of the relevant authorities, maintain representatives 
under appropriate Service or other suitable cover wherever they are considered to be 
necessary throughout the Middle East area. Such representatives and responsible to 
Head/SIME from whom they receive directions and funds, and locally to their 
respective Service Commanders and/or Civil Authorities. 
5. SIME will maintain close relations with MI6 in the Middle East to ensure thorough 
integration of all security information affecting the area. It will also maintain liaison 
as required with the Police and/or Security Authorities of the countries within the 
area, and with all representatives and links of the Security Service. 
6. SIME cannot be called upon to reveal its sources of information to any other 
organisation or outside authority. It is, however, within the discretion of Head/SIME 
to do so in a case where he considers it desirable or expedient and subject to obtaining 
the consent of any other organisation which may control or have an interest in the 
source. In important cases the matter should be referred to the Director-General of the 
Security Service. 
7. Head/SIME will be a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Middle East. 
8. SIME has an establishment sponsored by the Army which allows for any appointment 
to be held by a member of any of the three Services or of the Security Service. 
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9. The Army will continue to furnish Field Intelligence funds upon estimates submitted 
by Head/SIME. It will also provide accommodation and other services. 
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APPENDIX II 
List of Key Personnel (Selective) 
Cabinet Committees 
Official Committee on Communism (Overseas) (1949-56), Chairman 
Sir Gladwyn Jebb (1949-50) 
Sir Pierson Dixon (1950-53) 
Sir John Ward (1954-55) 
Sir Patrick Dean (1955-56) 
Foreign Office 
Overseas Planning Committee (1956-57), Chairman 
Douglas Dodds-Parker (1956-57) 
British Ambassador to Egypt 
Sir Edwin Arthur Chapman-Andrews (1947-51) 
Sir Ralph Stevenson (1951-55) 
Sir Humphrey Trevelyan (1955-56) 
British Ambassador to Iraq 
Sir Henry Mack (1948-51) 
Sir John Troutbeck (1951-54) 
Sir Michael Wright (1954-58) 
Sir Humphrey Trevelyan (1958-61) 
British Ambassador to Iran 
Sir John Le Rougetel (1946-50) 
Sir Francis Shepherd (1950-52) 
Sir Roger Stevens (1954-58) 
British Ambassador to Jordan 
Sir Roderick Parkes (1962-66) 
British Ambassador to Lebanon 
Sir William Houstoun-Boswall (1947-51) 
Sir Edwin Arthur Chapman-Andrews (1951-52) 
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MI5 
Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME)
1159
 
Colonel Raymond Maunsell (1939-44)  
Brigadier Douglas Roberts (1944-46) 
Alex Kellar (1947) 
Brigadier William Magan (1947-51) 
Colonel (later Brigadier) Robin ‘Tin-eye’ Stephens (1951-53) 
William Oughton (1953-55) 
Philip Kirby-Green (1955-58) 
Defence Security Officer (DSO), Cairo 
Colonel Geoffrey Jenkins, the DSO Cairo (1943-50) 
Walter Bryan Emery (1950-51) 
DSO, Baghdad 
John Percival Morton (1947-48) 
Philip Bicknell Ray (1949-51) 
Roger Edward Rowley Lees (1951-53) 
Norman Himsworth (1953-) – serving as Security Liaison Officer (SLO)  
DSO, Beirut 
Major David Beaumont-Nesbitt (1949) 
Police/Security Advisers 
J.M. Kyles, Security Adviser to Lebanon (1950-51) 
John Albert Briance, Security Adviser to Iran (circa 1950-52) 
Roger Edward Rowley Lees, Security Adviser to Iran (1956-57) 
Duncan MacIntosh, Police Adviser to Iraq (1955-58); Police Adviser to Jordan (1958-
62) 
Colonel Sir Patrick Coghill, the Director-General of Intelligence of the Arab Legion 
(1952-56) 
Michael Clayton, Deputy Security Officer of the Security Committee, the Baghdad 
Pact (1956-58) 
Middle Eastern Counterparts 
Iraq 
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Said Qazzaz, the Iraqi Minister of the Interior (1953-58) 
Bahjat Beg Attiyah, Director of the Iraqi CID (1947-58) 
General Ghazi Daghistani, Deputy Chief of Staff (1954-58) 
Iran 
General Haj-Ali Kia, the Chief of the Military Intelligence (circa, the mid-1950s-early 
60s). 
General Teymour Bakhtiar, Head of SAVAK (1957-61) 
General Hassan Pakravan, Deputy Head of SAVAK – external affairs (1957-1961), 
later Head of SAVAK (1961-65) 
Hassan Alavi-Kia, Deputy Head of SAVAK – internal affairs (1957-62) 
General Hussein Fardust, Chief of the SIB (1959-) 
Lebanon 
Emir Farid Chehab, the Head of the Lebanese Sûreté Générale, (1948-1958). 
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